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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 



A Text-Booh for High Schools 
and Academies. 



i^ 




GEO. M. STEELE, D.D., LL.D., 

PRINCIPAL OF WESLEYAN ACADEMY, 

AND AUTHOR OF " RUDIMENTARY PSYCHOLOGY," " RUDIMENTARY ECONOMICS, 

AND "OUTLINES OF BIBLE STUDY." 




LEACH, SHEWELL, .& SANBORN, 

BOSTON AND NEW YORK. 



Vv *$\ 






Copyright, 1891, 
By Leach, Shewell, & Sanborn. 



C. J. Peters & Son, 
Typographers and Electrotypers, Boston. 

Press of Berwick & Smith. 






PEEFACE. 



This volume, like a similar previous one on Psychology, 
is intended to meet a want in our academies and high 
schools. It professes no new discoveries in the ethical 
field, and no especially novel method of instruction. The 
design is to set forth the more essential principles of 
ethics in clear, simple, and familiar language, in their 
logical connections and with adherence to scientific forms. 

The book is not a compilation ; though doubtless very 
many of the thoughts presented may have been given by 
other writers, and have been absorbed by the author 
during years of reading in connection with instruction to 
successive classes of pupils. 

On a few topics the writer has ventured to present views 
differing from those taught by the great majority of ethi- 
cal philosophers. This is particularly true in respect to 
the doctrine of Conscience. It has seemed to him that the 
theories on this subject held by many of even our ablest 
writers have been confused and indefinite. Still, the fault, 
if fault there be, is doubtless one of phraseology rather than 
of essential principle. It is evidently better and simpler 
where we have several faculties, each with its separate 



IV PREFACE. 

function, to keep these separate under separate names, 
than to group them all together under a single name, 
which after all indicates no special function. Conscience 
and Judgment have been confused ; and " moral faculty," 
and " moral sense," and " moral impulse," are much used, 
but not accurately defined. If Judgment is precisely 
the same faculty when exercised upon moral subjects that 
it is when exercised upon any other subject, and if Con- 
science, as is universally admitted, whatever else it does, 
always impels us to do what we judge to be right, why 
extend it to another function which already has a name of 
its own? 

Similar but less pronounced variations from general 
standards will be found in respect to a few other topics. 

Theoretical ethics has been treated with much brevity, 
as it was the intention to devote the work almost exclu- 
sively to practical morals. 

G. M. S. 

WlLBRAHAM, MASS. 



CONTENTS. 



BOOK I. — TIIEORETICAL ETHICS. 

CHAPTER I.— FREEDOM OF HUMAN ACTION. 

Definition and general statement. — Terms implying free- 
dom of action. —What is an act? 



Section 1. The Will. 
Threefold character of the soul. — Relation of Conditioning 
and conditioned. — Two functions of the will. — Volition 
not always immediate upon the action of choice. — Voli- 
tion an effort of the mind, not of the body .... 2 

Section 2. Arguments in Favor of Freedom. 
1. Testimony of Consciousness. — 2. Universal conviction. — 
3. Testimony of language. — 4. Implied in Law.— 5. Im- 
plied in Promises and Contracts 4 

Section 3. Arguments against Freedom. 
1. The power of motives. — 2. Human prescience of human 
conduct. — 3. The Law of Habit. — 4. Divine foreknowledge 6 

Section 4. Habit in Relation to the Will. 
Habit defined. — The Will affected by Habit. — Effect on 
both Virtues and Vices. — One may lose Desire without 
losing Ability. — Responsible for evil choices and therefore 
for effects. — Habit as related to Virtue. — As related to 
Vice 10 

CHAPTER II. — THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 

Section 1. Origin of the Moral Conception. 
All sciences begin with the observation of phenomena. — Uni- 
versality of the moral conception. — What is an act ? — The 
moral quality in the intention. — Do all actions have a 

moral quality ? 16 

v 



VI CONTENTS. 

Section 2. Theories of the Basis of Obligation. page 

1. Utilitarianism. — 2. Reason for the rejection.— 3. Authority. 

— 4. Intuitionalism. — 5. The first two theories not without 
value 18 

CHAPTER III. — SPRINGS OF ACTION. 

Section 1. The Appetites. 
Definition. — Artificial appetites. — Moral uses of the appetites 2-1 

Section 2. The Desires. 
Definition. — Desire for Continued Existence. — For Wealth . 

— For Knowledge. — For Power. — For Approbation. — For 
Liberty. — For Society. — Association and Individuality . 26 

Section 3. The Affections. 
Differ from Desires. — Natural and Moral. — Benevolent and 
Malevolent. — Divisions of Benevolent Affections. — Of the 
Malevolent 30 

Section 1. Self-Interest. 
Dependent on other desires. — Has reference to the future. — 
Difference between self-love and selfishness .... 33 

Section 5. Conscience. 
Diverse views on its function. — A separate and peculiar 
power. — Definition. — Tbree cases. — Conditions for the 
exercise of Conscience. — How far infallible .... 36 

Section 6. Conflicting Impulses. 
An order of worthiness. — Appetites and Desires. — Desires 
and Affections. — All these in conflict with self-love. — Self- 
love with Conscience. — The supreme arbiter. — This su- 
premacy evident from several considerations. — Compre- 
hensive self-love possibly coincident in its demands with 
conscience. — Difference between self-love as a motive, and 
conscience as a motive 39 

CHAPTER IV. — VIRTUE. 

Section 1. Nature of Virtue. 
Original meaning, Courage and Manliness. — Derived mean- 
ing. — Can there be Virtue where there is no temptation ? 

— Not all moral excellence Virtue. — Virtue defined . . 44 



CONTENTS. vii 

Section 2. Relation of Virtue to Piety. page 

An Atheist may possibly bo virtuous. — Yet a sense in which / 

Virtue implies Piety. — Piety always implies Virtue . . 47 (s 
Section 3. The Virtues. 
Virtue as a quality of the soul. — Groups of Virtues. — Is 
Prudence a Virtue ? — Fortitude ? 48 

BOOK II.— PRACTICAL ETHICS. — DUTIES CLASSI- 
FIED. —DOUBLE OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS OUR 
FELLOW-MEN. 

PART I. — DUTIES TO SELF. — THE GREAT END 
OF THESE DUTIES. 

CHAPTER I. — DUTIES TO THE BODY,— THEIR IM- 
PORTANCE. 

Section 1. Subsistence. 
Industry. — Wealth, and duties involved in its possession. — 
Labor a blessing. — Provision for the future. — Diligence, 
Frugality, Economy. — Limits of Frugality. — Wealth not 
a necessary evil 58 

Section 2. Health. 
Moral importance of Physical vigor. — Duty of Health.— 
Temperance. — Control of the appetites. — Consequences of 
intemperance. — Moral relations of Dress. — Generous use 
of water. — Sleep, Rest, Recreation. — Regular Habits.— 
Freedom and limitations of Impulses ... .62 

Section 3. Personal Appearance. 

Cultivation of this characteristic 66 

Section 4. Chastity. 
Incontinence in relation to the individual. — To the body. — 
To the mind. — Evil to the Community. — A vast moral 
evil 67 

CHAPTER II. — DUTIES TO THE MIND. 

General Duty. — Development of the several Faculties . . 69 
Section 1. Duties to the Intellect. 
Relation to Sensibilities and Will. — Mental training and dis- 
cipline. — Wisdom more needful than knowledge. — Good 
Sense. — The highest power to be sought. — Utility of the 
Imagination. — Its moral value. — Moral uses. — Ideals . 69 



viii CONTENTS. 

Section 2. Duties to the Sensibilities. page 

Important duties here. — Difficulty of controlling the Sensi- 
bilities. — Control of environment. — Conflicting desires. — 
Attainment of complete freedom. — Diagram. — Esthetic 
Culture. — Cheerfulness. — A Sensitive Conscience. — Its 
supreme authority. — Evil of a deadened Conscience . . 73 

Section 3. Duties to the Will. 
The Character-creating force of the soul. — Strength of 
"Will to be cultivated. — A paramount purpose. — Decision. 

— Opposed to inaction and vacillation. — Rashness. — Fixed- 
ness of purpose. — Fickleness and instability. — Formation 
of a life-purpose. — Obstinacy. — Independence. — Must be 
genuine, not spurious. — Courage, Fortitude, Patience. — 
Difference between Courage and Fortitude. — Fortitude 
and Patience. — Manliness. — Certain Vices: Pride, Van- 
ity, Self-conceit, Selfishness 79 

PART II. — DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW-MEN. 

DIVISION I. — JUSTICE. 

Difference between Civil and Ethical Justice. — Difference 
between Justice and Beneficence. — Classification . . 91 

CLASS I. — DOMESTIC DUTIES. 

CHAPTER I. — MARRIAGE. — MARRIAGE DEFINED. 
Section 1. Ethical Conditions of Marriage. 
Who may not marry. — Essential conditions. — Alien station 
in life. — " Marriages of convenience " 93 

Section 2. Permanence of Marriage. 
Bad consequences of Easy Divorce. —Unfortunate marriages. 

— Mitigation of the evils. — Extreme cases. — Separation 
without legal divorce • 96 

Section 3. Polygamy. 

Monogamous marriage the original institution. — Reasons 
against Polygamy 98 

Section 4. Marriage and the Civil Law. 
Marriage prior to society. — Still, civil sanction necessary. — 
Moral sanctions 99 






CONTENTS. ix 

CHAPTER II. — THE FAMILY. 

Section 1. Husband and Wife. page 

Duties binding. — Fidelity. —Mutual kindness and Forbear- 
ance . — Co-operation. — Equality. — Woman not a mere 
ornament. —A Helpmeet for Man 101 

Section 2. Rights and Obligations of Parents. 
Ordering of the Child's early life. — Not a permanent right. 
— 'No right of maltreatment 104 

Section 3. Rights and Obligations of Children. 
Right to support. — Right to demand that existence shall not 
be worse than non-existence. — To a certain Education and 
Industrial training. — Duties. — Obedience, Respect, and 

Kindness 105 

Section 4. Duties of Brothers and Sisters. 
The family a community. — Kindness and Affection. — 
Mutual forbearance. — Helpfulness. — Equality ... 107 

Section 5. Masters and Servants. 
Servants as members of the Family. — Not a Slave. — Under 
free contract. — Not to be treated as an inferior. — Duty of 
employer to make them happy as circumstances admit . 108 

CLASS II. — DUTIES TO INDIVIDUALS IN SOCIETY. 

CHAPTER I. — LIFE. 

Section 1. The Sacredness of Life. 
Murder. — The greatest possible wrong. — Voluntary Surren- 
der of Life. — Forfeiture of the right to Life by crime. — 
The Death-penalty 110 

Section 2. War. 
Is War justifiable? — The right of Self-defence. — Implied in 
the Police system. — Most wars might be prevented. — In- 
ternational Arbitration 112 

Section 3. Trades which tend to Destroy Life. 
General principle laid down. — Liquor-traffic. — Its murder- 
ous character. — Other kinds of business the effect of which 
is to diminish Life 114 

Section 4. Hatred and Unkindness. 
Tendency to violate the right to life. — Nature of Hatred. — 
Maltreatment 115 



CONTENTS. 

Section 5. Duelling. page 

Nearly obsolete. — Absurdity and "Wickedness of it . . 116 

Section 6. Self-defence. 
Not a violation of any rigbt of Life. — Instinctive and Spon- 
taneous. — Limitations. — Defence of one's Family . . 117 

CHAPTER II. — LIBERTY. 
Definition and Illustration 119 

Section 1. Liberty under Law. 

Reference to conflicting impulses. — Liberty not antagonistic 

to Law. — The largest Liberty where the laws are many 

and thoroughly executed. — So in morals. — The largest 

Liberty in the subjection of all desires to the supreme Law. 

— Illustration and analogies. — When men are adjusted to 
universal law there will be universal and perfect liberty . 120 

Section 2. Liberty in our Social Relations. 
Our liberty limited by the liberty of our fellow-men. — Viola- 
tions of the right of liberty. — Physical Liberty. — Excep- 
tions 122 

Section 3. Slavery. 
No large need for elaborate argument. — The question set- 
tled. — Still, instances in which the spirit of slavery is 
active 125 

Section 4. Mental Liberty. 
"What is implied ?— Answer to objection that by use of such 
liberty a man might harm himself. — Right of publication. 

— But not to the interference with another's rights. — Nor 

to stir up disorder and mischief 127 

Section 5. Religious Liberty. 
In what it consists. — How violated. — Its abuse . . . 130 

CHAPTER III. — PROPERTY. 
Section 1. The Right of Property. 
How this right originates. — Partial and limited ownership. 

— Sharer in joint product. — Why some have larger shares 

than others. — How this principle is abused .... 133 
Section 2. Property acquired otherwise than by Labor. 
By Exchange. — Philosophy of exchange. — By Gift. — By 
Will. — By Inheritance. — By Possession .... 135 



CONTENTS. 



XI 



Section 3. Violations of the Right of Property. — Theft 

and Robbery. page 

Definition. — Different kinds of Theft. — Purloining from the 
Government. — Embezzlement. — Peculation. — Forgery. — 
Robbery. — Property wrested by force. — Less of open Rob- 
bery than formerly. — But still carried on in subtler ways. — 
National Robbery 137 

Section 4. Violations of the Right of Property. —Fraud 
in Exchange. 
Dishonest Commerce. — Law governing exchange. — Methods 
of Violation. — Duty of the Trader. — Obligations of the 
Buyer as well as the Seller. — Taking advantage. — Prices 
influenced by false means. — Combinations to control 
prices. — Moral character of certain speculations . . . 141 

Section 5. Violations of the Right of Property. — Where 
the Equivalent is immaterial. 
Labor as a commodity in exchange. — "Wages. — Duties of 
the Employer. — Difficulties of just distribution. — Wages 
and Profits. — Several violations of Laborer's rights. — Ad- 
vantages taken. — Obligations of the laborer .... 146 

Section 6. Strikes and other Combinations. 
Ethical principle involved. — Right of combination. — Things 
to be considered. — Must be no violation of the rights of 
others in attempting to maintain their own. — Combination 
of employers 150 

Section 7. Borrowing and Lending. 
Divisions of the subject. — Risk and Use. — Duties of the 
borrower. — When security is given. — A bankrupt morally 
bound to pay his creditors if he becomes able. — The ethics 
of Interest on money loaned. — The Hebrew law, and why 
not now applicable. — Obligation of the lender. — Of the 
borrower. — Buying on credit. — Mutual obligations. — Ad- 
vantage taken by the creditor. — Rental of property. — 
Duties of the borrower. — Of the lender. — Unanticipated 
advantages of rented property 152 

CHAPTER IV. — CHARACTER AND REPUTATION.— 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM. 
Section 1. Character. 
To a certain extent responsible for the character of others. — 
General rule of conduct. — Influence for evil. — Placing 
temptations in the way. — Corrupting influences . . . 160 



xn CONTENTS. 

Section 2. Reputation. page 
Value of a good Reputation. — Three forms of injuring one's 
reputation: 1. Slander. — Definition. — Its execrable char- 
acter. — 2. Backbiting. — Described. — Hypocritical pre- 
tence. — 3. Rash Judgments. — .Malicious generalizations. 
— Flagrant injustice. — Malice and envy. — Indirect meth- 
ods and false suggestions 1G2 

Section 3. Cases in which Faults may be justly exposed. 
"When men are likely to be deceived by pretence of good 
character. — To what extent the character of others may be 
canvassed. — General disposition to license in this respect . 105 

CHAPTER V.- VERACITY. — HOW VERACITY DIF- 
FERS FROM TRUTH. 
Section 1. What is a lie ? 

Definition. — Illustration. — Fiction not always falsehood . 167 
Section 2. Violation of the Law of Veracity. 
Lies usually subsidiary vices. — But very mean ones. — Utter- 
ance of what is known to be false. — Of what one does not 
know to be true. — Exaggeration and extenuation. — Any 

method of false impression 168 

Section 3. Limitations. 
Some facts that an inquirer has a right to know. — Affecta- 
tions and false pretences. —Essential falsehood never jus- 
tifiable. — Concession dangerous 170 

Section 4. Promises and Contracts. 
A Promise defined. — How far binding. — Duty of perform- 
ance. — Exceptions. — Contracts defined. — Rules concern- 
ing 172 

CLASS III. — DUTIES GROWING OUT OF OUR RELA- 
TIONS TO THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 

CHAPTER I. — SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT. 

Society essential to human well-being. — Individuality and 
Association. — Fundamental Conditions. — Government 
defined. — Its functions. — Legislative. — Judicial. — Ex- 
ecutive 175 

CHAPTER II. — THE RIGHTS OF SOCIETY. 

Society has a right to its own preservation. — A right to levy 
taxes. — General education. — May demand the education 
of children. — May protect laborers from too great exac- 
tions. — Progress in this respect. — Whether society may 



CONTENTS. xiii 



assume direction of industrial enterprises. — Not yet ready 
for Socialism. — Gambling. — Speculative Combinations. — 
"Trusts." — Liquor Traffic 179 

CHAPTER III. — DUTIES OF CITIZENS. 

Obedience to the laws. — Injustice of the law not a sufficient 
excuse for disobedience. — Possible conflict of civil with 
moral law. — Disobey the civil law, but accept tbe penalty 
without resistance. — Duty of Citizens to see that good 
laws are enacted. — Evil of indifference. — Partisanship and 
local selfishness. — Duty to vote. — Also to aid in tbe execu- 
tion of the laws. — To honestly pay the taxes. — Duty to 
promote peace and moral order 187 

DIVISION II. -THE DUTIES OF BENEFICENCE. 

CHAPTER I. — GENERAL NATURE OF THESE DUTIES. 

The obligation implied. — Generous impulses, and what they 
imply. — Opportunities. — No subtraction from one's hap- 
piness 193 

CHAPTER II. — GOOD MANNERS. 

Included in good morals. — Politeness not necessarily ele- 
gance, nor vice versa 196 

CHAPTER III. — DUTIES TO THE UNFORTUNATE. 
Many everywhere needing sympathy. — "Wretchedness in the 
great cities. — Difficulty of comprehending the greatness 
of this misery. — Systematic and organized beneficence. — 
Increasing instead of diminishing tendency. — Plans sug- 
gested. — Necessary to understand the causes of the evil. — 
Four principal causes. — Remedies to be applied accord- 
ingly. — Two conditions to be recognized. — (1) Not so much 
subsistence needed as the means of earning it. — (2) The 
moral element essential. — The personal element needed . 198 

CHAPTER IY. — BENEFICENCE TO THE CRIMINAL 

CLASSES. 
Punishment not sufficient for reformation. — Obstacles in the 
way of individual restoration. — Remedies suggested . . 207 

CHAPTER V. — BENEFICENCE TO OUR ENEMIES. 

Spirit of retaliation. — Moral effect of generous kindness. — 
Compatible with justice 209 



xiv CONTENTS. 



PART III. — DUTIES TO GOD. 

CHAPTER I. -LOVE IN ITS RELATION TO THE 
MORAL LAW. 

How Love fulfils the Law. — Effect on the subject. — Love 
and sacrifice 213 

CHAPTER II. — DUTIES GROWING OUT OF OUR IM- 
MEDIATE RELATION TO GOD. 

Three kinds of relation. — Three classes of duties . . . 215 
Section 1. Worship. 
Character and effect of Worship. — Prayer. — Its reasonable- 
ness and efficacy 216 

Section 2. A Special Day for Religious Observance. 
Antiquity and universality of Religious Days. — Physical and 
Moral advantages. — How the day should be observed. — 
Rest, not idleness. — Contemplation, reflection, and instruc- 
tion. — Not to be made disagreeable to the young . . . 217 

Section 3. Study of the Scriptures. 
Design and contents of the Scriptures. — Obligation to regard 
and reverence such a revelation 219 

CHAPTER III. — THE RELIGIOUS USE OF ALL OUR 
POWERS. 

Performance of special duties not sufficient. — The performance 

of Religious service not incompatible with happiness . . 221 

Section 1. The Service of our Bodies. 

To make our Physical Powers of the highest efficiency for the 
Divine service. — This service not abstract from common 
human interests 222 

Section 2. Service of the Intellect. 
The whole process of training the Intellect, a religious ser- 
vice. — What is implied in this service. — All Scientific 
truths, truths of God. — Immaterial and Spiritual truth . 223 

Section 3. Service of the Sensibilities. 
Here the springs of action. — Love as Duty and Service. — 
Harmony of Desires object to be aimed at ... 224 

Section 4. Service of the Will. 
Executive power of the Soul. — Supreme question. — Strength 
of Will. — Cultivation of the Will 226 



BOOK I 



THEORETICAL OUTLINE. 



RUDIMENTARY ETHICS 



CHAPTER I. 
FREEDOM OF HUMAN ACTION. 

Ethics is the science of moral conduct. It is usually divided 
into Theoretical and Practical Ethics. Strictly speaking, the 
former is the science as presenting in systematic form the 
principles on which right moral action rests. The latter 
is the application of these principles to human conduct, 
and consists mainly of rules for the regulation of this con- 
duct. Though a brief survey of the underlying principles 
seems essential to a clear understanding of the subject, 
this volume will be devoted chiefly to Practical Ethics. 

There are certain terms in constant use in our language, 
and corresponding terms in other languages, to which one 
attaches definite meanings ; such as innocence m . , 

, ', Terms lmply- 

and guilt, condemnation, approval and disap- ingfree 
proval, responsibility, good and evil conduct. But a £ enc y* 
these terms really mean nothing unless our actions are 
free; that is, determined by ourselves and uncaused by 
any extraneous power. The very definition of an action 
would imply this. This definition is as follows : — 

An act or action in the strict sense of the words, is the 
intentional putting forth of an effort by an intelligent being , 

1 



2 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

or one capable of setting before him an object or end, and the 
means of achieving it. This implies a personality, that is, a 
What is an Will, and freedom in its exercise. This putting 
act? forth is by the power of the Will, and is known 

as Volition. But it involves more than this ; namely, the 
selection of the object to be accomplished in preference to 
any other. This is the power of Choice, and implies a pur- 
pose or intention. 

The fact that there are certain philosophers now, as there 
have been in the past, who insist upon the theory that man 
is not free, that all his actions are controlled by forces that 
he cannot resist, and that his character is thus determined, 
not by influences to which he exposes himself, but by influ- 
ences to which without any choice of his own he is exposed, 
render it necessary that we should discuss to some extent 
that constituent of man's nature denominated the Will. 

SECTION 1. — THE WILL. 

The phenomena of the soul are of three kinds, and are 
usually set forth under a threefold division, as the Intellect, 
Threefold tne Sensibilities, and the Will. This is not a 
character of separation of the soul into parts, since it is one 
and indivisible ; but a classification of its ener- 
gies and susceptibilities. The Intellect is the mind per- 
ceiving, judging, reasoning, knowing, etc. The Sensibili- 
ties are the mind feeling, that is, enjoying, suffering, crav- 
ing, and impelling. The Will is the mind choosing, 
determining, putting forth effort. It is the executive 
power of the soul. 

The relation of these faculties to one another is that of 
the conditioning and the conditioned. The Intellect is the first 
and lowest, as being a condition for the others. There can 



FREEDOM OF HUMAN ACTION. 3 

be no feeling except in view of some revealed fact, that is, 
of something known. I am glad or sorry, if at all, because 
of something which is made known to me ; and Relation of 
it is impossible to conceive of an emotion which conditioning 

1 t and con- 

is not occasioned by some knowledge or belief, ditioned. 

So, too, the Will acts only when some desire or emotion 

is present in the soul. There must be some impulse, or 

motive, some reason for its acting. 

There are two functions of the Will; namely, Choice 

and Volition. There are always two or more acts or 

courses of action before the mind when the Will Two functions 

is called into exercise, and it must determine of the will. 

between them. In other words, there must be Choice. It 

is to be noted that the mind must choose. Whatever we 

may conclude concerning the question of freedom as the 

result of this discussion, it is not free to decline to choose. 

There is a necessity in this case. Having chosen which 

of several acts it will perform, Volition naturally follows. 

This is the effort of the will to carry its choice into effect. 

In many cases, perhaps in most, it follows instantly on the 

choice, but not always. I may make a choice to 

' , . \ , J , , ,, ,. The Volition 

perform a certain act to-morrow ; but the voli- not always 

tion will not ensue until that time comes. It is imme( * iate 

upon the 
even possible that in the interim something may action of 

occur to change my purpose, and so the voli- 
tion may never follow. But when I determine to perform 
an act at once, the volition necessarily follows. Dr. 
Hopkins teaches that the freedom of the Will belongs to 
the power of Choice and not to that of Volition. This 
seems to me somewhat doubtful, though the fact that the 
Volition in certain cases necessarily follows the act of 
Choice is perhaps in favor of this view. 



4 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

Volition is not the physical effort, but an effort of the 

mind to perform an act. I may decide to leave the room, 

and forthwith proceed to put my purpose into 

Volition an . r f -,.-,-,-, 

effort of the execution; but! rind that the door is locked, 
mind. Nevertheless, there has been a complete act of 

the Will, a Choice, and a Volition. In this case there has 
been also a physical effort. But I may stop short of that. 
Before I get to the door I may find that it is locked. So 
I put forth no further physical effort. It is even possible 
that before I put forth the physical effort, I may find that 
I am paralyzed, and though I essay to move, I cannot 
make the physical effort. The action of the Will is, how- 
ever, still complete, the Choice and the Volition have both 
been made. 

SECTION 2. — ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF FREEDOM. 

The following are the chief reasons for believing in 
human freedom. 

1. Our Consciousness testifies to it. Every man is con- 
scious, when two objects or acts are presented to him, that 
„ he may choose either. When there must be a 

Testimony of . J . 

Conscious- choice between them, or when there is such an 
ness * alternative that one must be taken and the 

other refused, he always recognizes it as a fact that he is 
not compelled to take either, though he must take one. 

Nor can it be avoided by saying he may choose neither, 
for this is a case when to refuse one is virtually to choose 
the other ; and if there be a case where both may be re- 
fused, still there is a choice. For instance, he may change 
his position or retain it. He may prefer to choose neither, 
but that is to choose to remain as he is. In any case be is 
certain that whichever he decides to do, he might have 



FREEDOM OF HUMAN ACTION. 5 

decided to do the other. It is true that a man is some- 
times deceived, and that of what he believes himself to be 
conscious he is not conscious ; yet these instances are so 
manifestly infrequent and exceptional that they do not 
materially affect the question. 

The simple fact is, that if we cannot trust our conscious- 
ness we cannot trust anything, and thus nothing will be 
certain to us. This should settle the matter. Further- 
more, if there were any force in the argument that men 
are in exceptional instances deceived as to the testimony 
of their consciousness, it still ought not to shake convic- 
tion concerning a matter in which nearly the whole race 
in all ages and under the widest possible diversity of 
conditions agree. 

2. The way human conduct is universally regarded confirms 
the conviction just spoken of. Men regard themselves as 
having done what they were under no necessity universal 
of doing, and reproach themselves for their Conviction, 
folly or their wickedness. Even men who deny this free- 
dom talk and act as though they regarded it as a fact. 
They reproach their fellows for actions as being base and 
unworthy and vicious, and approve and praise what is 
noble and heroic or virtuous. 

3. The Language of all nations, ancient and modern, 
civilized and barbarous, and even savage, unmistakably 
indicates this. The remarkably significant word Testimony of 
ought, which has its equivalent in so many Ian- Language, 
guages, is a simple instance of this kind. Obviously 
what ought to be done can be done, and we have no right 
to say that a man ought to do what some extraneous 
power prevents him from doing. The terms guilt, respon- 
sibility, punishment, repentance, remorse, condemnation, 



6 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

and so many others in all tongues, that if obliterated from 
the vocabulary of any nation would seriously demoralize 
the language, show this. Men are not responsible for 
doing what they are compelled to do, nor for failing to do 
what is impossible. 

4. It is further implied in the existence of laws and rules 
of action. The moral law, as believed to be imposed by 
Law assumes the Ruler of the universe, would be, were there 
of^ndfvidud no free a g enc y of tne individual, not only like 
Action. the natural law in the absolute certainty of its 
execution, but at the same time misleading and preposter- 
ous in that, unlike it, it is accompanied by penalties for its 
violation and assumes the possibility of disobedience to 
its mandates. The laws of nations and of families go on 
the same supposition. It would be senseless for a legisla- 
ture to enact laws, or for a monarch to issue edicts, if it 
were the fact that some extraneous force determines obe- 
dience and disobedience to them. So of the government of 
families and other cognate societies, in which, if the mem- 
bers have no power of choice, the authority of those who 
govern can have no effect on conduct. 

5. Promises and Contracts imply a belief in freedom of 
action. The promiser has not the slightest doubt that he 
will be free to attempt what he promises, and the promisee 
accepts and relies upon such promise in the same natural 
conviction. It is considered a valid reason for the non- 
performance of a contract if there are unforeseen obstacles 
which render the performance impossible. 

SECTION 3. — ARGUMENTS AGAINST FREEDOM. 

The arguments against human freedom are curious and 
interesting, and might be convincing to many but for the 
overwhelming force of those for the affirmative. 



FREEDOM OF HUMAN ACTION. 7 

1. There is the supposed power of the strongest motive. 
It is admitted that the mind acts in view of motives, and 
that it frequently yields to that which it re- The Power of 
gards as the most desirable on the whole. Is it Motives. 
not natural to believe that it is the strongest in such cases 
that prevails? But what is meant by the "strongest" 
motive ? To this question there is no satisfactory reply. 
The only definite answer that can be made, as it would seem, 
is that it is the motive which prevails, and so we get an 
argument in a circle. 

The doctrine of the power of motives is altogether 
mechanical, and inapplicable to spiritual action. If we are 
to regard the motives as forces compelling the action of 
the mind, it is pretty likely to be the case that in the con- 
flict of two such forces impelling the mind in different 
directions it would move in neither direction, but in a line 
between the two after the analogy of the composition of 
forces. For instance, if I stand at one angle of a paral- 
lelogram and am attracted by some object in front of me, 
and at the same time by another object off at my right 
hand, according to this theory I should go to neither of 
them, but to a point somewhere between them. 

It is clearly possible for motives to influence the mind 
and at the same time to have no compelling power. We 
are to make the distinction here as elsewhere Difference be- 
between cause and condition. The former anTcon^ 
compels an effect; the latter is the reason why tion. 
the effect takes place. Motive is a condition and not a 
cause of action. 

2. It is urged in favor of necessity that if we know 
the character of the man we can generally foretell what 
his conduct will be under certain circumstances. It 



8 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

is true that we can frequently anticipate what a person with 
whom we are intimately acquainted, or whose principles 
Human Pre- and manner of life we know by report, would be 

Human Con- likel y to do m a g iven exigency. For instance, 
duct. we have great confidence that a friend whom 

we know as a stanch total abstainer, if at a party where 
wine should be on the table, would turn down his glasses. 
I have lived many years by a gentleman of strict integrity 
in all his conduct. When word is brought to me that he 
has deliberately lied about a certain matter of personal 
interest, I do not for a moment believe the report, and I 
think it much more likely that the reporter lies than that 
my neighbor does. But these cases, and hundreds of 
others like them, are cases of very great likelihood, not of 
certainty. Character is not so fixed as to be unchange- 
able. Great revolutions sometimes take place ; and so 
many are the exceptions, that the French proverb says, 
" It is the unexpected that happens." It may be said that 
if we perfectly knew a person's character we could per- 
fectly predict his conduct under perfectly given conditions- 
But this is begging the question. It is impossible that we 
should know all this, and it is preposterous to assert what 
would be the effect of an impossibility. Furthermore, it 
is more than doubtful that if the conditions were granted 
it would disprove freedom. For, as we shall see directly, 
a man might be in a condition that he would certainly do 
certain things and not do others, and still be under no com- 
pulsion whatever. 

3. It is further said that the power of habit is such that 
Power of it becomes at last irresistible. If this were so, 
Habit. it would not prove that a habit must become 

irresistible, as it may be controlled and checked in its be- 



FREEDOM OF HUMAN ACTION. 9 

ginnings if not later. It is no doubt true that a man may 
so yield himself to bad motives that the good motives 
may be displaced and that there will be no motive to 
a good deed. But this does not imply inability to do 
otherwise than he does, but a stubborn disinclination. So 
a good man may suppress and extirpate all motives to 
wrong action, and will then not sin, not because he can- 
not, but because he does not want to, just as he does not 
leap off the top of a house, not because he cannot, but 
because there is ordinarily no motive for him to do so. 

4. Another assigned reason for denying the freedom of 
the individual is found in the Divine prescience. If God 
is omniscient, he must know beforehand all our Divine Fore . 
acts. If he knows that a certain act will take knowledge, 
place, then it must take place, and thus all human conduct 
is previously fixed. So runs the argument. To avoid 
this conclusion, some believers in freedom have been led 
to deny God's foreknowledge. 

There are two fallacies in this reasoning which are not 
far to seek. The first is in the assumption that God must 
foreknow as men foreknow; that is, after a Difference be- 
scientific fashion. Men foretell eclipses, the tween Human 

• 111 aI1(i DlVlne 

rising and setting of certain heavenly bodies, Foreknowl- 
the ebb and flow of the tides, the coming and edffe> 
going of the seasons, because they know the causes that 
produce and the laws that govern these events. Hence it 
is assumed that God knows in the same way. But this 
assumption is entirely gratuitous. It is at least conceiv- 
able that the Infinite Intelligence has other means of know- 
ing than those which belong to finite men. He may know 
events and actions beforehand, not because he knows the 
laws and causes implied in them, but directly and in them- 



10 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

selves. Even men have intuitive knowledge of certain 
facts, and it is easy to believe that God has infinitely 
greater powers of cognition. 

But in the second place, the theory assumes that to 
know an event will take place, is the same as knowing 
That an Event that it must take place. To know the latter is 
will occur, to k now the former, but to know the former 

not the same ' 

as that it does not imply the latter. Looking forward is, 
must occur. j n ^ g reS p ec ^ no wa y different from looking 

backward. Because I know that an event has taken 
place, is evidently not the same as to know it must have 
taken place. God- looks forward and foreknows the acts 
of men, but he so far knows them to be unnecessary that 
he declares his purpose to punish the perpetration of some 
of them, and to reward the doers of others of them. 

SECTION 4. — HABIT IN RELATION TO THE WILL. 

In the previous section, Habit was spoken of as relating 
to the indications of a man's future conduct. The sub- 
ject, perhaps, demands some amplification. By 

Habit defined. * l\f . ^ ' . , . *1 . J 

Habit is meant the increased tacility m tne per- 
formance of certain acts, which comes from frequent 
repetition. It is not peculiar to mental conduct, but is 
characteristic as well of the physical acts. The little 
child takes its first steps with very great difficulty, and at 
some peril. Its first attempts to balance itself on its 
legs are apt to result in a tumble ; but continued and 
reiterated effort overcomes the difficult}^, and soon enables 
it to stand firmly, to walk confidently, and even to run, 
and perform the most surprising feats, without the least 
danger. It is so with all the members of the body. It is 
not the less so with the mind. Certain mental operations 



FREEDOM OF HUMAN ACTION. 11 

at first appear impossible; but persistence soon creates 
not only their possibility, but ease and skill in their 
performance. To most minds efforts in memorizing, in 
trying to comprehend certain thoughts, in literary com- 
position, in any form of conveying our thoughts to others, 
prove a very difficult task. To become a scholar requires 
constant action and perpetual repetition, till at last it 
becomes to some, at least, almost a second nature, and 
study is performed with both ease and enjoyment. 

This law of habit extends itself to the moral conduct, 
and is of very great importance there. Our wills, to 
some extent, come under the influence of this Th wm 
law. The first profane oath of the boy star- affected by 
ties himself, and brings with it self-reproach % 1S aw ' 
and condemnation. The second time it is easier; and 
within no very long time he repeats it without compunc- 
tion, and possibly comes at last to swear as he breathes. 
He finds it hard to resist the tendency, even if he would. 
So the appetites and passions indulged beyond their 
natural limit grow into habits that tyrannize over their 
subject till it seems impossible to break away from them. 

The virtues as well as the vices are subject to the same 
law. At first it is with an effort involving sacrifice per- 
haps, and self-denials, that we take up certain How it 
duties and abandon certain immoralities. Little ^ e s ct a s J[ ir " 
by little we come to feel the restraint and con- Vices, 
straint less and less, and at last our action or our absti- 
nence comes to be an easy and natural act. Not only 
particular virtues and vices are affected in this way, but 
the general purpose and plan of one's moral life is subject 
to this law. A man under the conviction that he is 
leading an unworthy life while following the dictates of 



12 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

appetite, or passion, or self-love, resolves to be governed 
by his conscience, and to live uprightly and justly. He 
will find at first that his way is beset with difficulties. 
He meets with constantly recurring inducements to turn 
aside from the way which he has determined to follow. 
There are powerful tendencies to be resisted; and he 
must exert all his energies, and guard with scrutiny all 
his steps. But gradually the force of former habits is 
diminished, and he becomes habituated to his new course. 
The effort, the conscious sacrifice, is less and less, and the 
vigilance may almost cease. We know some such per- 
sons to whom it seems as if a wrong act would be impos- 
sible. Evil desires in such a mind, as good desires in an 
evil mind, have been suppressed and extirpated by disuse, 
and there is no longer any motive contrary to the general 
purpose to be overcome. 

In view of these facts, the relation of Habit to the 
Will and Conscience is of very great importance. The 
habit of indulging an appetite, or cherishing any desire, or 
of any kind of wrong-doing, may become so strong that 
it seems practically irresistible. Doubtless it is not what 
it seems. The simple fact is, that while the individual 
One may lose nas not l° st the ability to do what he ought to 
the Desire c "[ ^ ] ie has lost all desire to do it; and since 
losing the desire furnishes occasion or condition for any 
Ability. action, the absence of desire to act in a par- 

ticular way renders it certain that he will not so act. 
But it is even doubtful that there is any case in which all 
desire for virtuous action is wanting. There are multi- 
tudes of instances in which the power of evil habit has 
become so great that it seems impossible to break it ; and 
yet by some intense effort, with great pain and much sac- 



FREEDOM OF HUMAN ACTION. 13 

rifice, the soul has wrenched itself away from its thraldom, 
and achieved its emancipation. That there are thousands 
of other instances in which the ability exists, yet the lower 
impulse is allowed to govern, may be reasonably inferred. 

But even if we suppose it possible that Habit ever does 
become so despotic that the will is paralyzed, and the 
individual is no longer a free agent, this would Wearere . 
be only a penal consequence of the crime he sponsible for 
has committed against himself, when, in the choices and 
unconditioned exercise of his will, he deliber- therefore for 
ately chose a course which was likely to lead to 
this debasement. It makes nothing against the entire 
freedom of the individual : he freely chose his own course 
of life and all that might be involved in it. 

We have an equally good and more pleasing illustration 
in the case of a man who elects to do that which is right, 
and forms a virtuous habit of life. We are „ ... 

Habit as 

not to presume that he will ever arrive at a related to 
point where he cannot do wrong; but he will 
doubtless arrive at a position by gradual development 
where he ivill have no desire to do anything which he per- 
ceives to be wrong, and for that reason will never do so. 
We must remember that men will never do what they 
have no motive for doing, however clear the ability may 
be to do it ; and motive implies some kind of desire. We 
have innumerable partial illustrations in actual life of 
what is meant here. As a rule we do not make a prac- 
tice of putting our hands into the fire, and this not be- 
cause we cannot do so. There are extreme exceptional 
instances where this has been done, as in the case of 
Archbishop Cranmer, and the Roman soldier Mucius 
Scaevola representing his people in the presence of a 



14 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

hostile king, and illustrating the fortitude of his fellow- 
soldiers. We do not ordinarily do it, because we don't 
want to : there is no motive for doing it. So of a hun- 
dred other things which we do or refrain from doing : not 
because the contrary is impossible, but from the absence 
of any degree or kind of desire. 

I have spoken of these as partial illustrations. They 
are not complete for the reason that there are exceptional 
cases where a motive does exist to do the unusual thing, 
and where, for the sake of some greater good, the dis- 
agreeable thing will be done, as when the life of a child 
or of a friend is in peril. 

We have some of us been accustomed to think of the 
glorified saints and angels as beyond the possibility of 
sinning. That a state is conceivable in which they will 
never sin, I have no manner of doubt ; but this is not 
because of inability, but because there will be no desire 
of anything involving moral evil: there is an infinite 
aversion to wrong-doing, and therefore no motive fur- 
nishing an occasion for it. 

It is also clearly conceivable that, under the power of 
persistent and cultivated evil habit, souls may reach a 
Habit in Re- stage in which there is not the slightest desire 
vicious ^ or virtuous action or pious conduct. Their 
Conduct. case may be hopeless, not because of an in- 
ability to practise righteousness, but because there is an 
infinite aversion to it, and consequently no motive furnish- 
ing a condition for such action. 

Such seems to me to be the relation of Habit to the 
Will. It may become a gigantic motive influencing but 
not compelling the Will, suppressing and annihilating all 
counter-motives, and thus destroying all conditions prece- 



FREEDOM OF HUMAN ACTION. 15 

dent for particular actions, or courses of action. The 
Will cannot choose an object which does not present itself 
in the consciousness. But in all cases where more than 
one such object is presented, it may elect freely ; and there 
is no power, finite or even infinite, which will coerce its 
choice. 



16 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 

SECTION 1. — ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPTION OF THE MORAL 
QUALITY IN ACTIONS. 

All sciences start with certain observed phenomena, 

and are developed and brought to perfection by classifying 

.„ . these phenomena, ascertaining their mutual 

All science ^ r © 

begins with relations, the order of change or progress to 
o servation. w j 1 j c j 1 £ ne y are subject, and the various laws 
that govern them. In the physical sciences the phenomena 
appeal to the senses. There are also metaphysical ideas, 
first principles and intuitive truths of which, when occa- 
sion is furnished, we become cognizant by the very consti- 
tution of the mind. The phenomena of the mind are as 
apprehensible by us through what is popularly called Con- 
sciousness, or the Inner-Sense, as are the phenomena of 
the external world through Sense-perception. Through 
the Pure Reason we have space, time, number, personal 
identity, etc. We know that a part of a thing is less than 
the whole, not that two quantities, each of which is equal 
to a third quality, are equal to each other, and that the 
same cause under the same conditions will always produce 
the same effect. 

In all nations, and in all generations of men, a distinc- 
tion has been made between Right and Wrong, and a belief 



THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 17 

has prevailed that there is not only a difference between 
these two conceptions, but an irreconcilable antagonism 
between them. Just as men made a distinc- Universalit 
tion between beauty and deformity, wisdom of the moral 
and folly, intelligence and ignorance, so they concep lon ' 
make the distinction between Right and Wrong. The 
standard is not always the same in the last of these cases 
any more than in the others. What in some communities 
are regarded as right, are in others regarded as wrong, and 
vice versa. But everywhere and always there is some 
standard of moral conduct, and a moral quality in human 
actions is recognized. 

Do all actions have a moral quality ? 

It is important to ascertain the precise place of the 
moral quality in relation to an action. In the perform- 
ance of an act, there are four parts of the pro- Location of 
cess. First, there is the conception of the object quaHtyofan 
to be accomplished ; secondly, there is the choice action, 
between doing and not doing, or the resolution to do or 
not do ; thirdly, the volition or effort put forth ; and 
fourthly, the intention. Now, the moral quality is not found 
in either of the first three, since these might be precisely 
the same, whether the action were good or bad ; but in the 
intention, inasmuch as the same act would be wholly bad if 
performed with one intention, and wholly good if per- 
formed with another. A man who shoots another and 
kills him, if he does it in malice, is regarded as deeply 
criminal; whereas, if he does it in self-defence, or to pre- 
serve the lives of his children threatened by a robber, he 
is held innocent. 

Whether all actions have a moral quality, then, depends 
upon the answer to the question whether the action has a 



18 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

moral end in view. If I go to a bookstore and am in a 
state of doubt whether to buy a volume of essays by a 
D all actions distinguished author, or an historical work of 
have a moral equal celebrity, it would seem almost obvious 
that no moral character could possibly attach to 
my action, that it would be decided on entirely prudential 
grounds, and would not be wrong to do either. So if I 
sit down to a dinner where two dishes are set before me, 
there would seem to be no ethical character in my choice ; 
it would be purely a matter of taste. 

Yet even in such instances a moral quality might be 
present in the act. In that of the books, the fact that one 
is evidently more profitable than the other, would make 
it my duty to take that. In the matter of the two dishes, 
it might easily be the fact that one would be more nourish- 
ing or be followed by less unfavorable consequences than 
the other, and it would clearly be my duty to give the 
preference to that one. It is no doubt conceivable that 
two acts may present themselves so exactly alike in their 
moral effect that the choice between them would have 
no ethical character. These are exceptional instances ; 
but in a considerable number of cases the consequences as 
good or bad cannot be foreseen, or would not be thought 
of by the actor, and would therefore have no moral char- 
acter. Still, there is little doubt that a much larger pro- 
portion of our acts are subject to moral conditions than 
we are accustomed to estimate. 

SECTION 2. — THEORIES OF THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION. 

We have seen that the conception of a moral quality in 
conduct exists universally among men. Whence, then, 
does it arise ? Where do we find the ultimate authority 



THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 19 

and indisputable ethical standard? There are several 
theories on this subject. 

The first that we shall consider is the Utilitarian Theory. 
According to this, the motive of right and wrong is derived 
from that of the greatest good. Very early in 

A x.' * t ^ ill* Utilitarianism. 

the history ot the race, men would learn to 
estimate what would be for their greatest happiness, and 
in process of time this came to be regarded as an obliga- 
tion ; that is, a compliance with it was looked upon as right, 
and a violation of it as wrong. There are two principal 
forms of this theory ; namely, one in which the 

i • i i i iic i Two forms. 

moral idea is supposed to be evolved irom the 
individual regard for personal welfare ; the other, where 
it is derived from that of the highest good of the whole, 
or at least of the greater number. Probably these two 
forms are reconcilable, and very likely the latter is derived 
from the former. It is not unlikely that the highest wel* 
fare of the individual, if regarded broadly enough, would 
coincide with the highest welfare of the community or the 
race. But few individuals would be able to take that 
view of the subject without a considerable process of 
education. 

The main objections to this theory lie in the facts, first, 
that the two ideas, the ethical and that of the greatest 
good, are totally unlike ; second, that there are (Objections to 
numerous acts in which the thought of the this theory, 
greatest happiness is in many instances obviously alto^ 
gether absent from the mind of the actor. Upon the 
former of these it is unnecessary to dilate.. As to the 
latter, let us take a single case. The mother, finding her 
child in peril, rushes to its rescue without a thought of 
whether her action, which may not only involve some 



20 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

inconvenience, but perhaps some suffering to herself, will 
add to her own happiness or the happiness of the commu- 
nity. It is true, also, that she does not consider the demand 
of duty ; still, it is what would be duty, were no other 
impulses present. It may be said that this is the prompt- 
ing of maternal love. But it may easily be shown, as we 
shall see in the progress of this study, that love is the 
perfection of the moral law, and that it so involves all 
duties and obligations that they cease to be felt in the 
form of restraint or constraint, being changed to inclina- 
tions and appetences. So far is self-interest, or a desire 
for one's own welfare, from being an essential element in 
moral action, there is a very large range of conduct in 
which it does not at all appear. 

Another reason for rejecting the utilitarian theory is 
that the ideas of the right and of the useful are entirely 
Our concep- distinct in our minds. Still another is that in 
tionof.the a vas {. num |3 er f cases we should find it im- 

two ideas 

distinct. possible to determine what would be the high- 
est good, either of the individual or of society. Again, in 
the Providential administration of human affairs, deeds 
which are in themselves of the worst character are very 
likely to be so overruled that unmeasured good comes from 
them. 

A second theory of the origin of the ethical idea is that 
of Authority. The child in the family is taught that 
Theory of there must be obedience to the parents, and he 
Authority. soon comes to have a feeling of obligation, or 
sense of duty. This is further cultivated by the relations 
of civil society and subjection to government. It becomes 
still more sacred in the relations of a religious society and 
the government of the church. In close connection with 



THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 21 

this last, or possibly without it, emerges the thought of 
Divine government, and the supreme authority of the 
Infinite Creator and Ruler of the Universe, and the con- 
viction that this authority is asserted in the Sacred Scrip- 
tures as containing a revelation of His will concerning 
human conduct. 

No doubt these are all influential in the cultivation of 
moral character ; but that is not sufficient to account for 
the origin of the sentiment of universal obligation. This 
must first exist in the human mind before there can be 
any tendency to recognize authority of any sort. Even 
the highest authority — that of the Divine Ruler — would 
appeal in vain to the individual soul, were the latter not 
so constituted that the feeling of obligation would rise 
spontaneously on its proper occasion. 

This brings us to the third theory, namely, the Intui- 
tional. The phenomena which lie at the basis of the 
science of ethics are included in and imply intuition- 
psychical phenomena. They are apprehended allsm * 
from the very constitution of the mind as soon as the 
occasion for them presents itself. As soon as certain acts 
are brought before the mind, either in fact or in concep- 
tion, the moral quality of them is discerned, just as men, 
when they perceive a body, know that it occupies space, 
or as they know, when they see an apple cut into quar- 
ters, that a quarter is less than the whole. According to 
this theory, the ethical idea is original, a first principle 
evolved or derived from no other idea previously in the 
mind. 

In rejecting the first two theories, it is not intended to 
be denied that there are certain important facts connected 
with them which are essential and useful as subsidiary 



22 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

to the application of the third theory, and in determining 
the establishment of a right code of conduct. Though we 
The first two may not accept the doctrine that the concep- 
theonesto ^ on f a mora ]_ quality is evolved from that of 

be rejected, . . 

but not with- the greatest happiness, either of the individual 
outvalue. Qr £ SO ciety, it is unquestionably true that the 
observance of the moral law, or the rule of right conduct, 
always ultimately coincides with, and is conducive to, 
this great happiness. It is in this way that men, without 
a revelation or other positive instruction, learn what kind 
of conduct is virtuous and what is vicious. Those who 
believe in the Divine government must believe also that 
God has so constituted the world and its intelligent in- 
habitants, that, when the conduct of the latter is right, a 
part of the result at least will be their greatest happiness. 
Hence the observance of the moral law will always tend 
to the well-being of the subject of it. 

It is also no doubt true that obedience to parents, and 
submission to civil government and to the precepts of 
Scriptures as expressing the Divine will, prepare the mind 
for the appreciation and acceptance of moral law. It is 
not necessary to discuss the question whether God's will 
is the sole foundation and basis of the moral law, or 
whether, as some eminent thinkers maintain, this basis is 
in the very nature of things, and that even the Divine char- 
acter is to be judged by its conformity to it ; for in either 
case it is obvious that God's character, and consequently 
his law and government, are thus conformed to the eternal 
law of right ; and therefore whatever expression he has 
given of his will must coincide with this. So that we 
need seek no further than to know what is the Divine will 
in order to know what is the ultimate authority. Those, 



THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 23 

therefore, who accept the Bible as a Divine revelation will 
be justified in making it their supreme moral standard. 
But underneath all this, and essential to it, there is strong 
reason for believing that the idea of a moral quality in 
actions is intuitively discerned, and that it is a product of 
the constitution that has been given us, and therefore 
universal and necessary. 



24 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 



CHAPTER III. 

SPRINGS OF ACTION. 

We are excited to action by certain impulses and incen- 
tives which are a part of our constitution. These may be 
Divisions of divided into five groups ; namely, the Appetites, 
the subject, the Desires, the Affections, Self-love, and Conscience. 
We will consider them in order. 

SECTION 1. — THE APPETITES. 

The Appetites are cravings for such things as are for 
the well-being of the body and continuance of the race. 
They are hunger, thirst, sex, and perhaps the 
cravings for air and sleep. They are for the 
most part, and primarily, periodical and self-limited. In a 
healthy and well-balanced person the appetites are satis- 
fied when they have been indulged so far as is good for 
the body. But they are liable to be abused in such ways 
as to minister to physical disorder, and the degradation of 
the soul. Such craving is prompted, not by any proper 
demand of the appetites themselves, but by certain con- 
comitants which constitute a fictitious want clamoring in 
various degrees for indulgence. For instance, when one 
eats of a certain kind of food there is, besides the satisfac- 
tion of the normal appetite, the pleasure of the palate and 
other organs ; and there is frequently an inducement to 



SPRINGS OF ACTION. 25 

prolong this enjoyment by continued eating, and this is 
usually to the detriment of the body. 

This is more especially the case in the indulgence of 
artificial appetites. There are certain articles for which no 
person, except those hereditarily affected, has an appetite. 
Tobacco is a conspicuous instance. Probably Artificial 
no human being ever naturally enjoyed the use Appetites. 
of this drug. The first experiment with it almost always 
results in nausea. Yet to multitudes it not only becomes 
a luxury, but the occasion of a slavish habit, which even 
when it is felt to be a physical evil of very great magni- 
tude, they have not the energy to shake off. The same 
is true of other narcotics. It is terribly true in respect 
to alcoholic beverages, the use of which has become a 
vice of incalculable magnitude, destroying multitudes of 
lives, ruining character, and bringing poverty, degradation, 
and untold suffering, to thousands of families. 

I have spoken of the appetites as among the incentives 
to human effort. In their normal action the satisfaction 
of them is a source of pleasure. But for this Norma i use f 
we should be liable to neglect much that is the Appetites, 
essential to our well-being. But for hunger, and the 
pleasure of its satisfaction, we might be indisposed to eat 
at proper times, or in proper quantities, or of the most 
nourishing food. The craving for food also spurs men up 
to the effort to secure it, and thus we have productive 
labor. Men do not naturally like to work, — it is only the 
pressure of some want; and but for this many, perhaps 
most, would not work. But in these, as in other springs 
of action, there needs to be some check and balance among 
the several incentives which will keep them all within 
their designed limits. 



26 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 



SECTION 2. — THE DESIRES. 



These are cravings of the mind for such things as are for 
the well-being of the soul. We will consider 

Definition. WiQ ^ ^ chief of ^^ 

There is first the desire for Continued Existence. We are 
constituted with a love of life. We instinctively shrink 
from death, not merely because of its possible agonies, 
nor its sequences, but because it implies the cessation 
of our present conscious condition. It is only when 
men have, either by their own misuse of the blessings of 
life wrought themselves into a position where the provis- 
ions for their happiness have become utterly unavailable, 
or when, by assiduous religious and spiritual culture, they 
have come to have an earnest faith in the superior blessed- 
ness of the future world, that they ever welcome death, 
— in the former case because they are disgusted with life, 
and have no faith in the future ; in the latter, because, 
having made the best of their life, they accept the glo- 
rious promise of that which is to come. Both these 
classes are doubtless exceptional. The great mass of men 
utility of this love life ; the desire is made useful by inciting 
Dssire. them to care for their health, to guard against 

accidents, and to instinctively seek to protect themselves 
in sudden danger. 

Another of the desires is that for Wealth. If life is to 
continue, there must be means of supporting it ; and these 
means are, in part at least, what constitute wealth. This 
may exist in a very small, an almost imperceptible, de- 
gree ; the meanest shelter, the coarsest and poorest raiment, 
the earnings of a single day, the provisions which a few 



SPRINGS OF ACTION. 27 

meals, and scanty at that, may exhaust, are still of the 
nature of wealth. It is a legitimate desire to secure so 
much of this as will make one comfortable, and as Liabilities to 
will be a defence against want, both in the pres- Perversion, 
ent and for the future. This desire, like the appetites 
and other cravings, may become inordinate, and eventuate 
in the vices of avarice and covetousness, and lead to 
extortion and fraud, and may result in robbery and cog- 
nate crimes. Still, in itself, and within its legitimate 
limits, it is of great utility, tending to promote industry, 
temperance, frugality, thoughtfulness, carefulness, and 
other virtues. 

The desire for Knowledge is also to be considered. The 
means of preserving life, and all that makes life valuable, 
depends upon the knowledge we have. But it is not 
merely for the sake of ulterior ends that we are incited to 
seek knowledge : we desire it for its own sake. There is, 
in earliest childhood, a restless curiosity, an eagerness to 
get at the secrets of things, which leads even . Natural 
the infant to dissect its own toys to satisfy this Desire early 

T j. • j '±. j. j_ Manifested. 

craving. In more mature minds it prompts to 
great sacrifices, to protracted and laborious study, to 
years of minute investigation. It is out of these labors 
and sacrifices that sciences are born and philosophies are 
constructed, that marvellous discoveries are made, and 
that the most wonderful inventions are rendered possible 
by which labor is saved and production is increased a hun- 
dred and a thousand fold. This also may be abused, 
though it is less likely to be than some other desires. But 
in the eagerness of the pursuit of knowledge, health is 
sometimes sacrificed, and life shortened, or cut off in its 
prime. 



28 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

The desire of Power. This, too, is a proper and inno- 
Notoniv cen ^ desire. It i s subsidiary to some of the 
Desirabie,but others ; yet power is often sought for its own 

igatory. sa k e? an( j ^ s possession gives satisfaction to the 
possessor. It is, no doubt, not only legitimate for every good 
man to be as powerful as possible, but it is obligatory 
upon him. Such a man being devoted to the production 
of all kinds of moral utilities, both for himself and for 
the community, and as well for the whole race, must 
needs make himself as influential as his condition permits. 
Capable of A bad man will seek power for bad ends ; and, 
Perversion, like all else that he does, he may in this be 
actuated by pernicious motives. But this desire, like that 
for possession, is easily carried to excess, however virtuous 
its beginnings may be. Hence it prompts to various 
vices. The selfish ambition of man has been the cause 
of a large part of the evils which prevail in humanity, and 
of the degradation and suffering of large masses in our 
communities. 

The desire for the Approbation of our fellow-men is another 
of the inducements to action which affect all men. It is 
in our constitution, therefore universal. The reason for 
its existence is not far to seek. A man's usefulness and 
value as a member of human society would be almost or 
quite wholly wanting, were the good opinion of his fellow- 
members withheld from him. He could do little good to 
them, and get little good from them, if they should regard 
him with indifference or distrust. Like other desires, it 
may become a vice when indulged beyond its province. 
An inordinate desire for approbation becomes vanity, a 
foolish disposition, and one to be deprecated, and, in cer- 
tain of its forms, to be despised. 



SPRINGS OF ACTION. 29 

The desire of Liberty. This differs so much from the 
other desires that some eminent writers refuse to reckon 
it among them. Instead of having special Differsfrom 
objects of its own, it has reference to all the the other 
other desires ; and the craving which charac- 
terizes it is a craving for the privilege of gratifying them. 
We can scarcely conceive of its existence, were there no 
other desires, and were these not in some way restricted. 
It is the removal of restriction for which this craving 
makes demand ; and so far forth it would seem to be per- 
fectly subsidiary, though perhaps not subordinate. Still, 
it so far partakes of the nature of desire as to be a pow- 
erful incentive to action. A large proportion of the efforts 
put forth by individuals and societies is for the removal 
of the restraint which is put upon their actions, and which 
hinders their enjoyment. It is a proper and legitimate de- 
sire when urging to the breaking down of the barriers which 
prevent the free action of the soul, or the removing of 
obstacles to the growth and development or to the action, 
of society ; but it easily degenerates into the L iberty not 
vice of license, as, sometimes, when it leads to License. 
the disregard of wholesome rules of conduct, or allows the 
passions and appetites to have free scope, and overwhelm 
and debauch the soul ; or, in other words, when it would 
give the lower powers of the soul control over those that 
are higher and nobler. 

The desire of Society, like that of Liberty, is by some 
writers refused a place in this list. But like Society es- 
Liberty it so far partakes of the nature of desire sent S al t0 

J r man s com- 

that for our present purpose it may properly pieteness. 
be considered here. Man was constituted for society. No 
human individual is sufficient unto himself. Every man 



30 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

has something that others, possibly all others, lack. No 
one, without the aid of others, can secure more than a 
small part of what is essential to his well-being. Every 
man is not only a small fraction of humanity, but he 
is also a small fraction of his really complete self, if 
dependent solely on his own Individuality. Hence each 
man is essential to every other of, at least, a large 
group. Association is thus indispensable. Men must 
form societies for economic as well as for political pur- 
Association P oses an( i f° r a ^ the great ends which they pro- 
and Individ- pose to themselves. This association may not 
ua l 7 ' be sought in a way to destroy individuality. 

On the contrary, Individuality in its fullest development 
is essential to the highest type of Society. Men associate 
most when they differ most, and this difference is what 
constitutes their individuality. Two men who produce 
the same commodities are of very little use to each other 
economically. Two men who have precisely the same 
ideas would have no inducement to communicate with 
each other. Hence an organization of society on the 
basis of the suppression or diminution of individuality 
would be unprofitable and vicious. Man then being 
dependent on society, whatever he does to render society 
weak or inefficient reacts upon himself and is a damage 
to him. So also whenever society, by its agent the gov- 
ernment, diminishes the individuality of its members by 
despotic measures or a tyrannical policy, it brings ultimate 
damage to itself. 

SECTION 3. — THE AFFECTIONS. 

The Affections are like the desires in the fact that they 
imply a craving for certain objects. They differ from 



SPRINGS OF ACTION. 31 

them in the fact that they are altruistic, or have refer- 
ence to others, while the desires are self-regard- Howth dif . 
inor. It is of the essence of love to seek to fer from the 
promote the happiness of the object loved. The esires " 
affections are usually divided into the natural and the 
moral. The former are those which spring up spontane- 
ously when the object of them presents itself. Natural and 
The latter are those that may be cultivated, moral affec- 
But, for the most part, all affections are pri- 
marily natural, and only take on a moral character when 
they are liable to be prevented or suppressed by other 
influences. Thus a child under the restraints of parental 
discipline may be so devoted to some forbidden pleasure as 
to regard its own gratification more than the affection 
that ought to govern it ; and this affection may diminish 
or possibly cease. In all cases of this kind the condition 
of the child is not only undutiful, but it is unnatural and 
so far forth vicious. To resist and rectify this bad tend- 
ency becomes an obligation and so takes on a moral char- 
acter. There are also cases in which there may spring up 
spontaneously an affection towards an unworthy object, and 
it may be a duty to check and neutralize it. Here also 
the affection takes on a moral character. 

The affections have also been by most writers divided 
into Benevolent and Malevolent. These terms are objected 
to by Dr. Hopkins as implying that the affections are 
under the control of the will, as they are not wholly or 
directly. The terms Beneficent and Maleficent have been 
suggested as substitutes ; but as the former have come to 
be of nearly universal use, and are readily understood by 
readers, it will be as well, so far as our present purpose is 
concerned, to adhere to them. 



32 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

The Benevolent Affections are Love of kindred, Friend- 
ship, Love of country, Love of Humanity, and Sympathy. 
Different The Love of kindred embraces parental love, 
classes of fi\i&\ i ove an( j fraternal love. They are nat- 

Benevolent J 

Affections. ural and spontaneous affections, and spring up 
as soon as the objects of them are known. The strongest 
of these is parental love, and the love of the mother for 
her child has come to be the synonym of all great affec- 
tion. These affections may become extravagant and inor- 
dinate. They may be perverted or interrupted or cease 
altogether. In this condition they indicate a moral char- 
acter, and may thus be rectified only by moral means. 
The same is true in respect to the other affections accord- 
ing to their measure. 

The Malevolent Affections are the opposite of the Benevo- 
lent ; and as the latter are characterized by the desire to do 
Essential ele- the object of them some good, so Hatred, which 
Makvotent 6 is ^ e essential element in Malevolent Affec- 
Affections. tions, is characterized by a desire to do the 
object some harm. Foremost among the Malevolent 
Affections is AngeT, and this is perhaps in some sense 
implied in all the rest; indeed, it is sometimes repre- 
sented that the others are only modifications of this. 

The question is sometimes raised whether Anger is 
is Anger ever ever justifiable. Unquestionably, when it takes 
justifiable? ^ e f orm f resentment of some evil deed, and 
the sentiment arises that, such conduct is deserving of 
punishment, it is an innocent feeling. But when it passes 
beyond this, and implies hatred of the person, it cannot 
be justifiable. It is not unfrequently a wholly bad and 
forbidden passion, disagreeable to the subject and harmful 
to all affected by it. 



SPRINGS OF ACTION. 33 

Some of the modifications of Anger usually reckoned as 
separate malevolent affections, are Indignation, which indi- 
cates a more or less intense feeling of the culpability of 
an action accompanied by a sense of the ill-desert of the 
doer ; Wrath, which is anger expressing itself in outward 
manifestations sometimes alarming to the objects of it; 
and Fury, a still more excited form of it in which the sub- 
ject tends to lose all self-control. Envy and Jealousy are 
feelings that belong here. The former is a base feeling 
excited by beholding the success of another with whom 
we are in some way in competition, a hatred of him sim- 
ply because he has succeeded better than ourselves. The 
latter is the state of mind into which one is thrown when 
a person to whom we are attached is suspected of bestow- 
ing his affection or friendship on another. More fre- 
quently than otherwise perhaps this feeling arises on 
mere suspicion when there is no ground for it. It is a 
painful, unreasonable sentiment, and is indicative of a 
mind weak and ill-balanced. 

SECTION 4. — SELF-INTEREST. 

This constituent of the affections also known as Self-love, 
and Desire for one's own happiness, is sometimes reckoned 
among the Desires; but it occupies so large a Why reek- 
place among the incentives of human action, £ r n e m JJ e 
and is so powerful a force, that it seems alto- other desires, 
gether important that it be considered by itself. Another 
reason for this separate consideration is found in the fact 
that though partaking of the nature of the Desires, it 
radically differs from the other desires in this, that it can 
in no way be gratified except through the gratification of 
one or more of them. If a man can be supposed to exist 



34 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

in a condition in which all desires — and here we must take 
the word in its very broadest sense as including the appe- 
tites and the affections — are wanting, he might still have 
an eager craving for happiness which, nevertheless, it is 
impossible to satisfy either in whole or in part. Such is 
the condition called hypochondria. A person in this state 
may have the same ardent longing for happiness that 
others have, but he can think of nothing which will pro- 
duce this happiness. In other words, while the desire for 
food, or for power, or for wealth, can be gratified directly, 
the desire for happiness can be gratified only through the 
medium of some other gratification. 

But again Self-love differs from other desires in the 
_ .,. . characteristic that while the latter clamor for 

Sell-love nas 

reference to instant satisfaction, for the greatest immediate 
enjoyment, and have no reference to the future, 
Self-love takes account of this and seeks the largest 
amount of enjoyment on the whole. Hence there is fre- 
quently a struggle between this and some other inclina- 
tion. We see it in infancy. The little child has its cake, 
111 f a P art °^ wn i cn ft would like to keep till 
to-morrow ; but it would also like to eat it 
now. Hence the common and suggestive proverb, " You 
cannot keep your cake and eat it too." 
• The young man who is earning money, but has only 
what he earns, may desire to save a part of his earnings 
and accumulate for the future. He may also desire to 
spend it on fine clothes, on entertainments, and high 
living. He cannot do both. Here is a man who has 
acquired a taste for alcoholic beverages. He has come to 
long for the excitement which they produce. He knows 
that if he indulges that appetite freely the consequences 



SPRINGS OF ACTION. 35 

are likely to be his unfitness for any calling in life, and 
lack of respectability among men, and finally the ruin of 
both body and soul as well as the disgrace and misery of 
his family. He wants to be a competent and efficient 
workman, a respected and respectable member of society, 
to have property and a home, and to have his family in 
comfort and the enjoyment of the conveniences of life. 
He wants also the pleasure that comes from the indul- 
gence of his appetite. He cannot have all these, There 
is a struggle. The prudent and sensible man suppresses 
the appetite, denies himself the present momentary gratifi- 
cation, and chooses the lasting good that lies in the future. 

Primarily man does not like to labor, that is, to per- 
form systematic and regular and protracted work. It is 
only as this is associated with the rewards of N . . 
labor, and the habit of years, that men come to aversion to 
love work. True, they then feel uneasy if a or * 
they are not accomplishing something. But originally 
it is mostly from the fear of want, and the desire of pro- 
viding against it, and for the sake of larger enjoyments in 
the future, that they submit to this in the present. Toil 
and self-denial are the conditions of nearly all the enjoy- 
ments that men have in this world ; and Self-love is the 
motive that impels to these. 

We are to distinguish between Self-love and Selfishness, a 
distinction not always made. Self-love is a characteristic 
of our constitution, and is therefore not only legitimate, 
but of very great utility. A desire for one's own happi- 
ness, and seeking for one's own interest, can be justly 
condemned by no one. It has much to do, as has been 
shown, in limiting the appetites, desires, and affections, 
and compelling them to act within their own proper 



36 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

sphere. But Self-love has also its own limits ; and it is 
when transgressing these limits that it becomes selfishness, 
which is a vicious and pernicious disposition. In other 
words, Selfishness is inordinate Self-love. When men pur- 
sue their own happiness in violation or disregard of the 
rights of others, or of any higher interest than their own en- 
joyment, then they become selfish. Selfishness is the author 
of most other sins, and to combat and suppress it is the chief 
moral obligation of every man. It presents itself in mani- 
fold forms ; it is extremely subtle in its operations, and is 
frequently active when supposed to be wholly absent. 

SECTION 5. — CONSCIENCE. 

Among the springs of human action, the last and most 

important is Conscience. There is much confusion among 

ethical writers on this subject. While the 
Conscience. . , . , . 

great majority agree on certain characteristics 

of this constituent of the soul, there are scarcely any two 
that agree in a complete description of it. In fact, many 
Different writers do not attempt a formal and compre- 
different hensive definition. The general conception 
writers. most common is that of a combination of cer- 

tain intellectual powers and certain sensibilities having to 
do with moral conduct. There is implied an intuition of 
ideas com- "the moral quality in actions, an exercise of the 
montoaii. judgment as to whether certain actions are 
good or bad, right or wrong; an impulse to do what is 
judged to be right, and not to do what is judged to be 
wrong; a sense of approval when one has done what is 
judged to be right, and of degradation and condemnation 
when one has done what is judged to be wrong; and a 
sense of approval or disapproval respectively of the right 



SPRINGS OF ACTION. 37 

or the wrong conduct of others. Sometimes all this is 
symbolized in the one expression moral sense or the moral 
judgment. It is not usually contended that Conscience as 
thus described always determines correctly whether a 
particular action is right or wrong, though some go as far 
as this ; but for the most part, it is regarded as fallible 
and dependent on education. 

Now, it seems to me, as it does to some others, that we 
may get a much more simple and definite conception of 
Conscience and its functions by regarding it as a A gei)arate 
wholly separate and peculiar power of the and peculiar 
mind, standing by itself, and being in itself power ' 
exclusive of any other powers of the soul. These have 
their distinct places and offices, and are the same when 
relating to moral subjects as to any other ; hence we have 
no need to combine them with each other and with an 
entirely new element in order to form a Conscience. 
Why may not this additional element have a name and 
function of its own ? 

It would seem, then, that the most simple and unexcep- 
tionable definition of Conscience would be, that it is that 
ivithin us which impels us to do what we judge to Definition of 
be right, and to refrain from doing what we judge Conscience. 
to be wrong ; and which also excites in us a feeling of 
approval of acts which we regard as right, and of disap- 
proval of acts which we regard as wrong. 

Three cases are implied. 1. A man has in view two 
actions, one right and the other wrong, and having such 
relation to each other, that one must be per- 

First* C3.S6 

formed, and the other left unperformed. He 

must choose between them. He cannot do both, and he 

cannot leave both undone. His passions or appetites may 



38 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

impel him to do the one which he knows to be wrong, and 
his Conscience impels him to do that which he knows to 
be right. It will always do this when it does anything. 
It is possible that the monitions of Conscience may be 
neglected, and so come to be disregarded and inefficient. 
But it still remains, if Conscience acts at all, it will be in 
favor of the right and against the wrong. In this respect 
Conscience is infallible, and it is only of a Conscience so 
defined that we can predicate infallibility. 

2. The second case is of a man who has done an act of 
the kind described. If he has done what he judges to 

be right, his Conscience gives him a feeling 
of approval and satisfaction. If he has done 
what he judges to be wrong, his Conscience will make 
him uneasy with a feeling of disapproval and dissatis- 
faction. 

3. It is in accordance with these conditions that we 

regard the conduct of others. When we see a man doing 

what we nudge and what we know he "judges to 
Third case. _ T ? , . . -, 

be wrong, we disapprove ot his action, and are 

sure that if we were in his place we should have a sense 

of condemnation. So on the other hand, if in the face of 

temptation to do wrong, he has overcome and has done 

what he judged to be right, we approve and applaud his 

conduct. 

The conditions, then, for the exercise of Conscience are 

as follows : (a) There must be a conception of some act 

Conditions to be performed. This will be by the same 

c°is?ofCon-" powers of the mind as those by which other 

science. individual concepts are formed. (5) It must 

be seen to have a moral quality. The Reason or Intuition 

gives us this just as when the occasion occurs it gives 



SPRINGS OF ACTION. 39 

beauty, cause and effect, power, etc. (e) Then the judg- 
ment decides whether the action is right or wrong. It is 
the same judgment that determines whether an object is 
small or great, hot or cold, comely or uncomely ; or 
whether an action be wise or foolish, prudent or impru- 
dent. It may in this case, as in other cases, err in its 
decision ; but such as it is finally we must act upon it. 
(d) Then Conscience asserts itself. If the judgment 
decides that the action is right, Conscience urges to the 
doing of it, and if wrong to refrain from the doing of it. 
As we have seen, it does this always if it does anything, 
and is so far forth infallible. It does not compel our 
action ; we may disregard its monition, and How far 
yield to some other impulse. The consequence infallible. 
of such action will be followed by the reproaches of 
Conscience, a sense of guilt and ill-desert, and an expec- 
tation of punishment. 

SECTION 6. — CONFLICTING IMPULSES. 

Such are the springs of human action. They have 
been set forth very nearly in the supposed order of their 
worthiness. It would be admitted by most The order of 
persons that the appetites are of a lower order worthiness. 
in this respect than the desires, and that the latter are 
inferior to the affections. This is not altogether true in 
respect to the superiority of Self-love over the Affections. 
Still it is not altogether false. We are to Self . love and 
remember that Self-love implies a desire for theAffec- 
one's highest individual welfare on the whole. 
It subordinates Appetites and Desires as demanding in- 
stant gratification, to some larger and better enjoyment in 
the future. At the same time, it is dependent in some 



40 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

measure on those for its own gratification. Self-love in 
its narrower sense, as lapsing into selfishness, may come 
in conflict with the Affections, and illegitimately sub- 
ordinate them. But a broad and wise Self-love in the 
form of Prudence may sometimes properly subordinate 
them, while at the same time they are a condition for its 
highest and noblest gratification. The indulgence of 
the Affections may sometimes be unworthy or inordinate, 
and may need, in order to the highest happiness of the 
individual, to be suppressed ; and they may properly be 
cherished only under such conditions as will tend to the 
highest welfare. This will not be incompatible with self- 
denial and sacrifice for those we love, since in the exer- 
cise of those virtues the noblest pleasures of man's being 
consist. 

But Self-love, as we have seen, may become inordinate 
and vicious, and thus may need some check. Here it 
Self-love in comes in conflict with Conscience ; and Con- 
conflict with science must have the right of way, and be the 
supreme and dominant impulse in the soul. 

Let us illustrate these conflicts by some single instances. 
Here is a man who craves some article of food or drink, 
not because he is hungry or thirsty, but because 
it will pleasantly affect the organs of physical 
taste. The money which he would spend for this will 
purchase for him a book, or admit him to a lecture, or 
gratify some other desire of the mind. Here Desire is in 
conflict with Appetite, and it is not difficult to determine 
which of these is the worthier impulse, and therefore 
making the higher demand. But suppose further, there is 
a friend who is in trouble, and whom a small amount of 
money would relieve. This claim would be higher than 



SPRINGS OF ACTION. 41 

that of mere Desire. It may be, however, that the friend 
has committed a crime, and his trouble is that he is likely to 
suffer a just penalty, and that the crime is one against my 
own rights of life and property, and that his deliverance 
from punishment is likely to result in its repetition ; then 
Prudence would be and should be superior to Affection, 
and induce me to let justice take its course. 

But Self-love, as has been intimated, may come in con- 
flict with Conscience. We may not seek our own happi- 
ness where it involves the violation of some moral law, 
even where no Appetite, or Desire, or Affection is con- 
cerned. Here Conscience is paramount, and Self-love 
must be subordinate. It is also evident that Conscience 
may come in conflict with each of the lower impulses, as 
well as that of Self-love. It may demand that the indul- 
gence of Appetite, where such indulgence would harm 
health, or involve much waste, should be suppressed. It 
may also require that the gratification of Desire, if it 
impels to what is hurtful, should be refused. It may be 
that not only the Malevolent Affections, but some inordi- 
nate Benevolent Affections, should be restrained because 
threatening to eventuate in unrighteousness. It must 
thus rule all along the line. It is the most authoritative 
impulse of the soul; and when authority, how- supremacy of 
ever weak, conflicts with any mere strength, how- Consc i en ce. 
ever great, the latter must give way and the former prevail. 

That Conscience is thus supremely authoritative is 
further evident from several considerations. In _ . , . . 

Evident from 

the first place, it may be easily shown that several con- 
» i • i j ij» • it -it i siderations. 

man s highest weltare is secured by yielding to 

this as the paramount authority. The Appetites and Pas- 
sions, when acting in subordination to Self-love, clearly 



42 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

produce a larger amount of happiness than when per- 
mitted to indulge themselves without restraint. We all 
know that unlimited gratification results in such disorder 
of these impulses, that they become causes of misery 
rather than enjoyment ; while a moderate and restricted 
use, or temporary suppression of them results in a larger 
measure of enjoyment in the future. So, too, when Self- 
love antagonizes Conscience, the man who yields to the 
authority of the latter not only secures all the happiness 
that he would in obeying the sole impulse of Self-love, but 
a purer and nobler enjoyment in the consciousness that he 
has done the more fit and manlier thing, and in freedom 
from the sense of degradation that comes from yielding to 
a baser motive. 

Then, again, the man who obeys Conscience is always 
sure that he is actuated by the highest possible principle, 

and is building up a worthy and righteous 
comprehen- character. It is true that a broad and compre- 
maycoin-° Ve hensive Self-love, if we had intelligence enough 
cidewith to see what would be for our highest good, 

might, and probably would, impel to the very 
same conduct to which Conscience would urge, and that 
the results would be coincident. But we are not omnis- 
cient, and Self-love will impel us to such acts as seem to 
us for our highest welfare, whether they really are or not ; 
and for this reason Self-love and Conscience will frequently 
be in conflict. In other words, if we always knew just 
what is right, expediency would doubtless demand the 
doing of it ; but as we do not know with perfect accuracy 
always either the right or the expedient, what seems to us 
to be these are liable to be in conflict. 

But suppose it were possible that Self-love would 



SPRINGS OF ACTION. 43 

prompt only to that which is right, yet even so there 
would be a difference to ourselves between acts . _ 
done under this impulse and those done under between act- 
the impulse of Conscience. We should feel ! n e from Self " 

love as a 

that we had acted more worthily in the latter motive, and 
case than in the former, though the results s^ence^even 
otherwise might be the same. Almost anyone wn en not 
will admit the moral superiority of actions done 
because they are right, over precisely the same actions 
done because they will increase our personal enjoyment. 



44: RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 



CHAPTER IV. 

VIRTUE. 

SECTION 1. — THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 

The term Virtue has been used heretofore in our discus- 
sions in the general and popular sense of moral excellence, 
or of conduct such as the intelligent conscience approves. 
But it needs to be more particularly and scientifically 
understood. 

The word itself is from the Latin virtus; and this is 
derived from vir, the Latin term, not for a human being, 
Ordinal ^ut for one who is more emphatically a man, 
meaning of having something of the nobler and more heroic 
type. Thus it is easy to see how, originally, it 
meant all that is implied in our word " manliness," and 
perhaps something more. It had reference especially to 
military prowess, including the qualities of courage, 
energy, obedience at whatever sacrifice, orderliness, forti- 
tude, and unswerving loyalty. From this meaning the 
transition was easy to that of the moral contest to which 
man is exposed. Qualities similar to those just enumerated 
are implied where one, under the influence of temptation, 
whether of outward allurements or inward impulses, still 
persists in obedience to the law of righteousness. There is 
a call in the contest here implied for courage, energy, 



VIRTUE. 45 

decision of character, independence, loyalty, self-forge tf ill- 
ness, sacrifice, and whatever pertains to the highest man- 
liness. Nobility and greatness of character were never 
displayed on the battlefield, or in any physical exploit, 
which were superior to similar characteristics shown by 
men and women who, in the midst of fierce temptations, 
have been true to their convictions, and steadfast in their 
obedience to moral principle. 

Here a question arises which has interested many minds, 
namely, whether there can be any virtue where there is 
no temptation to do wrong. It has already Can there be 
been implied in the previous discussions that therels^™ 
there is no virtue where there is no possibility Temptation? 
of doing wrong. But under the law of habit, as has been 
shown, it is possible for a human being to arrive at such 
a position that there is no longer any consciousness of 
temptation, because all desires for whatever involves evil 
have been extirpated, and the soul craves only what is 
morally right. Now, the action of such a person may 
properly be called virtuous, not simply because he never 
does wrong and always does right, but because he has, 
through contests, and the putting forth of energies, and 
in the exercise of self-denials, and through sacrifices, 
achieved this condition. It is the result of conflicts 
valiantly waged and successfully accomplished. There- 
fore his present state may rightly be regarded as virtuous. 

Nevertheless, one may be permitted to believe that 
not all moral excellence is virtue in its highest or in its 
strictest sense. It is evident that we instinc- Not all moral 
tively estimate the degree of virtue by the ^regarded 
greater or less degree of inducement to the as Virtue, 
contrary ; and where there is an absence of such induce- 



46 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

ment we can hardly consider it as virtue at all. Dr. 
Peabody says that we do not think of attributing virtue 
to a child not come to years of accountability, notwith- 
standing it may have many beautiful traits of character, 
and great innocence and amiability. But there may be 
certain characteristics of adults which have no taint of 
vice in them, but which are still not virtuous. Some per- 
sons have a quiet, dull constitution; and their freedom 
from wickedness is not from the power of moral principle, 
but from lack of energy. A very lazy man is free from 
certain vices into which an energetic, restless man is 
likely to fall. Then, again, men are free from certain vices 
simply from want of opportunity. Their environment has 
been such as to preclude certain inducements to do wrong. 
It is often the case that a man who has sustained a good 
character for years, even till middle life, or verging upon 
old age, suddenly falls into wrong-doing. It is not that 
all his life before was one of superior virtue, and that he 
has all at once become vicious, but he has come into what 
are to him unprecedented conditions ; and the propensity 
which till now has had nothing to call it into action, 
though existing in all its latent power, is suddenly awak- 
ened, and the man falls an easy prey. 

Virtue, then, may be denned as conformity to the moral 

law, or obedience to Conscience as the impulse to do what 

we judge to be right, and to refrain from what 

Definition. J . ~* u "U +1. ■ u 

we judge to be wrong, where there is, or has 
been, opportunity, and more or less inducement, to do the 
opposite. 



VIRTUE, 47 

SECTION 2. — RELATION OF VIRTUE TO PIETY. 

These terms obviously have not the same signification, 
though a clear discrimination is not always made in the 
use of them. Piety, or Religion, has reference to the rela- 
tions of the soul to God, and the obligations growing out 
of those relations. Virtue has reference to all kinds of 
moral relations and obligations. It is conceivable that a 
sceptic, or even an atheist, may be virtuous, though, by 
the very nature of the case, destitute of piety. He may 
recognize his relations to his fellow-men, and that certain 
duties arise therefrom ; and he may discharge all the obli- 
gations herein implied. I do not undertake now to dis- 
cuss the question whether this unbelief in God comes 
from a neglect of using means of information which he 
was under obligation to use, or, in other words, whether 
there are any honest sceptics and atheists. This is at 
least conceivable, that such persons may be virtuous, though 
not religious. Most of us have known some such unbe- 
lievers whose moral character, as distinguished from their 
religious character, was without reproach. 

But there is a sense in which Virtue implies Religion ; 
and, on the other hand, there is a sense in which Religion, 
or Piety, implies Virtue. Virtue, as we have seen, con- 
sists in obedience to the moral law, as far as it is or may 
be known. This applies to our relations to all beings in 
the universe with whom we are brought into any kind of 
moral relations. Now, we are in relations with God of a 
most intimate and solemn character. We are bound to 
act in moral accordance with these relations. To do so 
is Virtue, and not to do so is the contrary of Virtue. 
Hence to those who know their relations to God, and 



48 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

refuse to act in accordance with these relations, we cannot 
attribute virtuous conduct. To such to be not religious 
is to be not virtuous. 

On the other hand, a religious person must be virtuous. 
There are those who deny this, and hold that morality and 
Piety implies pi e ty ar e quite independent of each other. It 
Virtue. j s true they are not the same ; yet since, as we 

have had occasion to see, the moral law is also the law of 
God, and as to be religious implies the doing of the will 
of God, no vicious or immoral person can be regarded as 
a pious person. The converse of this is not true in so far 
as it is conceivable that one may be ignorant of God and 
all relations to him. On the whole, it may be said that 
Virtue is a broader term than Piety, and that Piety itself 
is a Virtue. 

SECTION 3. — THE VIRTUES. 

Heretofore Virtue has been spoken of as a characteristic 
of the soul, and it is in this sense one and indivisible. 
Vi t a a -^ consists in a settled purpose or general dis- 
quaiity of position to conf orm to the law of right, and to 
obey conscience. But it has many forms of 
manifestation; and these forms take on the names of 
Virtues. Attempts have been made to form these into 
Groups of groups, but with indifferent success. There 
Virtues. j s danger in such a division that some kinds 
of conduct may be regarded as virtues which are not 
virtues ; as, for instance, Prudence is by many writers 
is Prudence regarded as a virtue. In a certain sense, and 
a Virtue ? by an accommodation of language, this may be 
allowable ; but in strict propriety it is not so. It may be 
our duty to be prudent, — and imprudence is certainly 



VIRTUE. 49 

sometimes a vice, — but prudence may be practised from 
the mere impulse of self-love, with no thought of moral 
principle connected with it. It is prudent for a man to 
protect himself from the cold in a severe day by wearing 
an overcoat ; but he protects himself for his own comfort, 
and for his own health's sake, and not because the act has 
any moral character. A man may put up an umbrella 
when it rains, but that is not necessarily a virtuous act. 
It is true we may do the same things at one time under 
the impulse of Conscience that we do at another from Self- 
love. In the one case it is a virtue : in the other it is not. 

Fortitude is usually regarded as a virtue. It is undoubt- 
edly a worthy trait of character ; and the person who is 
wholly destitute of it, or who has it in only a Fortitude a 
small degree, can but stand lower, both in his not^iwaysor 
own respect and in the respect of his fellow- necessarily, 
men, than if he had it. It may be a virtue, and that, too, 
of high rank ; still, it is not necessarily so. The savage 
Indian, captured by his savage foes, and subjected to the 
most excruciating torture, bears with the greatest equa- 
nimity the utmost that can be done to him, even some- 
times taunting his tormentors with the tameness of their 
inventions ; but this may be from an impulse of pride, 
and not from any moral principle. There are many other 
worthy and excellent traits of character which are so akin 
to the virtues as to be commonly reckoned among them, 
bnt which, nevertheless, so far differ from them that they 
must be regarded as really something else, and only come 
up to the grade of virtues when the motive to them is of 
a purely moral character. 

The second part of this volume will set forth the various 
virtues which pertain to men governed by moral principles. 



BOOK II. 

PRACTICAL ETHICS. 

51 



PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. 

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT. 

Practical Ethics comprises the application of the prin- 
ciples developed in Theoretical Ethics, and also a classifi- 
cation and explanation of the various duties classes of 
involved. These duties are naturally divided Duti e s - 
into three groups, and will be treated under the follow- 
ing heads : — 

Part I. Duties to Self. 
Part II. Duties to our Fellow-men : 
Division I. Justice. 

Class 1. Domestic Duties. 
Class 2. Duties to Individuals. 
Class 3. Duties to Society. 
Division II. Beneficence. 
Part III. Duties to God. 

All duties are primarily due to God as being our 
Creator, and therefore having a supreme claim on all our 
powers of service of every sort. He has also instituted 
the relations between us and all other beings ; and conse- 
quently the obligations which spring out of these relations 
are of Divine ordinance, and therefore binding upon us. 
It is true, that, if we could conceive of ourselves as having 

53 



54 



RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 



no such relations to God, but only our present relations to 
other beings, there would still be duties implied in these 
relations. Hence there is a double obligation : we are to 
treat our fellow-man righteously because he is our fellow- 
Double man, and also because God, for reasons of his 

towwdTour own > re( l u i res ft °f us > as ne would have a right 
Fellow-men. to require it even if we had no perception of 
the relations between us and them. 

For these reasons the natural order of presentation 
would be to begin with the duties we owe to God, or 
Religious Ethics. But as we learn largely through expe- 
rience our duties and obligations, and as we naturally 
begin with what is nearest to us, it is thought best to 
follow the order of development thus implied rather than 
the other order. . 



PART I. 

DUTIES TO SELF. 

55 



GENERAL DUTY OF SELF-CULTURE. 



The ultimate of all duty implied here is that of acquir- 
ing a perfectly worthy character. All other duties to self 
are subsidiary to this. Indeed, it may be said The t 
that all other duties of every sort contribute to End of ail 
this, whether this be the immediate object or u y 
not. To have a pure, strong, symmetrical, and attractive 
character, is immeasurably superior to all other wealth 
and all other good, and, we may well say, is the chief end 
of man's existence. But in this, as in all other great 
achievements, there is implied a great variety of methods 
and operations. These we shall consider in order. 



CHAPTER I. 

DUTIES TO THE BODY. 

It may seem to superficial thinkers that attention to a 
material and temporary organism hardly deserves to be 
reckoned among ethical duties. But, if we ImT)ortance 
carefully consider the subject, we shall see that of Duties to 
these duties, even if last in importance, are first e 0I ' 
in the order of time. Clearly enough, as under our 
present constitution a properly trained body is a condition 

57 



58 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

for the effective action of the soul, before all things we 
must bestow a certain kind and amount of care upon it. 
If no care be taken of the body the soul will be crippled 
and enfeebled in its activities. The desirableness that 
this one great instrument of the soul should, as nearly 
as possible, approximate perfection, is too obvious for 
discussion. 

SECTION 1. — SUBSISTENCE. 

The first duty we owe our bodies is to provide the 
things essential to their subsistence. The body must have 
nourishment to supply the waste of its tissues constantly 
taking place. It must also have raiment and shelter 
suitable to preserve it from the effects of varying temper- 
ature, and other conditions to which it is constantly 
exposed. Provision of these kinds implies many others 
which easily suggest themselves. 

The great leading virtue here involved is Industry. 
Productive labor is the duty of every man, unless in some 
The virtue of wa y incapacitated for it. Nature abundantly 
industry. furnishes the materials to supply human waste ; 
but they are not available without human labor. This 
duty of industry is universal. In its broad sense there is 
no laboring class. Every able-bodied man, who is also 
This duty mentally competent, is under obligation to pro- 
universal, duce, at least, as much as he consumes. In- 
herited wealth furnishes no exemption from this obligation. 
It is one of the evils of modern society, as it doubtless 
was of ancient, that men who are rich, and are not com- 
pelled by fear of want to labor, think that, therefore, they 
have no such duty. This is a great mistake, and very 
many of the moral and economic evils of our times come 



DUTIES TO THE BODY. 59 

from it. Wealth, like many another gift of Providence, 
brings with it its responsibilities, and among these is the 
duty of using this wealth in such a manner as. Dutiesim . 
will be productive of the greatest good to the posed by 
community. This cannot well be accomplished 
unless the owner give himself to some kind of labor of 
body or mind. By this is not meant that every man 
should engage in business enterprises, or that one should 
not under certain circumstances retire from business. 
But he has no right to be indolent, or refuse to occupy 
himself with work that will be beneficial to the com- 
munity generally. 

It is doubtless a blessing to humanity that men's wants 
are made the occasion for labor, since but for this motive 
most men would never do any protracted, systematic 
work. But it is a crying evil that there are men who 
live on the wealth of their ancestors, and add nothing to 
the wealth of the community. 

Here we may properly consider the duty of securing 
a competence for the future. If it be the duty of a man to 
produce by his labor those commodities or their equivalent, 
the consumption of which is a condition of his continued 
temporal existence, plainly this duty is not limited by his 
present daily needs. In the life of every person there are 
likely to come days and months and possibly years, when 
he cannot labor. It is his duty as far as practicable to pro- 
vide beforehand for these emergencies. It is true Dutvt0T)r() . 
some cannot do this. There are those whose pow- vide for the 
ers of body or mind are too feeble to achieve u ure ' 
more than the supply for each day as it comes, and the 
supply is often scanty at that. But it is practicable for a 
large proportion of men, not only to produce what they 



60 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

consume as they go along, but while they have their 
health and strength to produce more than they consume. 
The virtues here implied are those of diligence, frugality, 
Virtues an( l economy, though the last term has a broader 

implied here, signification than would be assigned to it in 
the present connection. Like some other virtues it im- 
plies more or less of temporary self-denial and sacrifice. 
But it may be prompted by self-love, and may stop short 
of a moral virtue. It is, nevertheless, a duty as well as a 
policy of prudence. 

The call for self-denial here comes from the conflict of 
the appetites and the desires both with the demand of 
self-love and that of conscience. There are so many 
cravings for instant gratification, the most positive dic- 
tates of prudence are overcome, while the voice of duty 
is wholly unheard. Yet there are moments when it is 
heard above both the clamorings of passion and the de- 
mands of selfishness. Not all the poverty in the world 
comes from disregard of the duties of industry, frugality, 
and economy, but unquestionably a great part of it is due 
to this. 

To what extent frugality should be carried is a question 
of some interest. There may be a saving that is incon- 
Extentto sistent with economy. When one denies to 
ity shonWbe" one ' s se ^ what is essential to the preservation 
carried, of vigor, and for the sake of accumulation par- 

takes of insufficient and innutritious food, and is clad with 
rags, or lives in a filthy den instead of a comfortable, even 
if a humble dwelling, one becomes either incompetent to 
produce, or settles into the wretched condition of a miser, 
whose character and state are fitly indicated by the term 
itself. 



DUTIES TO THE BODY. 61 

Is there a moral justification of the accumulation of 
great fortunes? There has been in the past, as there is in 
the present, so much of injustice and fraud, so much of 
advantage taken of the less shrewd and more scrupulous 
by the more shrewd and less scrupulous in the acquisition 
of wealth, and so much of vain and vulgar display and 
wanton wastefulness in its use, that many good people 
have an uncomfortable feeling in the contemplation of 
great riches. But surely wealth acquired by legitimate 
means is not a necessary evil, either to its Wealth not a 
possessor or to the community. By legitimate necessary 
means is implied generally that this wealth is 
really produced by the possessor of it. That one person 
may be able to produce five, ten, twenty, or even a hun- 
dred times as much as another, and that, too, without sub- 
tracting from another's share, but rather helping the 
accumulation of others, is as obvious as that one man may 
have greater physical strength or more mental power than 
another. It would seem that to a man who has this gift 
of producing much wealth, no matter how much, such pro- 
duction is not only permissible but obligatory. The more 
wealth there is in the community, provided it is not 
unjustly obtained or improperly used, the better it is for 
the community. 

In the present state of human society there must be 
great capitals for the operation of business enterprises on 
a scale that will supply the wants of men. GreatcaT)i . 
With the steady and rapid increase of popula- tais neces- 
tion in all civilized nations, but for these vast sary ' 
productive agencies which would be impossible but for 
great accumulations of capital, population would soon 
trench upon production, and there would be an immense 



62 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

increase of poverty and suffering. These accumulations 
could not take place under our present social system, 
except by the efforts and enterprise of individuals en- 
dowed with unusual business ability. This, doubtless, 
has very much to do with our relations to our fellow-men, 
and involves certain duties to them. But it also concerns 
our duties to ourselves. 

SECTION 2. — HEALTH. 

A sound body is of inestimable importance to every man. 
As an instrument of the soul, and a condition for its 
Physical effective action, we need to make it and keep it 
vigor essen- as nearly perfect as possible. As previously re- 
marked, a weak, sickly, crippled body is an incal- 
culable detriment to the mind. It is true, there have been 
instances of persons with feeble bodies who have yet been 
wonderfully efficient in the world. Of some of these the 
influence has been far-reaching in their own generation, 
and has perpetuated itself in the subsequent ages. But 
these are exceptional instances ; only a very few have been 
able to overcome their physical disadvantages, and they 
were persons of extraordinary mental endowments. It is 
something of an argument against the materialistic philos- 
ophy that there have been such minds, and that they have 
been so far superior to physical conditions as to indicate 
that mind is not a mere function of matter. It is evi- 
dently superior to the body, and uses the latter simply as 
its instrument ; and some minds with very poor instru- 
ments can achieve more than others with good ones. 

The duties we owe to the body in respect to health, are 
partly implied in what has already been set forth under 
the head of subsistence. There must be suitable and 



DUTIES TO THE BODY. 63 

sufficient food, raiment, and shelter, not only that the body 
may be kept alive, but that it may be kept in health. In- 
dustry, diligence, and the careful calculation The duty of 
which is implied in economy, are essential to Health. 
this end. Some fail in these respects through sheer indo- 
lence, and others through various self-indulgences, or 
by exchanging the produce of their labor for that which 
does not meet their wants. 

To this end men must also cultivate Temperance. I do 
not use the term here in its popular sense of abstinence 
from intoxicating beverages. Abstinence, not p^,.^ 
only from these, but from certain other objects meaning of 
of appetite, is a duty. But the word is used em P erance - 
here in the broad sense of restraining one's appetites 
within their proper limits. Men are tempted to eat and 
drink, not only what is wholesome and invigorating, but 
what is harmful and enfeebling. Even many things which, 
when received in reasonable quantities, are nourishing and 
healthful, may be partaken of so largely as to more than 
neutralize the good effect they would normally produce. 
So men become gluttons and gormandizers, and breed 
various diseases and distempers of the body. 

In order to the perfection of the physical powers, one 
must exercise steady control over the appetites. This is 
not a difficult matter when these propensities have not 
been indulged so far as to grow into tyrannical habits. 
But when the latter is the case, the effort and Control of 
care required are very great, and to many a poor the appetites 
victim it seems well-nigh hopeless. It is so no cu ' 
much easier when we once have the mastery to retain it 
than to regain it when we have lost it, that one needs to 
beware how he relaxes his vigilance. There are multitudes 



64 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS, 

of physical wrecks in our communities; and to a very 
large extent these are the results of intemperance in the 
Consequences sense 0I " immoderate use of such things as are 
of intemper- good in themselves, or, it may be, indispensable 
within their proper limits. There are other 
multitudes who, while not wrecks, still lack much that 
belongs to manly vigor and power. 

It should be noted that we are not now insisting on 
health merely in the sense that there is an absence of 
positive disease. That is but a kind of negative physical 
condition. There may be, and it is our business to see 
that there is, over and above this, an abounding vitality, 
an energy, and an elasticity, which multiply one's effec- 
tiveness many fold. In order to this, there must be in 
addition to the conditions already mentioned several 
others. Both men and women need to have an eye to 
sanitary effect in the matter of Dress. There is a vulgar 
Moral reia- an( ^ s ^ an gy expression when persons are spoken 
tion of Dress. f as « dressed to kill," which might well be 
wrested from its disreputable connections, and put to a 
sober and sensible use, for I fear it indicates a very 
unpleasant truth about a considerable number of persons. 

Another duty is that of Cleanliness. This is so obvious 
that it becomes almost offensive to speak of it, as though 
m , there might be some lack in this respect. 

The generous & r 

use of Surely there is no call, as most men are situated, 

to be economical in the use of water. It is 
scarcely of more importance as a matter of decency than 
as a condition for physical health. A large part of the 
Old Testament religious ceremonial regimen consists of 
directions for washings and cleansings of the body. 
Many other ancient religions lay much stress on this. 



DUTIES TO THE BODY. 65 

Physical purity is no doubt intended to symbolize spiritual 
and inward purity. But it is none the less a very great 
virtue in itself. 

There is a whole group of duties somewhat closely 
affiliated but not of inferior importance. A certain 
amount of Sleep is absolutely essential to the 
best physical condition. That it should occur 
at regular intervals, and as far as possible be undisturbed, 
is obvious. The constitution of things is happily such as 
to conspire to this end. The night when men cannot 
work to advantage, and when in a well-ordered community 
business largely ceases, and there are peace and quiet, is 
evidently the time for sleep. It is unfortunate when 
either the customs of society or individual habits turn 
night into day or the reverse. 

There must be periods of Rest and this aside from sleep. 
These are not necessarily times of idleness or vacuity, 
but opportunities for the mind and body to Rest recrea . 
relax themselves and give way to spontaneous tion, and 
activity within the limits of one's own phys- 
ical welfare and the liberties and privileges of others. 
To persons of sedentary occupation this may be coinci- 
dent with Physical exercise and Recreation. Play in the 
proper sense of that term, when the faculties unbend 
themselves and are released from their ordinary strains 
and allowed to act more freely, giving a certain zest and 
exhilaration to the mind, is almost indispensable to a 
large number of persons. There are doubtless few among 
the young who need exhortation to this as a duty ; yet 
these few by refraining from relaxation do great damage 
to their physical constitution. 

Finally, Regularity of habits is among the chief utilities 



66 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

tending to physical welfare. To have our hours for work, 
for sleep, for exercise, for society, for meditation, for eat- 
ing, and for resting, to order our lives on some well- 
digested plan, tends powerfully to sound health and the 
prolongation of life. It is true there is a possibility of 
going to an extreme in this attempt to live by rule, 
important Some have laid down for themselves such 
functions of minute regulations that they have left no room 
impuse. ^ ^ e pi a y £ h ea itiiy impulse. And yet our 
impulses are a part of our constitution and have an office 
to perform. To shut them out from all part in the gov- 
ernment of our lives is to ignore Providence, set up an 
arbitrary system, and do ourselves much harm. To know 
all the conditions on which physical prosperity depends is 
not given to man. Hence we must depend, to a certain 
extent, upon certain instinctive impulses which are given 
us for a wise purpose. They are to be kept subordinate, 
but they are not useless. In a man of perfectly healthy 
soul and body their action is likely to coincide with the 
decision of sound reason. 

SECTION 3. — PERSONAL APPEARANCE. 

Among our duties to ourselves is certainly included 
some attention to our Personal appearance. It cannot be a 
matter of indifference from a moral point of view whether 
we are personally agreeable or disagreeable to others. 
That we are under obligation to rid ourselves, as far as 
possible, of whatever tends to the latter condition and to 
cultivate whatever tends to the former, is fairly evident 
on the face of it. It is true that not every one has phys- 
ical beauty, either of face or of form. But most can keep 
themselves from being offensive and repulsive. An indi- 



DUTIES TO THE BODY. 67 

viclual may be plain or even deformed, and yet win 
respect and approval by cultivating certain physical vir- 
tues. Among these are neatness, good taste, skilful 
management of the body, and the avoidance of Cu i tivation 
the opposite of these, as negligence, carelessness, of this char- 
slovenliness, and slouching, clownish habits. 
One need not be a " dandy " or a " dude ; " indeed, the 
qualities implied in these terms are to be avoided quite as 
much as those just previously mentioned ; but every one 
may have and should have good manners (and good morals 
include these), a certain dignity and self-respect, a sense 
of propriety, and a mingling of gentleness and manliness. 
These are all elements of inestimable personal value. 

SECTION 4. — CHASTITY. 

This subject pertains not more to the welfare of the body 
than to the moral health of the soul, but it may perhaps be 
better considered here than elsewhere. It is all Reasons for 
the more of vital importance because of its seclu- its consider- 
sion from the range of general discussion by its 
very nature, and by the fact that its violation is among 
the secret vices into which so many are liable to fall. 

The consequences of incontinence to the body are of 
the most damaging character. It generates the foulest 
diseases and makes miserable wrecks of thousands of men 
and women. It saps the foundation of all manly vigor 
and mightily diminishes all power of usefulness. In com- 
munities where it is most prevalent a physically feeble and 
puny race is the consequence. 

The effect on the mind is still more disastrous. In- 
dulgence is preceded by unworthy and base thoughts 
and impure imaginations, always tending more and more 



68 



RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 



to familiarize the subject with vice, and to reconcile one to 
its naturally repulsive features. Nothing is more destruc- 
Effect on the tive oi mental vigor, of refined and delicate sen- 
mind - sibilities, and of spiritual vitality, than sensual 

conduct and the indulgence of the imagination in impure 
conceptions. The mind under such perverted culture be- 
comes a nest of filthy abominations, from which at last the 
wretched victim would fly if it were possible to escape. 

Its influence on the community is incalculably evil. If 
Effect on the generally indulged, the disorder and wretched- 
community. ness wou i(} De appalling. Homes there would 
be none, families would be broken up, children would 
be cared for only by the public, and the whole moral 
structure of society would tend to utter dissolution. 

Finally, it would be a moral and religious evil of the 
most calamitous character. No personal duty is more 
clearly indicated by natural religion, and more frequently 
and explicitly set forth in the Bible, than that of Chastity. 
To disregard its obligations is more palpable rebellion 
against the Divine authority and the Divine government 
than is found in almost any other sin. All considerations, 
moral, religious, social, personal, and prudential, cry out 
with a loud voice to every young person, " Keep thyself 
pure." 



DUTIES TO THE MIND. 69 



CHAPTER II. 

DUTIES TO THE MIND. 

In general, our duty to the mind is to make it as effec- 
tive and powerful as possible in all its depart- General 
ments. It is not possible for every one to give dut y- 
a very large proportion of time to mental culture, but a 
certain amount can be given even by the least favored; 
many are so situated that this will coincide with their main 
business. In order to the achievement of great mental 
strength there must be an harmonious development of the 
several faculties and powers. There is in our times, as 
perhaps there has been in all times, a tendency to one-sided 
mental development, certain powers being cultivated to the 
neglect of others. Thus there has been and is a want of 
proportion and symmetry, a lack of balance and there- 
fore of effectiveness. 

SECTION 1. — DUTIES TO THE INTELLECT. 

As the body is a condition for the action of the soul 
generally, so is the Intellect a condition for the action of 
the Sensibilities and the Will. As a condition it Relation of 
is lower in importance than these, being in * he In ^ e !j ect ' 
relation to them as means to an end. For, how- and Will, 
ever true it may be that intellectual exercise is itself a satis- 
faction, yet this satisfaction can only exist as the Sensibili- 



70 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

ties are affected by the knowledge. It is the business of 
the Intellect to perceive, to reason, to imagine, to investi- 
gate, and, finally, to know. 1 

At the beginning of this discussion of Duties to one's 
self, it was laid down as a general obligation, embracing 
Mental train- a ^ others, to acquire a perfect character. Evi- 
inganddis- dently ignorance would imply a very great 
cip 1D imperfection. It is, therefore, a duty to secure 

knowledge. To this end there must be much training and 
discipline of the faculties. We must not only know how 
to read intelligently, and to take in oral discourse, but to 
observe, to compare, to discriminate, to judge correctly, 
to generalize, and to think deeply and widely. Some men 
can devote much time to this intellectual culture ; and it 
is their duty to use their opportunity to its utmost extent. 
The majority of men have not so much time to devote to 
this purpose, but all have the means of securing a cer- 
tain amount of knowledge ; and by using diligently such 
means as they have, by keeping eyes and ears open, by 
improving all opportunities to gain information, they will 
prove that gross ignorance is not a necessity. 

But it is not knowledge, nor learning alone, that is the 
end of this duty. There are many learned men who yet 
Wisdom lack wisdom ; and we have high authority for 
L W n/n aS asserting that " Wisdom is the principal thing." 
necessary. Wisdom is the ability to adapt means to ends, 
to apprehend the signification of things which are ob- 
served, and to estimate their relative value and utility. 
It ascertains sometimes at a glance the nature of a diffi- 
culty, and discerns its solution. It is nearly synonymous 
with good judgment, and, when found among the un- 

1 Dr. Hopkins's Outline Study of Man. 



DUTIES TO THE MIND. 



71 



learned or uneducated, as it not unfrequently is, it goes 
by the name of common sense. 

To have a fair share of the qualities implied in this 
ability is to have valuable elements of character; and 
there are few that need to be destitute of this fair share, 
if they will take the trouble to seek it. To be without it 
implies a certain moral as well as intellectual poverty, and 
a lack of energy and enterprise that is not justifiable. 

But it is our duty not merely to get Knowledge and 
Wisdom, but to get Power. The intellect is an instrument, 
and as such it should be made as perfect as possible. 
Every man is a member of society ; and it is the duty of 
each member to contribute, not simply what may be called 
" his share," but as much as he can, to the common weal. 
God has made each individual for some particu- Th Hi h 
lar purpose, and has endowed him with the rudi- Power to be 
mentary means by the development of which he soug 
may the most completely effect that purpose. Some men 
have natural ability for the pursuits of science ; and among 
the sciences one may be fitted for a mathematician, another 
to be an adept in Chemistry or Biology, and another in 
Natural History. In other lines one may be adapted to 
philosophy, and one to literature, or to oratory, or his- 
tory ; still others find their congenial fields in business, or 
exploration, or in politics. It is for each to cultivate the 
gift that is in him, to become a man of as much power as 
possible. In this way only will each one fulfil his own 
vocation, and attain to the wealth of character which he 
owes to himself ; and the community will be richer and 
mightier than would otherwise be possible. 

I have not undertaken to speak of the separate powers 
of the intellect ; but there is one to which it may be well 



72 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

to devote a brief space. The Imagination is a faculty of 
the mind which, while looked upon by some as ornamental 
Utility of the rather than useful, and by others as though 
imagination. w h lly idle and unreal, is nevertheless of vast 
benefit and great importance in its moral bearings. Imagi- 
nation is the power to combine conceptions into new 
wholes, and to modify these at pleasure. It deals not 
with the real but with the ideal. It is of value in forming 
plans of projects to be accomplished, or at least to be 
considered. It is essential to invention, since the inventor 
needs to have the idea of that which he is preparing in 
his mind so that he can change it, or adapt it to its uses, 
and determine its proportions and necessary elements. It 
is not confined in this respect to mechanical contrivances : 
it has to do with thoughts and schemes of thoughts which 
are to be developed into treatises, and with hypotheses 
which are to be tested by scientific investigation. It also 
has much to do with scenes which it may conjure up or 
construct, and on which it delights to dwell. 

Here is where its moral influence becomes palpable. 
We may form images and pictures of pure or of impure 
its Moral things in our minds. There are certain combi- 
Vaiue. nations and representations on which one de- 

lights to dwell ; and he encourages these, and keeps them 
in mind, and recalls them in moments of leisure. It 
depends very much on the character of these representa- 
tions what the character of the subject of them shall be. 
If he delights in representations of noble, elevating, and 
clear conceptions, these will come into his mind, and will 
be welcomed there ; and he will be made by the contem- 
plation of them nobler, purer, and more worthy. If, on 
the other hand, he is accustomed to bring before his mind 



DUTIES. TO THE MIND. 73 

images of impurity, and representations of vicious enjoy- 
ments, even though he commits no overt vicious act, he is 
still preparing himself, by the corruption of his soul, for 
evil practice, into which he will easily fall when the 
temptation presents himself. 

The moral uses of imagination are seen again in bring- 
ing before the mind ideals of moral goodness and exalted 
worth. In nearly all our plans of life, secular The Advan _ 
as well as religious, we set before us consciously tage of moral 
or unconsciously some ideal which all strive 
with more or less earnestness to realize. One young man 
has in his mind that he will be a man of science, another 
will take the line of literature, another of business ; and 
each sets before his mind, and holds in his imagination, 
the kind of person in several respects that he means to 
become. So, in the formation of moral character: a 
young man has something of an ideal of the character 
which he hopes to realize. It may be a low and unworthy 
one, or a high and noble and yet imperfect, one ; but the 
higher and better it is, the more likely he is to become 
an upright, honorable, and reputable person. These 
ideals have an incalculable influence on character and 
destiny. 

SECTION" 2. — THE SENSIBILITIES. 

A man's duties in this region of his personality are not 
perhaps at first glance so obvious as they are elsewhere, 
but they are not less real. It is here that the importance 
great springs of character are found ; and if ° f Q °™ j^ 
these be properly regulated and subjected to sibilitips. 
the law of righteousness, all other powers are likely to 
rightly order themselves. 



74 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

Using the term Desires in the broad sense as covering all 
the cravings of the soul, we shall easily see that the great 
general duty concerning our sensibilities is to keep them 
within their normal limits, and at the same time in their 
full vigor. We have already learned that the duties we 
owe to our bodies include the control and proper disci- 
pline of the appetites. Our duties to the mind involve 
the training and chastening of all the other desires. If 
we carefully observe the development of our own char- 
acter, we shall find that, especially at an undisciplined 
stage of development, there are desires for certain im- 
proper things. There is also a lack of desire for certain 
things that are proper, and even essential to the welfare of 
the person. Again, we find some desires even for things 
useful and profitable that are too strong, and others that 
are too weak. On the one hand there is an obligation to 
create and to strengthen desire, and on the other to 
Difficulty of diminish and suppress it. The apparent diffi- 
controlling cu ltv here is in the fact that the desires are 

the Sensi- J 

bilities. under the control of natural law, and not sub- 

ject to the direct action of the Will. But, as we have 
seen, though the will cannot directly create or increase a 
desire, nor the contrary, it can do so indirectly. Desire 
grows by being gratified, and is weakened, and may be 
finally extirpated, by being denied gratification. We may 
also ply ourselves with motives so that desires will spring 
up which previously did not exist, and will grow weak 
AbT and diminish where exciting motives are re- 

control our moved. In other words, though environment 

environment, r. r -i • n • j_i j.* i?i_ 

torms a powertul influence in the creation 01 char- 
acter, environment may be modified or wholly changed. 
But the great characteristic of moral disorder in the 






DUTIES TO THE MIND. 75 

sensibilities is the fact of antagonistic desires and impulses. 
There are cravings for things which are incompatible with 
each other: to gratify one is to refuse grati- Antagonistic 
fication to another. The child wishes to eat desires. 
his cake to-day, and also wishes to keep it till to-morrow. 
To do the one is to render the other impossible. A young 
woman has earned a sum of money by labor of some kind. 
She desires to use it in purchasing a gold watch. She 
also desires to expend it for a term at an academy. She 
cannot do both. A young man has reached a certain stage 
in the indulgence of his appetite. He wishes to drink 
with his boon companions, or, possibly, by himself. He 
also wishes to be regarded as a sober, temperate, and re- 
spectable person. He is convinced that he cannot gratify 
both of these desires. To gratify one is to deny the other. 
So we shall find that there may be two, three, or four sets 
of conflicting desires in the same mind at the same time. 
The problem is to harmonize these desires so that there 
will be no conflict. This would be a condition of complete 
liberty as well as of entire peace, whereas the other is that 
of restraint, bondage, and contest: of not having what 
one wants, and having a great many things that he does 
not want. Such a state must be one of unhappiness. The 
only method of emancipation is to discipline the desires so 
that they shall be in harmony. When we come to desire 
only what is right and proper, — to desire all things that 
we ought to have, — then our desires will have no longer 
conflict ; then we shall have whatever we desire, and we 
shall have nothing we do not desire. 

This is the state of perfect personal freedom. It may be 
illustrated by the accompanying diagram. We have first 
the line A, of perfect rectitude, representing what a theist 



76 



)IMENTARY ETHICS. 



would call the Divine desire, which would of course imply 
the Divine will. We have in the figure B a congeries of 
The attain- lines crossing and antagonizing one another in 

Sete °ersonai ^ sorts °^ ways > — a state °^ conflict and con- 
Liberty, fusion, the condition of an untrained and undis- 
ciplined human soul. The remedy for this evil condition is, 



A 




D 



as previously remarked, to get these lines of desire to run 
in the same direction, — that is, parallel with each other. 
This can be accomplished by getting each to run parallel 
with the Divine desire ; then, according to the familiar 
axiom, they must run parallel with each other. 

The third figure, C, represents an effort to train the desires 
in the direction indicated. There is still more or less con- 



DUTIES TO THE MIND. 77 

flict, but there is improvement. This is the condition of a 
large proportion of persons whom we know. In the fourth 
figure, D, we have the training completed ; each desire runs 
parallel with the Divine standard line. All antagonism 
has ceased. The soul desires nothing it cannot have ; it 
has nothing it does not desire. It has become adjusted to 
the eternal laws, and is at peace, and in the infinite liberty 
of the truth. 

It is furthermore incumbent on us to cultivate our 
Esthetic feelings. Good Taste, a delight in beauty, and 
avoidance of what is intrinsically repulsive, Esthetic cui- 
provided it does not arise from unavoidable ture - 
conditions, these appertain to a perfect character, and 
are to be cultivated, though in subordination to other 
duties. We cannot all be great artists any more than 
we can be great scholars, or possess great wealth, or great 
genius ; but we may all cultivate a love for what is beauti- 
ful ; and good taste is wholly compatible with good sense. 

It is also our duty to possess a cheerful spirit. To be 
always gloomy or morose, to look upon the a cheerful 
dark side of things, to make ourselves unhappy disposition, 
by magnifying and multiplying the evils with which we 
come in contact, is to subtract much from the value of 
character and the joy of living. It is true that this, like 
many another virtue, may be carried to excess and thus 
become a fault. One may be frivolous and trifling, and 
so become superficial and thoughtless. But a genuinely 
cheerful disposition, looking upon the pleasant side of 
even the ills of life, always finding something to be 
thankful for, is not only compatible with a sober, sensible, 
and deeply earnest character, but it is something to be 
sought for and cherished with great diligence. 



78 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

Not the least among the duties to the sensibilities is 
Character the cultivation of a quick and sensitive Conscience. 

and supreme jf w hat has been said concerning the con- 
importance of m & 
Conscience, science in another place is substantially cor- 
rect, its seat is here in the sensibilities, and it is the most 
authoritative of all our impulses. We have seen that it 
always impels us to do what we judge to be right, and 
restrains us from what we judge to be wrong. We have 
nothing to do in the training of the conscience in this 
respect as if it might do the opposite and so need rectifica- 
tion. If it does anything, it does this, and not something 
inconsistent with it. We may love or hate what we 
ought not to ; our desires and appetites may crave what 
they should not, and this abnormal action we need to be 
able to change by such means as we have seen to be prac- 
ticable ; but the Conscience never prompts us to do what 
we judge to be wrong, and so in this respect needs no 
change. But while the Conscience always impels in the 
right direction, if at all, it may become weak and ineffi- 
cient ^through neglect and inattention. When men who 
have begun to disregard the voice of Conscience persist in 
this bad usage, that voice will to their apprehension grow 
weaker and weaker till possibly it ceases to have any 
effect on the evil-doer. It is a lamentable loss to human 
character when the voice of this inward monitor becomes 
deadened even in a moderate degree ; how much more when 
Evil fa it virtually becomes altogether silent. The duty 
deadened here then, evidently, is to keep the Conscience 
onscience. q U i c k anc [ tender, to treat its slightest warning 
with attention, to obey its every behest. In this way, and 
in this way only, will one come to have a healthy moral 
character and a steady defence against all practical evils. 



DUTIES TO THE MIND. 



SECTION 3. — DUTIES TO THE WILL. 

The Will is not only a most important element of our 
constitution, but it is the great character-creating The charac- 
force of the soul. The value of a sound, healthy, ter-creating 

J1 force of the 

efficient Will is obvious. In order to a perfect soul, 
character, there must be perfect self-control, and we shall 
approximate perfection only as we approximate this com- 
plete command of all our powers. 

Strength of Will is the great requisite for this purpose. 
Like other desirable qualities, this may be cul- M be cultU 
tivated. It is not necessary when a man has a vat ed, 
weak will, to regard it as settled that this is to be his 
permanent characteristic. Like every other faculty, it 
may be strengthened by use, or it may be weakened by 
disuse. If a man cultivate the habit of yielding his will 
to every influence that for the moment happens to be pre- 
dominant, he will always be weak ; that is, he will always 
have a weak will. If, on the contrary, he accustom him- 
self to resist all unwholesome solicitation and impulses, 
even though he may do this weakly at first, this weakness 
will gradually change to strength ; he will come, if per- 
sistent, to have command of all the forces of his being, 
and to direct them to whatever end seems good to him. 

But it must be noticed that strength of Will by itself is 
not enough to constitute the ideal character, a -paramount 
It will depend upon what is the bent of the Will, purpose, 
upon what is the paramount purpose. If a man makes it 
his chief end to advance his own interests and selfishly to 
pursue wealth, or fame, or power, or political preferment, 
and if he means to subordinate all other interests to this, he 
may have a powerful Will, and possess much force of char- 



80 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

acter, but he will still lack immeasurably those elements 
which are essential to the ideal man. If, on the other 
hand, he has set before him, as an end to be achieved, a 
perfect manhood, and governs himself as he must in such 
a case by the principle of righteousness, suppressing what- 
ever is at variance with this and encouraging whatever is 
subsidiary to it, strength of Will will not only be essential 
to the achievement of his purpose, but it will be enhanced 
by the very efforts it puts forth. 

Decision, or as it is usually called, Decision of Character, is 
another constituent of a healthy Will. To be able when 
the facts on which a question turns are fully presented, 
to determine what is the proper course to pursue, and to 
pursue this course promptly and unhesitatingly, notwith- 
standing the fact, as is often the case, that there are many 
inducements to take the opposite course, is an invaluable 
trait of character. It is opposed to the vice of protracted 
inaction and vacillation which are the weakness of so many 
A . . minds. In such cases the soul is drawn hither 

Opposed to 

inaction and and thither, neither able to settle anywhere, nor 
having settled, to change its position ; or having 
settled its end, it is again moved by some real or fancied 
advantage in the other alternative, relenting and retreat- 
ing, and perhaps sacrificing in the end all the advantages 
of either choice. 

There are many instances in one's experience where 
there is no opportunity for such hesitation. The decision 
must be made at once, and must be final. To have trained 
one's self to take in the whole situation in a brief time, 
and to come to a quick decision, is one of the most valu- 
able powers the soul can possess. There is, of course, a 
vicious side to this virtue as to most others. It consists 



DUTIES TO THE MIND. 81 

in determining without sufficient reflection, not regard- 
ing all the factors of the problem, and through indo- 
lence or lack of enterprise failing to ascertain all Ras h ness a 
the elements of the case. To jump at a con- vice. 
elusion, or be influenced by some prejudice, or some over- 
bearing desire in the interest of self-indulgence, is no 
part of the virtue of decision. 

Persistence is a characteristic of a healthy Will. Having 
determined on an action, or a course of conduct, after con- 
sidering all the facts on which the decision properly turns, 
and having duly deliberated on the subject, it is gener- 
ally desirable that we adhere to our purpose. Fixedness of 
Fixedness of purpose is a great element of effi- purpose, 
ciency. Many persons decide upon a course of action, 
and enter upon it with an enthusiasm that promises fruit- 
ful results ; but after a certain period, when the novelty 
wears off, or the work becomes monotonous, or when they 
find unexpected obstacles, or other enterprises attract their 
attention, interest flags, and finally the course is aban- 
doned. Thus they go from one project to an- Fi kl 
other, and so really accomplish nothing. An and instabii- 
unstable and fluctuating Will is as unfortunate l y * 
as a hesitating and undecided one. The man that carefully 
and discriminatingly chooses and then perseveres through 
whatever difficulties and obstacles, is the man who not 
only succeeds in his vocation, but also gains the respect 
of his fellow-men. 

This is especially the case when one decides upon an 
upright and virtuous life as against the oppo- 

. r i n ■ i n i i • • Formation of 

site one ot self-indulgence and submission to aiife-pur- 

the demands of appetite and unworthy impulse. pose ' 

To determine on a life of rectitude after having deliber- 



82 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

ately considered the whole question, and recognized the 
claims of Conscience and yielded to them, but subse- 
quently to falter in presence of some strong temptation, 
to retreat or surrender when some vicious but attractive 
object presents itself, is wholly unworthy and most un- 
manly. It is by persistence in the face of temptation that 
a perpetuated righteous will or moral habit which is above 
all estimation comes to exist. 

Like most other virtues, Persistence, carried beyond 
Obstinacy is certain limits, becomes a vice, the designation 
to be avoided. f w hich is obstinacy, or stubbornness. When one 
has made a decision as to the character of an act, or his 
own line of conduct, it is always possible that he may 
have done this on imperfect or erroneous information, or 
by failing to consider all the conditions. For a man to 
adhere to his purpose after it "has been made clear to him 
that he is or may be wrong, is not proper persistency, but 
obstinacy. The thoroughly sensible man will not only 
guard against mistakes beforehand, but he will hold him- 
self open to conviction, and will abandon any position he 
has taken when more clearly manifest truth shows that he 
is wrong. It is not always easy for a positive and con- 
sciously strong man to do this, but it is essential to a con- 
scientious and well-balanced character. 

Independence is a characteristic of a firm, strong, and 
healthy will. We must not mistake this quality for some- 
A spurious thing quite different, which often passes for 
enc^tTbe * ms ' es P e °i a lly among a certain class of } r oung 
avoided. people. The latter is a rather blatant disposi- 
tion, to be causelessly different from other people, partic- 
ularly those who are older and more experienced and 
more thoughtful. A young man affected in this way is 



DUTIES TO THE MIND. 83 

pretty sure to talk largely about his " independence," and 

to contrast it with the " old-fogyism " of his parents and 

instructors and the more staid and sober members of the 

community. He wishes to be considered as having got 

beyond and above these antiquated notions, and to belong 

to a new order of things and as living in a more liberal 

atmosphere, and having a clearer understanding of what 

makes a great character. This, it is unnecessary to say, 

has nothing in common with genuine independence. It is 

born of self-conceit and ignorance, and is very suggestive 

of an empty head. But there is a real independence 

which is always an attribute of true nobility of , 

J § J A genuine 

character. It consists in forming one's own independ- 
opinion and convictions on the evidence pre- ence ' 
sented, and holding them whether few others, or many or 
none hold them. I do not mean by this that it is defiant, 
or regardless of the opinion of others ; but, on the con- 
trary, it treats these deferentially and with respect. 
Sometimes a person thus characterized will accept an 
opinion because held by others who have exceptional 
opportunities for knowing all the conditions and elements 
involved, while the person in question has none. But 
there are many instances where we must form our own 
opinions, and come to our own conclusions, each for him- 
self, and where those held by others constitute no reason 
for our own convictions. For one to adopt such views as 
seem to him worthy, and to maintain them whatever 
others may think, and at whatever cost, this is genuine 
and laudable independence. 

Courage, Fortitude, and Patience, are virtues that one owes 
to one's self to cultivate. They are closely affiliated qual- 
ities, but differ somewhat in their signification. Most 



84 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

people admire courage in a man. One who is possessed 
of this quality goes out to encounter perils from which 
Characteris- man y would shrink. He is calm and self-pos- 
ticsofCour- sessed, even when the danger is greatest, and 
by his very calmness and steadiness of nerve 
succeeds where others would fail. Courage when going 
beyond its limits becomes rashness and sometimes fool- 
hardiness. 

We are to distinguish this quality from that boasting, 
swaggering, and blustering disposition which sometimes 
Modesty of g oes by that name. True courage is modest, 
real courage. anc [ seldom announces itself in language, or by 
any representation except in action on its proper occa- 
sions. One is struck, on reading the autobiography of 
General Grant, with his depreciation of his own courage. 
He almost seems to himself to be a great coward ; but it 
will be observed that this apparent timidity never makes 
him shrink in the time of actual danger. There is no dis- 
count on his courage then. Genuine courage realizes all 
the perilous facts in their full force, and feels the danger 
that one would avoid if it were not duty to face it. It is as 
far as possible from the bravado which is not afraid because 
it is not thoughtful and intelligent. 

But the courage that is conspicuous on the battle-field 
or in physical danger is, after all, not the highest kind. 
Moral There is a moral courage which is nobler and 

courage. more laudable, — the courage that, having con- 
scientiously adopted an unpopular doctrine or policy, dares 
to persist in it, though all one's friends, as well as foes, 
cry out against it. Sometimes this is harder than to face 
the cannon's mouth in the conflict of battle. It is the 
hardest when, as sometimes with young people at school 



DUTIES TO THE MIND. 85 

or in other associations, one takes a position which to 
one's fellows, judging superficially, looks like cowardice, 
and when his purest motives and virtues are likely to be 
misapprehended, and perhaps maligned. For it is singu- 
lar that courage by the weak-minded is often mistaken for 
pusillanimity, and the latter for the former. A young 
person frequently goes with the crowd, and thinks he is 
very brave, when, if he would reflect seriously upon his 
conduct, he would see that he was actuated by mere fear 
of public opinion, and that it was arrant cowardice that 
restrained him from proper action. 

If courage is a disposition to encounter danger, and run 
the risk of great suffering, while the latter is only pro- 
spective and not yet actual, Fortitude exists when the suf- 
fering is present and real : it enables one to calmly endure 
the physical pain and the mental and moral evils to which 
we may be subject. In its noblest manifestation it is 
something more than a spirit of defiance, or than a dogged 
submission to what cannot be helped. It is a what real 
rational acceptance of the disagreeable and dis- Fortitude is. 
tressing experience as being a part of the allotted plan 
of life, and capable of being utilized for some high pur- 
pose. 

Patience, though nearly akin to Fortitude, is somewhat 
wider in its application. It implies suffering ; but there 
are various kinds of suffering, such as petty Difference 
annoyances, the endurance of which with equa- J^g 6 ^**" 
nimity we would hardly call Fortitude, but Fortitude, 
which afford a scope for Patience. Patience is also nearly 
synonymous with the calmness and gentleness with which 
certain souls bear the offensive conduct of others with 
whom they are placed in close relations. 



86 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

These qualities of Independence, Courage, Fortitude, 

and Patience, taken in connection with truth, honor, 

honesty, and integrity, constitute what is called 

Manliness, — a characteristic of the grandest and 

loftiest kind. 

There are also certain vices with the repression of 

which a firm, steady, well-educated Will has to do, such 

as Pride, Self-conceit, Vanity, Ambition, and a gen- 

Certainvices. . n , ' _ ; ' . ; . -. ' ,. & 

eral Selfishness. Pride is inordinate belt-respect. 

It is frequently spoken of as within certain limits allow- 
able and proper. Hence we have a "false pride," and 
Pride always other such qualifying terms to indicate a vicious 
a vice. kind of pride. But this seems to me not a 

proper use of the English language. The feeling that we 
have in view when Pride is spoken of as alloAvable is Self- 
respect; and this never becomes pride till it is unduly 
exaggerated. Pride is never a virtue. 

Pride is also frequently confounded with Vanity, and is 
very often used when the latter is meant. Pride "is esti- 
mating one's worth more highly than the conditions will 
justify, and exulting in this estimate. It cares little for 
the opinions of others. But Vanity is an overweening 
desire for the approval and praise of others. It is not 
improper to desire the approval of our fellow-men, 
where this desire is kept in proper subordination to 
other and higher impulses ; but when it becomes a 
ruling passion, or begins to displace more worthy de- 
sires, it is not only improper, but often exceedingly 
offensive. 

Self-conceit is a mixture of Pride and Vanity, and is apt 
to take on the form of Egotism, — a disposition to talk 
about one's self, one's exploits and capabilities. It is 



DUTIES TO THE MIND. 87 

usually not only foolish, but also ridiculous. Selfishness 
is inordinate self-love. The latter is innocent, Difference 
and may be a virtue : the former never is ^^^ 
either. Self-love. 

Ambition, in its strict and proper signification, is an un- 
heal thful and harmful craving for superiority. It is 
sometimes used in the sense of Enterprise ; but as that 
term is sufficient for the thought which it symbolizes, 
there is no need of using two terms for the same con- 
ception. 



PART II. 

DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW-MEN. 



DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW-MEN. 



DIVISION FIRST. — JUSTICE. 

Duties to our fellow-men may be grouped in two divis- 
ions, under the two heads of Justice and Beneficence. 

By Justice in Ethics is signified not exactly what is 
meant by the same term in the administration of civil 
government. There it means what is in accord- Ethical and 
ance with the fundamental and statute laws. Civil Justice. 
But Justice in its full sense covers a larger field. Even a 
civil law may be unjust; and all such laws are to be 
tested by a standard higher than themselves. 

Ethical Justice has reference to Rights and Obligations, 
— the right of others, and our own obligations to respect 
these rights. { Cousin says, " It is respect for the person in 
all that constitutes his personality/' It requires us to do 
wrong to no one, or at least to repair the wrong already 
done. Its maxim is, " Do not do unto others what you do 
not wish they should do to you." It is what any one may 
have a claim upon us for, and which we are correspondingly 
under obligations to render. 

Beneficence, on the other hand, while equally a duty on 
our part, may not be correspondingly claimed by others. 
Thus, if I have borrowed from a man a sum of money, or 

91 



92 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

if he have sold me property on rny promising to pay him 
a certain amount at a future time, he has a claim on 

How b nefi- me "^ or so mucn • ne mav demand it of me, and 
cence differs has a right to it. This is the claim of Justice, 
rom ustice. j^ however, he is poor and hungry, and likely 
to suffer, and I have the means to aid him, it is my duty 
to do so ; but he has no right to demand this of me. I 
do him no positive wrong in withholding aid, though I 
violate my duty and am guilty of inhumanity. I trans- 
gress the law of Beneficence. Its maxim is, " Do to 
others as you wish to be done by." 

The duties of Justice are comprised in three classes, as 
follows : Class I. Domestic Duties ; Class II. Duties to 
Individuals in Society ; Class III. Duties implied in 
organized Society, or in the relations of Government. 



CLASS L — DOMESTIC DUTIES. 



CHAPTER I. 

MARRIAGE. 

Marriage is the union of one man and one woman 
under mutual solemn contract to live together, and to 
form no other similar union " so long as they Marriage 
both shall live." It is the highest and most im- defined, 
portant of our social institutions. It is the condition and 
foundation of the family relations, and as such is essen- 
tially related to both human and Divine government in 
the world. It is, therefore, as the Ritual has it, " not by 
any to be entered into unadvisedly, but reverently, dis- 
creetly, and in the fear of God." 

SECTION 1. — THE ETHICAL CONDITIONS OF MARRIAGE. 

Not every man may properly be married to any woman. 
There are certain conditions which readily suggest them- 
selves. Clearly no one should marry an idiot who may 
or an insane person. There are certain heredi- not marr y- 
tary traits that render marriage of at least doubtful pro- 
priety. . No one should marry a drunkard, or a person 
of obviously immoral character. This is sometimes done 
with the expectation that the virtuous wife or husband 
will reform the other party. Thousands of lives have thus 

93 



94 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

been ruined. If a man or woman of immoral habits is 
not reformed before marriage, — and it should be long 
enough before to make it pretty sure, — there is small 
likelihood of reformation subsequently. There are, doubt- 
less, exceptions, but these are scarcely so many as to more 
than prove the rule. 

Among most civilized nations marriage is prohibited 
between persons within certain degrees of consanguinity. 
These vary somewhat in different nations ; but marriage 
between brothers and sisters of the same family, between 
parents and children, between parents-in-law and children- 
in-law, is not sanctioned anywhere among Christian nations. 
It is regarded as of doubtful propriety for cousins to 
marry, though this rule is not strictly adhered to anywhere. 
In England the law prohibits a man's marrying his de- 
ceased wife's sister. In this country and in some others 
there is no such restriction. 

It is, of course, an important ethical condition of mar- 
riage that there exist a high mutual regard, and that the 
Mutual regard parties be personally attractive to each other, 
essential. j^ jg no t necessary that there should be a pas- 
sionate affection on either side. There is no doubt some- 
thing meant by the expression which we find in novels, 
and sometimes in real life, " falling in love ; " and I by no 
means wish to cast any contempt on the sentiment implied, 
which, it may be admitted, plays often an important part 
in the affairs of many lives. Still less would I assert that 
there need be no mutual love. If we are required to love 
all men, even our enemies, it would be monstrous to sup- 
pose that there could be real marriage where this should 
be wholly wanting. But that there is a necessity for 
that overmastering passion which we usually mean by the 



MARRIAGE. 95 

expression alluded to, I do not believe. It is not an essen- 
tial condition of a happy conjugal union. 

There is also another side to this particular subject. 
Where two persons have an ardent and pecul- other condi- 
iar affection for each other, that is not an abso- tx ° ns bes:dss 

affection 

lutely conclusive reason why they should necessary, 
marry. There may be reasons why they should not; 
the situation of either party, hereditary characteristics 
which might render marriage unwise, physical disabil- 
ities, or tendencies, or dispositions, which may, sooner or 
later, result in alienation and perpetual discomfort; or 
there may be pre-engagements which would render such 
a union inconsistent with moral obligations. Friendship 

This, at any rate, we hold to be true, that and sympa- 
there should be a firm, steady friendship exist- y * 
ing under conditions which promise a likelihood of perma- 
nence. To this end it is essential that each should have 
a positive sympathy with the other's pursuits, and be 
interested in the other's interests. By this is not meant 
that the two are to be wholly alike in character and tastes. 
Two persons precisely alike would be of little use to each 
other. The most agreeable and the most profitable associ- 
ation can exist only when there is difference, and differ- 
ence is what constitutes individuality. Persons who have 
the same ideas and sentiments are very poor company for 
each other. Neither has anything that the other wants, 
and, if exclusively in each other's society, they would be 
no better off than if in solitude. 

Closely connected with these views, is the ethical ob- 
jection to the union of two persons of whom Alien condi- 
one is the marked inferior of the other, intel- tionsofiife. 
lectually or socially. There are, doubtless, cases where 



96 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

one of the parties has had smaller advantage than the 
other, or belongs to a less favored grade of society. This 
is not a necessary bar to the conjugal contract, since there 
may be evident capability, as well as a disposition, for 
development on the part of the less fortunate party. But 
where there is obviously an improbability of such improve- 
ment, it would be improper to form the union. 

What are sometimes called " marriages of convenience " 
are to be utterly deprecated on ethical grounds. When 
either the man or the woman, without any regard to per- 
sonal fitness, and solely for the sake of wealth, or title, or 
rank, or other social advantage, seeks to enter the mar- 
riage state, violence is done to sacred social obligations, 
and the most reasonable and most serious considerations 
are ignored. 

SECTION 2. — PERMANENCE OF MARRIAGE. 

This union is clearly intended to be a permanent one. 
Badconse- ^° ^ on S as koth tne contracting parties live, 
quencesof there can be innocently no dissolution. Any 
easy lvorce. ^ er SU pp OS ition would logically lead to the 
most deplorable consequences. The moral condition of a 
society in which temporary unions should be formed and 
dissolved at the will of either party would be incalculably 
bad. The breaking-up of families, the sad hopelessness, 
especially of many women, and, worse than all, the 
unfortunate lot of the children of such parentage, all 
these render the picture one not pleasant to contemplate. 
Then, too, the sensual degradation and demoralization of 
the great mass of the population would be beyond all 
estimation. 

It may be asked, Is there no help for persons bound by 



MARRIAGE. 97 

an unfortunate marriage tie, and whose lives are thus 
made incalculably wretched? There are drunken hus- 
bands and besotted wives, and brutes of both sexes, to 
live with whom would be an undeserved punishment, 
even for considerable criminals, much more to worthy 
persons. Would it not be better that these should be 
divorced, and allowed each to go his or her own way? 
So, too, when there is an entire incompatibility of disposi- 
tion, why should there be a forced companionship where 
the happiness of both parties would be greatly increased 
by separation ? I do not need to dwell on the fact that, 
in a large proportion of instances, the evils al- Mitigatlon of 
luded to can be greatly mitigated by restraint unfortunate 
and mutual forbearance, and in many cases, as unions - 
the experience of thousands might testify, be completely 
done away. These evils at the worst are not as great as 
would ensue from making marriage an arrangement to be 
maintained so long as it suited the inclination of either 
party. But let it be admitted that there are cases in 
which it would be better that a separation Extreme 
should take place. Separation is not divorce cases - 
in its legal sense, nor in the sense in which that term is 
generally used. When so used, it implies that the parties 
so separated may marry again. The latitudinarian moral- 
ists who declaim eloquently and pathetically of the mis- 
eries to which men and women are condemned by reason of 
the indissoluble marriage bond, rarely, if ever, propose as a 
remedy simple separation, but such a separation or divorce 
as permits the forming of new unions. It would be a 
grand preventative of the wide prevalence of divorce in 
our modern communities if divorce only meant separation 
without the liberty of marrying again. If it be claimed 



98 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

that this is a severe hardship, it will be difficult to main- 
tain that claim in the court of sound reason. In most of 
Hardships the relations and conditions of life, we have 
than ei*e- er neav y penalties for the mistakes which we even 
where in life, innocently make. If I accidentally so injure a 
limb that amputation becomes necessary, I am not to 
expect that either nature or Providence will furnish me 
with a new limb. If by unwise investments I have lost 
the savings of a lifetime, it will be useless for me to ask 
that the economic laws shall be so readjusted that my 
property will return to me. There may be severe hard- 
ships involved in unfortunate marriages and separations 
without the opportunities of a second venture ; but these 
hardships would be better borne by the persons who have 
incurred them than that these should be remedied by a 
change in our social system such as would entail untold 
miseries on our communities. 

SECTION 3. — POLYGAMY. 

According to our definition of marriage, Polygamy is 
excluded. The compact must be between one man and 
Monogamous one woman. The reasons for this are not diffi- 
mamages cu ^ ^ Q £ n( ^ Fi rs t, it appears to have been the 

the original x r 

intention. Divine intention from the beginning. The 
Bible represents to us one man and one woman as forming 
the first marriage and constituting the first family. Sec- 
Other rea- ondly, the approximate equality of the sexes 
sons for re- indicates this law. There are a few more males 
Polygamy as than females born ; and as the former are more 
wrong. exposed than the latter to the calamities of 

life, there is a substantial equality as to the number of 
each sex. Thirdly, the peace of the family is better main- 



MARRIAGE. 99 

tained under this system than under that of Polygamy. 
There would almost inevitably be jealousies and favoritism 
of some, and neglect of others, not only among the wives, 
but among the children. Fourthly, the nations in which 
monogamous marriages have been maintained, have been 
obviously less corrupt than those in which polygamy is 
practised. The members of these communities are likely 
to be stronger physically, and to have a higher mental 
development. So firmly fixed is this conviction in the 
minds of civilized and enlightened communities, that any 
proposition to adopt the principle of Polygamy is regarded 
by detestation, even by men whose practice is not always 
of the purest. The local attempts to establish such a prin- 
ciple in certain parts of our own country are almost uni- 
versally regarded as " a relic of barbarism." 

SECTION 4. — RELATION OF MARRIAGE TO THE CIVIL LAW. 

Marriage is not essentially an ordinance of civil society. 
It arises out of the constitution of humanity, and before 
society exists. Still, it is essential to the wel- Marria 
fare of society, that civil sanctions should be prior to 
attached to it. Otherwise there would be no society - 
way of preventing abuses, and of determining the many 
questions that are liable to arise, because of its institution. 
The laws of inheritance, the rights of property gtm ei „ 
of husband and wife, the regulation concerning sanction 
the care of children, and many other such, imply necessar y- 
the cognizance of marriage by the government, and neces- 
sitate a definition of that which in the eye of the civil 
law constitutes the conjugal estate. 

It is also subject to moral sanctions. Not only is it 
instituted by God by positive ordinance, but it is so pal- 



100 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

pably indicated in the constitution of humanity, and there 
are such ethical consequences connected with it, that we 
Moral Sane- can scarcely doubt that it is one of the chief 
tion. things included in the scope of the Divine govern- 

ment of men. The fact that in the moral law given to the 
Hebrews, one of the ten great precepts prohibits adultery, 
and the additional fact, that in nearly all nations, poly- 
theistic as well as monotheistic, civilized and barbarian, 
and even savage, the institution has a certain sacredness 
attached to it, and the commission of adultery is regarded 
not only a crime but a sin, sufficiently prove this. 



THE FAMILY. 101 



CHAPTER II. 

THE FAMILY. 

Out of the marriage relations grow the family and the 
various rights and obligations pertaining thereto. Among 
these are comprised those of Husband and Wife, Parents and 
Children, Brothers and Sisters, Masters and Servants. 

SECTION 1. — HUSBAND AND WTPE. 

The duties here implied are such as inhere in the very 
nature of the marriage compact. Some of them are com- 
mon to both, others belong to them respectively from their 
separate offices in the family. 

First, there should be mutual fidelity. They are pledged 
to each other as long as both are alive. Neither has any 
right to form in any respect implied in the contract into 
which they have entered, any union or intimacy with any 
other person of the opposite sex. Adultery, as we have 
already seen, is held in reprobation and de testa- Adultery held 
tion by all civilized and by most uncivilized in universal 
nations. The moral law and the civil laws 
which forbid it are based on obvious principles of sound 
reason. We have seen what deplorable evils would result 
from polygamy, and from divorce at the pleasure of either 
party, or from the legal multiplication of the conjugal 
bonds on any loose pretexts. The same or worse evils 



102 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

Avould result from the promiscuous concubinage implied in 
a general disregard of the marriage covenant. Hence, 
infidelity on the part of either husband or wife is reck- 
oned in all civilized nations, and by the precepts of the 
Christian religion, as sufficient reason for the severance of 
the conjugal tie. But it is not enough that there be no 
criminal act. There may not justly be any intimacy which 
implies a preference for the society of another over that 
of the lawful partner. This fidelity must be of the spirit, 
and not merely of the letter. 

The affection or the mutual regard presumed to exist in 
all proper marriage, implies kindness and forbearance on both 
Patience and sides. There are few persons who are brought 
consideration. i n to such close and constant relationship to 
whom there will not come some occasions for patience and 
consideration. With very many it is so easy to exercise 
these qualities that they are scarcely noticeable. But 
with many it often requires some effort, and the support 
of moral principle. To those who subject themselves to 
proper moral training, the acts of self-denial and mutual 
sacrifice soon become lost in a sense of pleasure. 

There must be a Co-operation on the part of both husband 
and wife. In the ordering of their household, in the 
economic measures requisite to their comfort and happi- 
ness, and in their plans for mutual culture, and the 
nurture of their children, they must work on some har- 
Systemand monious system. Each must contribute his or 
harmony. ner share to the general welfare. As we have 
seen, in the happiest marriages it is not necessary, it is 
rather far from desirable, that there should be a close simi- 
larity of character, though there should be no antagonism 
of tastes and tendencies. 



THE FAMILY. 103 

This individuality, together with that implied in the 
constitution of the sexes, indicates a division 
of labor, and that both are not to do the same 
things. Hence, there are certain duties that particularly 
devolve on the man, and certain others that Division 
specially devolve on the woman. But this in- and Combina- 
dividuality results in a combination as well as 10n ° a or * 
a division of labor, and both become contributors to the 
common welfare. 

This does not imply any inferiority on the part of the 
woman, or superiority on the part of the man. Their 
relation is that of co-ordination, not of sub- No inferiority 
ordination the one to the other. A great change suX^rity* 
has taken place in the prevailing notions as to ofman. 
the position of woman in the household as well as in 
society. As a wife she is no longer held in subjection to 
her husband as, theoretically at least, in even the highest 
ancient civilization; still less the drudge or slave, as in 
certain ranks of society, both in savage and, to some 
extent, in enlightened communities. If her perfect eman- 
cipation has not yet been achieved, as certain reformers 
claim, she is, at least, the companion and partner of man 
in all the great interests of life. 

While very likely the ideal position demanded for 
woman by some of her zealous champions has not been 
attained, there is unhappily an extreme view of her proper 
condition, which is practically entertained by a certain class 
in the community. It amounts to something like Not a mere 
this, that she is to be regarded as an ornament, a ornament, 
person to be labored for, and supported and ministered to, 
by her husband. Probably the vicious elements in the 
constitution of modern society have much to do with the 



104 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

existence of this pernicious notion. It surely is not a 
sensible view of a wife's relation to her husband. In the 
ideal home, the husband no more supports the wife than 
the wife supports the husband; but they both labor 
together, and conspire to build up each other's fortune and 
happiness and character. 

"... in the long years liker must they grow; 
The man be more of woman, she of man ; 
He gain in sweetness and in moral height, 
Nor lose the wrestling thews that throw the world; 
She mental breadth, nor fail in childward care, 
Nor lose the childlike in the larger mind ; 
Till at last she set herself to man, 
Like perfect music unto noble words ; 
And so these twain, upon the skirts of Time, 
Sit side by side, full-summ'd in all their power, 
Dispensing harvest, sowing the To-be, 
Self -reverent each and reverencing each, 
Distinct in individualities, 
But like each other ev'n as those who love. 
Then comes the statelier Eden back to men : 
Then reign the world's great bridals, chaste and calm: 
Then springs the crowning race of human kind. 
May these things be ! " 

SECTION 2. — RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF PARENTS. 

The parent has a right to order the child's life in most 
respects, especially during all its early years. This arises 
from the fact of responsibility for the training of the 
child, and from the very nature of the family as a place 
for such training. Hence the parent has a right to the 
Not a erma- res P ec ^ affection, and obedience of the child, 
nentiyabso- both for the sake of order in the household and 
for the child's own physical and moral health. 
That this right is not permanently absolute is evident. 



THE FAMILY, 105 

The very training of the child involves the expectation of 
its own self-government and responsibility ; therefore, in 
proportion as these increase, the authority of the parent 
diminishes, till, at a certain time which it is impossible to 
accurately fix, it ceases altogether. 

The parent has a right to the earnings of a child in all 
these cases where, within the limits of certain years, there 
are any earnings. This limit it might not be possible to 
define accurately ; but, for the sake of preventing dispute 
and wrangling, society fixes the time at twenty-one years 
of age. 

The parent has no right to maltreat the child, or to do 
anything to render it physically or mentally incapable, or 
to compel any immoral conduct or habit. In- Limi . f 
dustrial training, on the contrary, so far as the the parental 
circumstances will allow, is a duty. The ne L 
child is to be furnished the means of Education, and 
to be trained to good habits of moral conduct, and pre- 
pared for the position of a good and useful member of 
society. 

SECTION 3. — EIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF CHILDREN. 

Children, as well as parents, have Rights. These, like 
their Obligations, are partly indicated in the corresponding 
obligations and rights of parents. 

First, the child has a right to Life and all that is implied 
in its support, so far as it is in the power of the parent to 
supply it. The very fact that the parent has Rightsof 
caused the child to be, confers upon the latter children, 
this right, and upon the parent the corresponding obliga- 
tion. Furthermore, it is the right of the child that his 
existence should not be made so miserable that it would 



106 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

be better not to be. There are multitudes of children 
whose miseries seem to almost reach this sad level. In 
many cases it i: the misfortune rather than the fault of 
the parents ; but in many others it comes from either 
needless negligence, or because of conditions for which 
the parents are criminally responsible. The child, as has 
been implied, has a right to suitable industrial training, 
and to such education and moral instruction as will fit 
him to make his way in the world, and become a useful 
member of society. 

The child's duty is, first of all, to Obey his parents. This, 
when he first begins to perceive the relations between 
Duties of himself and them, is supreme and absolute, 
children. Subsequently there will be higher duties; but 
these will be learned only through the former. With 
increasing years, and the development of his personality, 
this obligation of the child becomes modified, and at last 
may cease altogether. 

The child is also under obligation to show Respect and 
Kindness to parents. Natural affection would impel this ; 
and it is a laudable condition of the child's mind, in which 
these are the result of spontaneous impulse instead of 
enforced as duties. A child in whom they are wanting 
is rightly regarded by members of the community not 
only as unworthy but unnatural, and in a sense abhor- 
rent. These sentiments do not, like the duty of obedi- 
ence, diminish with increasing years, but rather grow 
with the growth. Even if the parent should become 
immoral and unworthy, it is still the duty of the child 
to show him respect and kindness, simply because he is his 
parent. 



THE FAMILY. 107 



SECTION 4. — DUTIES OF BROTHERS AND SISTERS. 

The family is a little commonwealth by itself. It is 
here that the members are trained for membership in the 
larger communities of their fellow-men, and for The family a 
the duties and responsibilities of human society, community. 
Hence the obligations existing are, in a more simple and 
rudimentary form, the obligations which exist between 
men in the world at large. The general end to be sought 
is the peace and harmony of the household, and the happi- 
ness and healthful development of all its members. 

Kindness and Affection stand foremost here as in other 
family relations. Nature will inspire these to a certain 
extent, unless it is thwarted and perverted. Duties im- 
Whenever this is unhappily the case, there are P lied - 
means of restoring the proper spirit. Reasonable consid- 
eration of the relation existing, and of the evil implied in 
wrong and malevolent dispositions, and of the happiness 
which would result both to the individual and to the 
family from kindly conduct, would ordinarily produce a 
sensible state of feeling. Few things are more deplorable 
than domestic dissensions, the selfishness of individual 
members of the family, jealousies, rivalries, perpetual 
strifes, and bickering. 

To prevent these, there must be mutual forbearance. 
There will always be something in the conduct of each 
which may produce more or less annoyance to others. 
There will be opportunities for the exercise of patience 
and the overlooking of many faults and errors. Each may 
well remember that he is himself imperfect. 

There should be mutual helpfulness. No one is quite 



108 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

sufficient unto himself anywhere in this world. This 
great lesson must be learned first of all in the domestic 
community. Every one has something that another has 
not ; each lacks something needful for his welfare which 
another has. Much of this is of a kind that imparting 
does not diminish ; and even where sacrifice is implied, that 
becomes a valuable element in the building of character. 
It is especially the duty of the elder to help the younger, 
while the latter in a hundred ways may reciprocate the 
kindness of the former. 

There should be equality among the children. Not that 
they are to be all alike. This they are not by their 
Equality natural constitutions, and it is not required 
does not im- that this should be sought by culture. It is 
larity of better that there should be variety than same- 
character. ness . k u {. there is a certain equality of right. 
No one can properly assume superiority in this respect 
because of age, or of physical strength or comeliness, or 
as having more brilliant mental parts than another. If 
superior gifts exist in any one, instead of making them 
the occasion of higher privilege or of exemption from 
duty, they should rather be thankfully used as a means 
of aiding others less favored. Greater powers imply 
greater obligations and more numerous duties. 

SECTION 5. — MASTERS AND SERVANTS. 

In many families servants constitute a part of the house- 
hold. We are not to shrink from the thought that they 
are members of the family. I mean, of course, 

Servants as J . 

members of such servants as are permanently domesticated, 
the family. and ^ Ye un d er the same roof with other members 
of the family. This is an important relation, and implies 



THE FAMILY. 109 

mutual rights and corresponding duties. In the first 
place, a servant in our own country and in many others 
is not a slave but a free person ; and his rights are 
those of a freeman. Ordinarily they are under contract 
voluntarily entered into, to render service of a specified 
kind and under certain stipulated conditions. A part of 
the conditions in the kind of service we are now consid- 
ering is, that they are to have a home in the house of 
their employer. Hence they are to be treated not as 
though they belonged to another and inferior To be treated 
class, but as possessing all the rights of human J^J^ne to ao 
beings. I do not now discuss the duty of pay- inferior class, 
ing them fairly for their work, and observing all the con- 
ditions of the contract, as these will be considered under 
another head; but their opinions and convictions, and 
even their prejudices, so long as they do not interfere 
with their duties, and do not lead to practical immorality, 
are to be respected. This embraces both their religious 
opinions and their political views. Furthermore, it is the 
duty of all employers to make their employees as happy 
as circumstances will admit. 

On the other hand, it is the duty of servants to show 
all fidelity to those who employ them. This they may do 
without loss of manliness or womanliness, and without 
lapsing into a degrading servility. There is no Duties of 
reason why employees in any situation should Servants, 
not have a sensible independence. But care should be 
taken that this does not assume an offensive form, as 
springing out of conceit, or as being the outcome of a con- 
tentious spirit. 



CLASS II — DUTIES TO INDIVIDUALS 
IN SOCIETY. 



Here again we find that all men have rights as well as 
obligations ; also, that where a right exists a correspond- 
Various * n £ obligation exists somewhere else. Among 

kinds of these rights which are to be respected, both 
ng ts# by society and by individuals, are: 1. Life; 

2. Liberty; 3. Property; 4. Character; 5. Reputation; 6. Ve- 
racity. Justice demands of us that we do not intention- 
ally violate any of these rights. 



CHAPTER I. 
LIFE. 



SECTION 1. — THE SACREDNESS OF LIFE. 

Generally speaking, every man has a right to Life 
who has not forfeited that right by some crime. Our first 
duty, then, is not to interfere with this right. We may 
not commit murder. 

Looked at from a natural point of view, and with refer- 
ence to this world, it is the greatest wrong we can inflict 
upon a man. It is true, that there are evils that a 

110 



LIFE. Ill 

man would rather lose his life than endure. Men have 

freely given up their lives when the alternative was the 

denial of their religious faith, or subjecting 

, , , , . , The greatest 

themselves to some dishonor, or that they might wrong possi- 

save those whom they love. For the sake of ble * 

their country, or because of some other great interest 

they have had at heart, they have put their voluntary 

lives in peril. But this generally has been their surrender of 

own offering. Except in the last case men- worthy pur- 

tioned, no one has a right to subject them to P° se - 

this sacrifice. The nation has the right to put its citizens 

in peril for its own salvation and in its own defence. 

It is also true, that a man may forfeit his life by crime. 
I do not undertake to discuss the question of capital 
punishment. There are certainly very strong r orfeitureof 
arguments for its entire abolition. There are the right to 
also cogent arguments in favor of it. I am 1 e y crime# 
disposed to believe that in our present state of civiliza- 
tion and in civilized nations, it may safely be dispensed 
with. In some of our own state governments the experi- 
ment has been tried ; and although there are those who 
think they discern an increase of crime because of the 
change, others, equally candid, discern no change for the 
worse. Certainly the results are not so obvious as to prove 
conclusive against the abolition. 

But in any case, the death penalty for certain crimes is 
in the judgment of most nations considered necessary to 
the protection of society. Whether this is a Avise judg- 
ment may be doubted ; but even if untrue, the infliction 
of the penalty is not a violation of the right of the crimi- 
nal to life. B}^ his crime he has forfeited his life, whether 
it be the better policy for the community to exact it or 



112 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

not. Still, in all cases he has a right to the most thorough 
investigation, and to whatever vindication may be possible, 
and he should not be condemned except on indisputable 
evidence. 

SECTION 2. — WAR. 

It is an important question whether the taking of life 
in war is justifiable. The main question here is whether 
is War ever war itself is ever justifiable ; for if war exists, 
justifiable? then the taking up of arms and the slaughter 
of foes are inevitable. The ostensible object of an army is 
to destroy the lives of those composing an opposing army. 
It would, no doubt, be one of the altogether best things 
for humanity if war were entirely abolished. The asso- 
ciations of men and women who seek this end are engaged 
in the noblest of undertakings. There is no question 
that there are better methods for settling national dis- 
putes. But neither this nor the fact that there is never a 
war which did not involve some selfishness and wrong on 
the part of one party or the other, if not of both, proves 
that war is never justifiable. Wars cannot entirely cease 
except by the unanimous consent of nations ; and for one 
nation to declare that it would in no case engage in war, 
not even to resist invasion, might render it an easy prey 
to the greed and selfishness of others. So, too, it may be 
the case that a nation does all in its power to avert a war ; 
but an antagonist may declare war against it, and invade 
its territory. In such a case it seems evident that self- 
defence is its duty at whatever cost. So that we cannot 
say that war may not sometimes be justifiable. 

Then, again, the very existence of government implies 
power to execute its laws, and this involves the possibility 



LIFE. 113 

of using force. Evil-doers must be coerced, violence 
must sometimes be suppressed by violence. The whole 
police system is in some sense a system of war, The police 
or at least implies a possibility of war. Riots pi^po^ie 
and insurrections, and combinations of all war. 
sorts against the execution of the laws, must be put down, 
or there is an end to civil government, and an inaugura- 
tion of anarchy. 

Unquestionably the great majority of wars might be 
prevented were either party in real earnest to maintain 
peace. The majority of wars, we might perhaps say all 
wars, arise from some immoral action or pur- War invoIves 
pose on the part of one or more of the nations wrong some- 
engaged in them. They are so far forth un- w ere * 
justifiable, not only in the fact that they destroy human 
life, but that they do other vast and irreparable injury. 

If the nations would agree upon the practicable scheme 
of an international tribunal before which all differences 
should be brought, and where decisions should international 
be final, wars would cease at once. That this arbltratlon - 
is practicable is evident not only from the fact that 
most serious disputes have been decided by arbitration, 
but from the fact that this is substantially the method 
of determining the difference between the local govern- 
ments of great nations. Notably is this the case with the 
states of our own Federal Union. No one of the individual 
states thinks of going to war with another. There has 
never been an instance of hostile collision, so far as I 
recollect. If a conflict arises, there are peaceable and 
rational ways of settling it. It is true, there has been a 
great civil war, but this was not so much of states as of 
sections. What is possible and practicable between 



114 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

such states as ours, is possible and practicable between 
nations. A Congress of nations could easily reconcile all 
differences of opinion and all conflicting claims. This 
would save all the wanton destruction of human life in- 
volved in war : it would also prevent the vast destruction 
of property and other incalculable losses, many of which 
are the occasions of wide-spread misery in communities, 
and which tend to shorten multitudes of human lives. 

SECTION 3. — TRADES WHICH WORK MISCHIEF IN THE 
COMMUNITY. 

It is a violation of this right to engage in any business 
the effect of which is to endanger human life, or to bring 
it to an earlier close than would otherwise take place. 
There are several employments of this kind. The most 
prominent and most destructive is, of course, the Liquor 
traffic. It is said by those who would defend this busi- 
ness, that no one is forced to indulge in the use of 
alcoholic beverages ; that it is wholly voluntary, and that 
Sophistical it is not necessary to suppose that all those 
fevorrfan "* wno P ai> take of such beverages do endanger 
evil practice, actually their lives or the lives of those de- 
pendent upon them. Conceding this for the sake of the 
argument, it still remains that probably nine-tenths, and 
possibly nineteen-twentieths, of these dealers in such com- 
modities would have no basis for their business, and no 
inducement to remain in it, but for the patronage of 
those who are perilling their lives and the lives of those 
dependent upon them by their indulgence. The command 
"Thou shalt not kill," runs, if not as directly, yet as 
surely, against this class of life-destroying agents as 
against those who, with knife or pistol or bludgeon, 



LIFE. 115 

threaten the lives of their fellow-men. When one man 
puts a pistol to the head of another, and demands his 
money or his life, he does not compel him absolutely to 
give up his money, but he puts him in a position where he 
is pretty sure to do it. So the powerful temptations which 
are spread in the sight of a man given to appetite do not 
compel him to get drunk, yet they put him in a condition 
where he is morally certain to do so. 

I have mentioned only one kind of occupation as being 
murderous in its character. There are others that are less 
obviously and less extensively, but not less actually so. 
Every kind of article produced by the skill or labor of 
man the main, I do not say the sole, use of A j lkindsof 
which results in the diminution of human life, business the 
and every business the object of which is to Jhichtend 
increase the facilities for the indulgence of to diminish 
unwholesome appetites, or for physically harm- tionofthis" 
ful practices, come under this head. Such in- ri s ht - 
diligence and such practices not only are evil in the first 
instances, but they tend to fasten a habit on the subject 
of them which is enslaving and degrading ; and what is 
still worse, the habit is sometimes transmitted to children. 
Very often diseases and weakness thus generated and 
which diminish life become hereditary, and this bad inherit- 
ance does not always terminate with the second generation. 

SECTION 4. — HATRED AND UNKINDNESS. 

It may seem to some as going to an extreme to say that 
Hatred of our fellow-men tends to the violation of the right 
of life. But we have the authoritative assertion of a 
superhuman wisdom that " he that hateth his brother in 
his heart is a murderer." This statement is certainly not 



116 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

altogether irrational, even if the utterance were not 
The nature clothed with authority. For what is the nature 
of Hatred f Hatred ? Is it not essentially to wish ill to 

and its pos- 

sibie ex- its object ? How great that ill may be depends 
tremes. upon the intensity of the passion. As the 

worst ill that can be desired for any one is death, it needs 
only a certain degree of hatred to inspire that desire, and 
such desire in multitudes of instances only waits an 
opportunity to secure its gratification. No one knows 
when he begins to cherish hatred towards another to what 
lengths it may carry him, or in what crime it may end. 
The only safety is to stifle such a passion in its conception. 
There are other ways in which the lives of men are 
shortened through the agency of their fellows. Maltreat- 
ment of children or servants by overwork, or by want of 
Life short- those things essential to health, or by unneces- 
ened by need- sar y exposure of various kinds, often puts their 

less expo- J x x 

sure. lives in peril. On the other hand, indulgences 

on the part of parents have similar results, as when pala- 
table but improper food, fashionable but unhealthy styles 
of dress, irregular habits, nocturnal excitements and con- 
sequent exposure, are permitted or encouraged. No doubt 
thousands every year fall victims to such usages. 

SECTION 5. — DUELLING. 

It may seem nugatory to speak here of the Duel as a 
violation of the sacredness of human life. Happily it has 
now come to be almost universally reprobated in all civ- 
ilized communities ; and although it long persisted in prac- 
tice, even after it was theoretically discarded, it is now 
become nearly obsolete, and needs little argument to con- 
vince us of its detestable character. It seems scarcely 



LIFE. 117 

credible that men brought up in highly civilized Christian 
communities should have for so many ages cherished this 
barbarous custom : that because of a fancied or A t, sur di t y f 
even a real insult, men should challenge one the custom, 
another to a murderous contest in which one or the other, 
and perhaps both, were likely to lose their lives. It was 
both wicked and senseless. Men were considered brave 
who did this, and to avoid such a contest was regarded as 
cowardly. The rules by which it was justified and regu- 
lated were called the " Code of honor," and the character 
of the transaction was reckoned as chivalrous in the high- 
est degree. Yet to sober and sensible minds it appears 
rather like lack of courage which led men to engage in 
such encounters. It might better be regarded as fool- 
hardy than chivalrous, and that which regulated it 
appears more like a code of dishonor than of honor. 
Why it should be considered as settling anything, or heal- 
ing any mental hurt, or rescuing an imperilled reputation, 
when one man has insulted another, either to kill the 
other, or to run the risk of being killed by him, is not 
at all obvious. That a man of hot temper, under strong 
provocation, and in great excitement, should assault and 
kill his opponent, wicked as it is, admits at least of some 
mitigation ; but when two men proceed deliberately, and 
with ample time, to make all their preparations, and 
therefore for reason and good judgment to resume their 
sway, there is no room for palliation, and such conduct 
deserves contempt as well as condemnation. 

SECTION 6. — SELF-DEFENCE. 

It is not intended in anything that has been said in the 
foregoing sections to deny the right of individual self- 



118 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

defence. We have already inferred the justification of 
national self-protection, even to the extent of war and the 
consequence of the destruction of life as against those 
assaulting the nation. This is not the less obvious in the 
case of the individual. Possibly the right of the former 
Self-defence is developed from that of the latter. This 
smdT'onta- seems ^° be am ong the instincts of every 
neous. human being. There is a spontaneous im- 

pulse, when we are assaulted, to use every means to pre- 
serve ourselves from death or injury. This defence may 
go to the very extent necessary for this purpose, even to 
Limitations sacrificing the life of the assaulter. But we 
of this right, have no right to go further than what is thus 
essential to self-protection. We may not take his life 
unless there be a probability that it is the only way of 
preserving our own. No injustice is done him in this 
case, since by his attempt to destroy another life, he has 
forfeited his own. 

It would not be just, when once we have been freed 
from danger, to pursue our foe vindictively. To kill 
him, or to do him any bodily harm, when it is evident 
that his hostility cannot be the cause of any injury, would 
be a violation of moral obligation and might be murder. 

This principle will bear extension to the defence of 
Defence of those who are dependent upon us. Should the 
one's family, father of a family find a villain attempting to 
murder his wife and children, if there were no other obvi- 
ous way to prevent this crime, he would be justified in 
taking the life of the invader, and it would not be wise to 
deliberate very long as to the probabilities of other means 
of prevention. 



LIBERTY, 11 ( J 



CHAPTER II. 
LIBERTY. 

Next to one's life, the most highly prized boon of a 
human being is Liberty. By Liberty we mean the unob- 
structed use of one's powers in any way that Definition 
may seem good to him. A child might de- tion . Idea i" 
scribe it as doing and having whatever one Liberty, 
wants to do or have, and having and doing nothing that 
he does not want to do or have. This is the perfect ideal 
liberty, and as such it could probably not be more happily 
set forth. Yet evidently this ideal liberty is seldom, and 
perhaps never, actualized among men ; and it is approxi- 
mated only through much and careful moral training. 
Until this training is complete, our liberty has its limita- 
tions. Since every man has this right in common with 
every other man, the right of each becomes the limit of 
that of his fellows. I may want my neighbor's horse ; 
but he wants it too, and as we cannot both Limitations 
have it, one must do without it. That the of Liberty, 
right to the horse is his and not mine, is clear from the 
fact that he is the possessor of it, unless it can be shown 
that he has violated some right of mine in getting posses- 
sion of it. My liberty, then, consists in the privilege of 
doing and having whatever it is in my power to do and 
have, provided that I do not exercise this power in viola- 
tion of the right of any other person. 



120 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 



SECTION 1. — LIBERTY UNDER LAW. 

It has been shown-, in a previous part of this book, that 
the motive and impulses of a man conflict with one an- 
other, so that even subjectively, with most men, real 
liberty does not exist. It must be achieved by the edu- 
cation and discipline of the desires. They must be 
brought into harmony with one another by being made 
severally to harmonize with the one great paramount 
principle of the Divine Law. 

It is a crude and superficial yet somewhat popular notion, 
Liberty not that Liberty and Law are antagonistic. This is 
to Lfwfbit 5 utterl y untrue. Liberty under Law is the 
the contrary, only real and complete Liberty in the Universe. 
We might illustrate this truth by reference to the condi- 
tion of our communities, as they are more or less under a 
system of civil law. Where do we find the largest Lib- 
erty ? Is it in those communities where laws are few, im- 
perfect, inadequate, and only partially executed; or in those 
in which there is a thorough system of laws, calculated 
to reach and guard the rights of all citizens, and where 
they are thoroughly executed ? The question answers 
itself to every mind. In the communities where most of 
us live, the laws are numerous and effective, and they are 
carefully executed. But is any upright citizen burdened 
by the pressure of these laws ? Men go about their daily 
business, and from morning to night, and from the begin- 
ning of the week to its end, they are unconscious of the 
restrictions laid upon them, and they seldom think of the 
laws except as some one wantonly violates them. They 
have been accustomed to subject themselves to this condi- 



LIBERTY. 121 

tion all their lives, and it has become a kind of second 
nature to them. 

What is true of the civil law is true also, only in a far 
greater degree, of the moral law ; since the moral law is 
perfect, while the civil law at best falls short of perfection 
by a considerable interval. As we have seen, men here 
in this world are under the influence of conflicting desires ; 
and it is this conflict that causes a very large part of the 
unhappiness of the race. Such a state is also incompati- 
ble with genuine liberty. Over all there is the The largest 
moral law with its retribution and its rewards, liberty con- 

t . n ,1 •, ii i-i « ditioned on 

Jt is oi supreme authority, and hence all lm- tnesubjec- 
pulses and desires are to be subiect to it. The tlonofa11 

A J desires to 

great business of every man is to bring himself the supreme 
into harmony with this. It is the only means morallaw - 
by which this painful restriction will cease and genuine 
liberty can exist. Until these inferior cravings are sub- 
jected, the law will press unequally on the soul. If a man 
were to lie upon a hard rock, even if the surface were 
smooth, the whole weight of the body would be supported 
at a few points, and would be very painful. If, by any 
means, the rock could be chiselled out so as to conform to 
the exact shape of the body, there would be no more dis- 
comfort than in lying upon a bed of down, because every 
part of the body would be equally supported ; or, in other 
words, the support would press equally upon every part. 
This may be illustrated again by the pressure of water 
upon a fish, or of the air upon our bodies. It is said that 
the pressure of the atmosphere upon the body is equal to 
that of many tons. If it were not even and uniform it 
would cause intense suffering, as indeed it sometimes does 
when, by fortuity, any portion of the body is exposed to 



122 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

an undue pressure. Analogous to this is the relation of 
the human spirit to the moral law. It must be adjusted 
Our charac- to it so that there will be no painful pressure 
Justed to uni- at an y P omt - This adjustment is the end of 
versaiiaw. moral culture ; and the closer the approxima- 
tion to perfection this is, the larger the liberty of the 
soul. 

In such a state the desires will be properly regulated 
and subordinated. The inferior will at once yield to the 
superior, and all to the supreme law. Men will do what 
they ought to do, not because they must, but because they 
want to do so. They will have and. do what they desire, 
and nothing that they do not desire, simply because they 
desire what is right and nothing else. This is what is 
meant by " Liberty under Law." In no world, nor in any part 
of the universe, in time nor in eternity, can we conceive 
of any other perfect liberty. Whatever may be our con- 
ception of heaven, it will be false if we regard it as a 
place or state in which there is no law. Law the most 
thorough and all-pervading exists there ; but it reveals 
itself hj no effect of restraint or constraint on its sub- 
jects, since it presses so equally and uniformly on every 
individual and the whole society, that no one is conscious 
of its presence, any more than men or animals are con- 
scious of the atmosphere in which they live. It produces 
no antagonism and interferes with no one's liberty. 

SECTION 2. — LIBERTY IN OUR SOCIAL RELATIONS. 

I have dwelt so long on subjective individual liberty as 
containing the germ of the whole doctrine of liberty in all 
possible human relations. The moral law, as we have 
seen, is no restriction upon the liberty of moral beings, 



LIBERTY. 123 

but rather the promoter of it. Yet it demands that we 
sacredly respect the liberty of our fellow-men. This does 
not imply, as has been seen, that society is to our desires 
allow men to do whatever they may desire to do limited by 

th.6 dcsirps oF 

if in so doing they interfere with the rights of ourfeiiow- 
others. If one desires to have my farm, or my men * 
horse, or my books, and attempts to gratify that desire 
against my consent, he is met, by both civil and moral 
law, with the stern utterance, " Thou shalt not ; " and the 
whole force of society may be summoned to restrain his 
action. It is not liberty in defiance of law to which he 
has a right, but liberty under law. Men may forfeit their 
liberty, as well as their lives, by crime, and may be de- 
prived of it by imprisonment or by other restrictions. 
There are many ways in which men are unjustly Ways in 
deprived of their liberty. It has been shown which the 
that every man has a right to himself, — that is, liberty is 
to all the powers of body and mind which he vlolated - 
possesses, to use them in any way that seems good to him, 
provided that he does not interfere with the rights of any 
other man, or violate the requirements of the moral law. 

First, a man has a right to his physical powers and to 
use them as he pleases. He may go anywhere at his 
own option, provided such action does not trench upon 
another's rights, or upon the rights of society. He may 
engage in any occupation which will not endanger the life 
or property or other interest of any one else. He may 
work or be idle ; and, so far as other men are concerned, 
it is no business of theirs, unless by so doing he trans- 
gresses the aforesaid limits. He may eat and drink ac- 
cording to his own inclinations, and dress as he chooses, 
subject to the same conditions. 



124 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

This right is violated when a man is compelled to remain 

in one locality, or at least to make his home there, as has 

sometimes been required in certain European 

Locomotion u * 

andoccu- communities, lest he should become a burden 
pa ion. j. q another parish than that in which he has 

been brought up. It is also violated when he is compelled 
to learn a particular trade against his own preference, as, 
for instance, the trade of his father. But he may not 
pursue an occupation that is dangerous to the community, 
as if one should enter upon the manufacture of gunpowder 
in the immediate vicinity of dwelling-houses. If, how- 
ever, he has established his business at a safe distance 
from human habitations, and after it is established others 
see fit to build in the vicinity, they do it at their own risk : 
he has a right to continue his business. So of a slaughter- 
house or other such offensive enterprise. 

It may be said that he may make an unwise choice, and 
thereby effect his injury. That is his own affair, and he 
Th . must bear the consequences. It may also be 

his liberty said that, if left to his own preference, he may 
no Sonfor cnoose to spend his time in idleness, and that 
depriving a this would be a great wrong in itself, and might 
likewise result in starvation, or make him a 
burden to the community. It would no doubt be a great 
wrong, but it is one that he must settle with God and not 
with his fellow-men. As to his becoming a burden on the 
community, that is optional with the community. It is 
under no obligation to support a man who is in danger of 
starving through indolence. If left to receive the natural 
penalty of his idleness, it would be likely to operate as a 
warning to others. While there no doubt are instances 
where it would be better for the individual if he were 



LIBERTY. 125 

compelled to labor, and to do this in some particular 
occupation rather than another, still the loss to men in 
general by relieving them of their responsibility and de- 
priving them of their power of self-disposal, would be 
incalculably greater than the gain in exceptional instances. 
It is subtracting greatly from a man's value, and is an 
unjust reduction of his manhood, to allow any other choice 
than his own in these matters to which we have referred. 

There are doubtless some apparent exceptions to the 
application of these general principles. Most prominent 
among these is, that society has a right to regu- Exceptions to 
late the employment of married women in tioV^/these 
factories. It may do this on the assumption principles, 
warrantable, as it seems to me, that a woman may be so 
employed as to neglect her children, and therefore be 
acting in violation of their rights. Under this view of it 
there is not even an exceptional violation of the principle. 
So, too, I do not see that it is inconsistent with the same 
principle to compel a lazy, shiftless man who has a family, 
to work and do something for their support. 

SECTION" 3. — SLAVERY. 

To deprive a man of all these rights, or to put him in 
respect of them at the disposal of another man, is slavery. 
Happily there is at this day no great need of elaborate 
discussion of this subject, since in our communities and 
in our nation, as well as in most civilized nations, this 
evil system has been done away. It is amazing that such 
a system could have existed so long in a Christian nation ; 
astonishing too are the arguments which were offered in 
its defence. That one man should own another, and de- 
prive him of all power of managing his own person, of 



126 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

acquiring and possessing property, and of all domes- 
tic privileges, seems to us here and now almost mon- 
strous. 

Happily, after the agonizing struggle of ages, the ques- 
tion has been settled in favor of individual liberty. Theo- 
retically, at least, it is almost universally admitted that 
every man owns himself, and no one is any longer a 
chattel personal or subject to the control of another. 
Still in- Still there are instances of oppression in nearly 

of virtual a ^ our communities, where, by the advantage 
slavery, of position or power, the strong virtually sub- 
ject the weak to their dictation, and practically deprive 
them of their freedom. It is true this is not universal or 
general, nor where it occurs is it often absolute ; but there 
are many instances in which poor men unfavorably situ- 
ated are made to do and suffer what they would not but 
for the fear of having their lives made still more wretched 
by the rapacity and selfishness of those who have the ad- 
vantage over them. Employers do not always have it in 
their power to oppress or deal unfairly with those who labor 
for them; and many who have the power do not exercise 
it after a selfish fashion. But there are many instances 
in which this power is exercised, and the effects are seen 
in the hopeless poverty of not only laborers but of those 
dependent on them. This evil is being considered and 
investigated by good men and women, and measures are 
more and more being put in operation to remedy these 
abuses. The growing intelligence and capability of the 
great masses of laboring men are also promising in this 
respect. 






LIBERTY. 127 

SECTION 4. — MENTAL LIBERTY. 

Man has a right to the control and ownership not only 
of his physical powers but also of his mental and moral 
faculties. Corresponding to this right on the one part is 
the obligation on the other. A man, then, has a right to 
use his mind as he chooses under the limita- what ig im _ 
tions elsewhere obtaining that he do not inter- plied in men- 
fere with the rights of others. He may read ta l erty ' 
what he pleases, and pursue any studies for which he has an 
inclination, and pursue them as far as he pleases. If he 
has reached the age of maturity and self-government, and 
has never yet learned to read, he may do so now or he 
may remain in ignorance as he chooses. 

If it be said that in so doing certain men might study 

what is unprofitable and harmful, or might read vicious 

books or those which inculcate false doctrines, objections 

this is all true ; and no doubt it would be tnat a man 

better in some instances for certain persons if JJ5 liberty 

they were restrained. But for the vast majority t0 his own 

■, , -, 11 .-,.-.. /, harm and the 

it is better that they take the responsibility oi harm of the 
governing themselves ; and if they make mis- communi ty. 
takes or follow evil inclinations in this respect or in 
others, the consequences are their own. To interfere 
would be productive possibly of a little good, but of so 
very much more evil that it would better be avoided. 
No men and no set of men are wise enough to determine 
what any other man should read or study, any more than 
what he should eat or drink or wear ; and to give this 
right to any persons or to society would be so far to cur- 
tail the liberty of the individual. So too every man has 
a right to publish his thoughts to the world, and to do this 



128 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

orally or by writing. He must do it under the same 
limitations as have been set down elsewhere, 
promuiga- He may not come into an assembly of people 
tlon - gathered for a purpose of their own, and insist 

on discussing a subject that interests no one but himself, 
or that those who are present do not generally care to 
hear about. Nor may he come into my family, and ven- 
tilate doctrines that I do not wish to have presented there 
except by myself or some one whom I might choose and 
trust to do this. Nor may he properly, without my con- 
sent, come into my factory or workshop or school-room, 
and proceed to present his thoughts, and divert those who 
are present from the proper business of the occasion. But 
in any private company assembled for the purpose of 
hearing him, or who consent to his speaking, or in any 
place of public assembly to which he has invited the pub- 
lic that he may address them, or in any newspaper or 
other periodical to which he may have access, or in any 
pamphlet or book which he may publish, he may freely 
set forth his views, provided that, in so doing, he does not 
interfere with the rights of others. If these views are 
wrong, let them be refuted with the same freedom as they 
are set forth. No one may say that I am wrong and he 
is right ; but he has the privilege of proving this if he can. 
But a man may set forth not only notions that are false, 
but those which, if carried out, are bad and injurious. 
Should he not be restrained ? Not unless the publication 
tends directly and obviously to incite men to disorderly 
and unlawful conduct. As long as it is a mere matter 
of opinion or theory, no matter how erroneous it is, the 
liberty of the writer should not be infringed. The reason 
of this is fairly obvious. Every false doctrine is, no doubt, 



LIBERTY. 129 

harmful to some extent. But then most opinions, though 
believed by some, are pretty certain to be regarded as 
false by others. Hence were we at liberty to ^ .. 

J p Should not 

prevent the publication of opinions deemed false be restricted, 
by any, very few publications would be permit- e ™J lfl J ls 
ted, and freedom of thought and utterance pernicious, 
would cease, — a policy upon which only the f/merf mat- 
most despotic governments would now venture, terofopin- 
The only safe remedy of a free people against 
the utterance of pernicious sentiments by tongue or pen, 
is the exposure of their evil character by the same instru- 
mentalities, and thus give the public an opportunity to 
judge concerning the views presented. 

To this limit, but not much further, may intellectual 
liberty proceed. So long as men only promulgate and advo- 
cate pernicious theories and policies, they may be tolerated. 
But when they begin to urge others to put Not at liberty 
them in practice, and excite them to unlawful °iJers to un- 
acts, then liberty changes to license, and they lawful acts, 
become obnoxious to public law and public order. A man 
may teach that property is robbery, and that what one has 
accumulated another may innocently take for his own use. 
This may be refuted by wise and sensible reasoners, and 
no great harm be done. But if, in addition to this, it be 
advised and urged upon the thoughtless to steal and plun- 
der, the adviser may properly be restrained by the govern- 
ment, and made to suffer the penalty of such criminal 
conduct. 

So also if a man publish any such opinion as tends to 
injure the reputation of another, he transgresses the proper 
limit of freedom of utterance. He is violating the right 
of his fellows, and no one can justly do this under the 



130 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

cover of intellectual liberty. The freest governments pro- 
hibit such utterances, or at least make those who indulge 
Nor at lib- themselves in them liable to suffer a proper 
erty to vio- penalty. Still, so jealous are we under such a 

late the right 

toreputa- government as ours of any restriction of the 
tion - liberty of the press, that our journals are 

allowed to go to, if not beyond, the very verge of mis- 
chievous and disgraceful license. In a political campaign 
Mi hi f of ^ ne a ^ use lavished upon a candidate for office 
license in of the opposite party is appalling. The only 
t is respec . re( j eem i n g feature in such a case is that the 
extravagance of defamation is so great that few really 
believe what is published ; not unfrequently it is dismissed 
both by the friends of the person assailed and by the pub- 
lic generally as a " campaign lie." In this respect men 
may and do in innumerable instances avoid amenability to 
the civil law, while flagrantly violating the most impor- 
tant ethical obligations. Certainly there is little danger 
among us of erring on the side of too great restriction of 
the freedom of the press and of public speech, but much 
of going to the opposite extreme. 

SECTION 5. — RELIGIOUS LIBERTY. 

Religious Liberty implies the right of every person to 
entertain and profess such religious convictions and doc- 
trines as seem to him most reasonable, and to put in prac- 
in what it tice the principles implied, under the familiar 
consists. limitations. He may have any religion he 
chooses ; or, if he so choose, he may reject all religions, 
being accountable to none but his Maker. He may adopt 
such ceremonies or ritual as seems to him desirable, and 
attend any assemblies or unite with any ecclesiastical 



LIBERTY. 131 

body whose views and regulations are adapted to meet his 
religious wants. This right is violated when men are 
required to worship God in any particular way ; How vio . 
when they are forbidden to worship in some lated - 
particular form; when they are forbidden to worship in 
any way at all ; or when they are subjected to disabilities, 
political or otherwise, because of their profession or non- 
profession of a particular faith. These disabilities may be 
imposed by the government or by public sentiment. Men 
and women are sometimes socially ostracized because they 
belong to a certain religious party or sect. All such treat- 
ment is a violation of right, and is therefore immoral and 
unjust. 

But religious liberty, like intellectual, may pass beyond 
its legitimate bounds, and become the pretext for conduct 
detrimental to personal rights and to the- inter- Abuse of re- 
ests of society. No pretence of religious devo- ligious lib- 
tion or usage can justify conduct of any sort er y * 
which is harmful to the prosperity or the morals of the 
community. Suppose a religious denomination adopts the 
theory of Polygamy, as the Mormons, or the Oneida com- 
munity of several years ago, and not only adopts the theory, 
but proceeds to apply it in practice. If polygamy is re- 
garded by the nation as a practice that is incalculably 
harmful and every way detestable, it makes no difference 
whether it is attempted under the guise of religion or in 
some other way, it must be put down by society in its 
own defence. The suppression of it by law can no more 
be regarded as religious persecution than the suppression 
of a gang of men associating themselves for the purpose 
of robbery, and proceeding to carry out their purposes, 
but accompanying their performance by certain religious 



132 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

rites, would be considered persecution. Their depredations 
may not be allowed any more because they had blasphe- 
mously undertaken to throw over them the sanction of 
religion than if they were to put their schemes in execu- 
tion by the ordinary methods. 



PROPERTY. 133 



CHAPTER III. 

PROPERTY. 
SECTION 1. — THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 

The right of property arises out of the general right of a 
man to himself, — that is, his right to all his powers of 
body and mind, to use them in his own way. From this 
it follows that any effect that he can cause in Genesis of 
this use of them belongs to him. If by any the right of 
labor upon any material which nature has fur- proper y# 
nished me, without the aid of any one else, I have pro- 
duced something of value, that is mine. Any utility 
which I have made available I have a right to appropriate 
and enjoy, and no other person has any right to it or any 
part of it. If I live near the sea, and go out on it and 
catch fish, the fish are mine. If I go in the forest and 
secure wild game for food, the game is mine. If, out of 
timber and lumber and other material which have come 
into my possession, I construct a house on land belonging 
to me, the house is my property. The ownership in all 
these cases is exclusive, except, as may be shown here- 
after, the civil government under which I live, and which 
secures to me my personal rights of all kinds, has a claim 
upon it for my share of the cost of the maintenance of 
the system. 

In the cases supposed, the ownership is absolute except 



134 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

as indicated. There are other cases in which it is partial 
and limited. If I raise crops on land in possession of an- 
other man, then only a part of the product is 
limited own- mine. If out of material furnished by another, 
ers ip * I construct implements or furniture, these are 

partly his, until I render him some equivalent. So in 
all the relations of wages and capital, a part only of the 
product belongs to the laborer, and for that he usually 
receives what is supposed to be an equivalent in money or 
some commodity. 

Furthermore, in the relation of employer and employee, 
the former, by virtue of his ability to manage the busi- 
ness so as to make it as productive as possible, may prop- 
erly claim a share of the product, usually a larger share 
Reasons why than the latter ; because it is by his skill and 
some have abilitv that it becomes so great as it is. If 

larger 

shares than such power and ability were not exerted, the 
others. results of labor, even to the manual laborer, 

might be only a small fraction of what it now is. The 
employer in the sense of the manager of the business, and 
not necessarily as a capitalist which he frequently is not, 
is a productive laborer, and as such is as truly as any 
other laborer entitled to that proportion of the whole 
product of which he is the efficient cause. A part of the 
difficulty between employers and laborers occurs at this 
point. Demagogues and inconsiderate zealots often teach 
that all property is created by labor, meaning muscular or 
manual labor ; whereas only a small fraction of it is so 
created ; though it is true that, in a very important sense, 
all property is created by labor. But in this case we must 
include mental as well as manual labor ; for more of the 
wealth of the world is due to this kind of labor, though 



PROPERTY. 135 

put forth by fewer individuals, than to physical exertion. 
There is, however, no doubt that this fact is taken advan- 
tage of in different ways by employers, and that the 
laborers for wages, as we may see later, are often the 
victims of gross injustice. 

The right of property, then, must be held to be a 
natural right in so far as it is the product of one's own 
labor. This constitutes the first right of property. 

SECTION 2. — PROPERTY ACQUIRED OTHERWISE THAN 
BY LABOR. 

A second right is constituted by exchange. If I actually 
own any kind of property, I may do what I choose with it 
provided I do not injure any other person. If Philosophy of 
I have made more shoes than I need for my own exchange, 
use, and if one of my neighbors has produced more wheat 
than he can consume, and if another neighbor has caught 
more fish than he wants, and if both of these are in want 
of shoes and I have not a supply of the commodities which 
they have produced, I may exchange my surplus for their 
surplus, and thus each will be benefited, and each will 
own something which he did not produce, but for which 
he has produced an equivalent. Usually, very much the 
largest part of what a man owns he has acquired in this 
way. 

Property may be acquired by gift. As the right of 
property implies the right to dispose of it at one's own 
pleasure, one may convey a portion or the whole of his 
property to another and thus surrender his right to him. 
In such a case, the right to the property inheres in the 
latter. 

It may also be acquired by Will. When one has pro- 



136 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

duced wealth, or in any way come into legitimate posses- 
sion of it, most civilized nations hold that he may deter- 
mine during his life who shall be the possessors of it after 
his death. There are, however, certain limitations to this 
freedom of disposal. If it shall have been proved that a 
man was unduly influenced by persons likely to profit 
by the disposition made of the property, the will would 
most likely be set aside. Also a man may not generally 
Restrictions w ^ awa y property so that his widow shall not 
of the power receive a certain legal proportion of it, since the 
o eques . ^ w supposes that the wife is joint owner with 
the husband to the property accumulated. So, too, a 
man may not bequeath his property to strangers, or to 
benevolent or other institutions, to the extent that his 
dependent children shall be left without adequate support. 
But in general the principle holds that a man may bestow 
his property by will, and the person on whom it is be- 
stowed become its rightful owner. 

Property is acquired by inheritance. When a man having 
property dies without having made a will, the presumption 
is that had he done so, it would have been divided in 
some way among his children, or nearest of kin. There- 
fore, in this country at least, such a division of the 
property takes place, and there is a legal order of relation- 
ship observed in the distribution. It is not exactly so in 
all nations. In Great Britain "and some other European 
countries there are rights of entail and primogeniture by 
which the eldest son, or the eldest male member in any 
collateral branch of the family, holds the landed estate, 
and keeps up the title if such there be. This is doubt- 
less designed to perpetuate the family name and impor- 
tance, in order to which there must be property to support 



PROPERTY, 137 

it. But in our country, where the democratic feeling is 
hostile to anything like a privileged class or artificial 
rank, no such laws prevail, and great properties are 
usually, though not always, broken up when the proprietor 
dies. At all events, inheritance here proceeds upon moral 
lines, and where there is no will the government divides 
the property equally among equal heirs. 

Finally the right of property is sometimes acquired by 
possession. If by any means a man is in possession of 
property, and there is no one who can show a superior 
claim to it, then the former is regarded as the rightful 
owner. But just here is a point of some delicacy. When 
I say that the present holder of the property must be re- 
garded as the rightful owner, I simply mean that no other 
person who can prove no better claim has any right to the 
property. But this is not saying that the person in pos- 
session had a right to take possession or that he strictly has 
any right to hold it. He must be allowed to hold it only 
because there is no one who has a better right There may be 
to it, and it is better that one man should be alepiright 

• • • pi iir while the 

permitted to hold it in spite of the moral defect moral right 
of his claim than that a dozen or score of lswantm s- 
equally defective claimants should be allowed to contend 
for it. The present occupant may have no moral right 
to it, though he has a legal right. No one else has either 
a moral or a legal right to it. 

SECTION 3. — VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY, — 
THEFT AND ROBBERY. 

There are many ways in which the right of property is 
violated. The first is by Theft; that is, by taking the 
property of another without the knowledge of the owner. 



138 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

Of the more obvious forms of this there is little need to 
speak. A thief and his practice are both universally 
reprobated, even by thieves themselves. More men steal 
than advocate or defend stealing. But there are methods 
of taking the property of others, the immorality of which, 
though less obvious, is nevertheless generally admitted, 
but which the perpetrators would not like to have called 
by that name. Yet that is its proper and real desig- 
nation. 

A man may manage to get a ride on a railroad train 
without paying for it. He is defrauding the corporation, 
Different and taking for his own what belongs to others. 

whfcVtheft -^ ^ oes not ma ^ e an y difference that it is a 
is committed, rich corporation. To appropriate its property 
is theft. Nor will it be of any moral avail to say that it 
will not be missed. Very likely not : still, it is a violation 
of right, and therefore forbidden by the moral law. This 
is given only as a specimen of a class of depredations on 
property which persons of no solid principles practise, and 
then excuse themselves on the flimsy pretexts mentioned. 
Similar to these is purloining from governments. I do 
not speak now of the more obvious peculations of dis- 
honest officials. But when a man evades the payment of 
his proportion of the taxes he compels others to pay more 
than their proportion, and this is equivalent to appropriat- 
ing money that belongs to them. It does not mitigate the 
offence that it is a small amount, and that it is distributed 
among a great number of persons. The principle is the 
same. Moreover, if any considerable number do the same 
thing the amount becomes large and the unjust burden 
proportionally large. All waste of public or corporate 
property partakes of the same criminal character, and is 



PROPERTY, 139 

doubly wrong. It is wrong to waste even our own ; to 
waste the property of others adds to the wrong by violat- 
ing trust and adding fraud. 

Embezzlement is another form of theft. By this is meant 
the using for our own purposes the property of others 
with which we are put in trust or of which we have 
charge. Of the direct and permanent appropriation of such 
property it is not necessary to speak, as being obviously in 
the category of theft. But men of not very lofty moral 
principles frequently make what they intend shall be only a 
temporary use of such property, expecting to be Temporary 
able to replace it before it shall be missed 1 ^ fl b l !?° m " 

-t mg perma- 

or needed by the owners. Clerks in stores, nent. 
cashiers in banks, treasurers and agents of corporations, 
trustees of funds, sometimes take money in their custody, 
and use it for speculative purposes, hoping to get imme- 
diate returns, and replace the amount before there is any 
possibility of discovery. Frequently, no doubt, this is the 
case, and no pecuniary injury results to any one. But the 
moral evil is none the less. Property belonging to another 
has been taken without his consent, and put to the risk of 
loss. More frequently the loss takes place ; and not only 
what has been wrongfully taken is lost, but perhaps much 
more, thus furnishing a temptation to repeat the crime, still 
hoping for a favorable turn. This may be repeated till 
the community is startled by rumors of a great defalca- 
tion, and the ruin of a reputation heretofore unblemished, 
and consequent arrest, condemnation, and imprisonment. 
Of the same nature, only as regarded by the public a 
more serious crime, is that of Forgery. A man signs his 
neighbor's name to a check, or note, or other document 
calling for the payment of money, and thus the perpetra- 



140 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

tor secures what is not his own, and some one has to 
lose it. 

Another form of violating the right of property is 
Robbery, taking what belongs to another by force. There 
Property are many forms of this. Nearly always it is 
Sawne/by 1 ^ ne stronger overcoming the weaker. There 
force. is not now so much as formerly of physical vio- 

lence and personal assault for this purpose. Highway 
robbery was at one period very common in England. But 
with the advance in civilization, and the perfecting of the 
judiciary and constabulary, it is now very rare. There is 
robbery still, but it is carried on in subtler and more 
evasive ways. It is still the strong overcoming the weak. 
Carried on in ^ * s some tinies the strength which wealth or 
recent times position gives. Advantage is taken of those 
ways, but wno are ^ eeble or ignorant to wrest their prop- 
not less erty from them. A man may be so situated, 
and his wants may be such, that he prefers to 
pay double the value of an article rather than go without 
it ; or to part with some product, or give his labor for half 
its worth, rather than not dispose of it in exchange ; and 
there are those who are glad to avail themselves of his 
distress, and become so much richer at his expense. 
Sometimes the laborer is compelled to receive the value 
of his wages from the store of his employer, and it may 
be to pay exorbitant prices. Sometimes a just claim for 
wages or commodities is made upon an unjust man. It 
may be a case where, if it were to be decided in the courts, 
the claimant would be promptly sustained. But he has 
little means to prosecute, and the other has the ability to 
make it more costly for him to do so than to lose what is 
due. Hence, rather than lose the whole, and perhaps 



PROPERTY. 141 

something more, he relinquishes a part. The man who 
retains this is a robber, by whatever euphemistic name he 
may be called. So also is the man who takes advantage of 
the necessities of another, and actually compels him to sell 
his property for something less than its proper value, even 
though his robbery be carried on under the forms of law. 
What is true of individuals is equally true of nations. 
When a strong nation goes to war with a weak one on 
some mere pretext, and then, as the result of National 
conquest, and the price of peace, forces the robbery, 
latter to surrender a part of its territory, this, too, is 
robbery on a large scale. Unhappily, this is not an infre- 
quent incident in the history of the world. Sometimes 
there is not even a pretext : the war is carried on avowedly 
as a war of conquest. But in modern times this is rarely 
the case, and there is usually some more or less flimsy 
excuse. Some such have occurred in our own times, and 
even our own nation can hardly show clean hands in this 
respect. 

SECTION 4. — VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY, — 
FRAUD IN EXCHANGE. 

The third method by which the right of property is 
violated is by Fraud in Exchange. I have already used the 
word Fraud in its general sense, but it has a Dishonest 
particular meaning in relation to trade or com- commerce, 
merce. As has been explained, property often comes to 
men by exchange. If we think of it, nearly all that men 
possess comes in that way. When we take an inventory of 
our goods, we shall find that only a surprisingly small 
fraction is of our own individval production. Men are so 
constituted that each individual can do but few things to 



142 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

advantage. His production is generally, then, of very 
few commodities ; but of these he may produce many 
times the quantity that he needs, perhaps enough to sup- 
ply the wants of a thousand others ; but he also has a 
thousand wants of his own which he cannot supply. 
Hence, Exchange or Commerce, the surplus of each going 
to supply the wants of others than those of the actual 
producers. Here is an opportunity for dishonest dealing 
if one desires, as some do, to receive larger value than he 
gives. The moral law governing the right of property in 
Law overn- excnan g e is value for value. An attempt to get 
ing exchange a larger value for a small one, is what in coni- 
o proper y. mon language is called cheating. 

The moral law governing exchange is violated when the 
seller gives in exchange a less quantity or a poorer 
Methods of quality of the commodity of which he is dis- 
vioiation. posing than the buyer supposes he is receiving, 
or than both know he ought to receive. On the other 
hand, if the buyer contrives to secure from the seller a 
larger quantity or a better quality than the seller supposes 
he is giving, or that both know that he ought to give, 
there is an equal violation. The same law holds good for 
both buyer and seller, and in barter each party sustains 
both characters. 

It is no way different in the case of the professional 
trader or merchant. It is his business to supply the corn- 
Business and muru ty with such commodities within the limits 
duty of the of his particular sphere of business as they may 
need. His compensation consists in what he 
receives for his goods over and above what he pays for 
them. It is right that he should have a profit, and it is a 
convenient method of paying him for his time and labor. 



PROPERTY. 143 

There is a temptation to make this profit larger by char- 
ging exorbitant prices ; but this is usually limited by 
competition, as if his customers find that his prices are 
unreasonable, they are likely to go to some other trader. 
His success depends on understanding the wants of the 
people, and in having the skill to meet them both in kind 
and quantity ; on his ability to buy to the best advantage 
of his customers and of himself, and to select the best 
articles ; on his attention to business ; and generally on his 
moral character. 

The moral law in the case requires him to furnish good 
articles and such as are what he represents them to be, 
and to sell them at fair prices. There is no hard and fast 
rule by which these prices can be fixed, as they must vary 
according to circumstances. He should at least allow 
himself a fair compensation for his services, and he 
should not demand more than such compensation re- 
quires. Should he buy when prices are high, and there 
should be an immediate fall in prices, he must be con- 
tent to sell at lower prices than those obtaining when he 
purchased. It is a part of his skill in trade to so pur- 
chase that he can fairly make a profit. If for any reason 
he fails to do this, the loss is properly his. On the other 
hand, if he has bought at low prices and there is an im- 
mediate advance, he is entitled to the additional profit. 
The advantages in the long run will thus compensate the 
disadvantages. 

It is not his business to urge his goods upon his cus- 
tomers, or to induce them to purchase what they are not 
otherwise inclined to purchase, though he may properly 
enough give advice if asked. He is not required to ex- 
plain the character of his goods generally ; but if he is 



144 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

selling an article which has been damaged he is not to 
conceal that defect ; and if it be one that is not obvious it 
is his duty to point it out. These and other kindred 
obligations bind the seller. 

The buyer, whether in trade with the merchant or else- 
where, has corresponding obligations. He may not 
The Law bind- endeavor to cheapen the commodities below 
ing upon the their proper value, nor pretend the discovery of 

buyer as well r r ■> c j 

as upon the defects which do not exist, nor bring to bear 
on the seller improper motives, such as inti- 
mating the loss of custom if prices are not diminished, or 
other such influences. 

It is not an uncommon thing when a man has discovered 
a very considerable value in a piece of property, which 
extra value is unknown to the owner, for the discoverer 
to offer the owner something more than the ordinary sell- 
ing price of the property, but much less than it would sell 
. for were the real value known. It may be a 
tageofthe piece of land on which a profitable mine has 
been discovered, or a lot where a railroad 
station is about to be located, or near which a large fac- 
tory is to be erected, or which is known to be wanted for 
some purpose which will make it very valuable ; or it 
may be some other description of property which has 
suddenly advanced in value, the advance being unknown 
to the owner. The buyer in such a case gets for a moder- 
ate amount what he knows he can sell for a great increase, 
and thus becomes the possessor of property which would 
Such trading na ve otherwise belonged to another. There is 
notjustifiabie. among a certain class of business-men a dispo- 
sition to justify such transactions. But I am confident 
that in the ideal society no such trading will be sanctioned, 



PROPERTY. 145 

nor can it easily be made to square with the rule of doing 
to others as we would have them do to us. 

Sometimes men interested in the purchase of certain 
kinds of property cause false rumors to be circulated; as 
that such property is to suffer a great decline Prices influ _ 
owing to certain changes that have taken place enced by falsa 
or are to take place, and thus secure the prop- rumors - 
erty at a cost much below its value. This is especially 
the case in buying or selling stocks and commodities on 
speculation. A false rumor may diminish the price of 
certain bonds, or shares of corporations, or government 
securities, or some material commodity, as wheat or corn 
or sugar. The buyer who is in the secret makes large 
purchases. Then when the false report is rectified he may 
sell at a large advance. Sometimes great fortunes are 
made in a day; but what is made by one is lost by 
another : the whole business is based on fraud. Corre- 
sponding fraud exists often on the part of the buyer as 
well as the seller. Rumors of a contrary character, but 
equally deceptive, are made to abstract money from certain 
pockets and to put in others. 

A different kind of dishonesty, though quite akin to 

those given, is practised when certain men combine to 

buv up all of a certain commoditv that is in 
, , , , , ,„ . . Combination 

the market or that can be secured. Ii it is to control 
a kind of stock or commodity that is in great P nces - 
demand when the purchases are made by the combination, 
the price may be advanced to any point thought desirable, 
and the public may be compelled to pay the extortionat 
amount. This is what is called a " corner," a somewhat 
familiar term in late years. 

The whole business of pure speculation is of doubtful 



146 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

morality. By pure speculation I mean that traffic in 
various kinds of property where no one is benefited un- 
Doubtfui less some other is injured, or where the gain to 

ter'of an^ure an y one ^ m P^ es l° ss to some one else ; where there 
speculation, is no increase of wealth, since nothing is pro- 
duced. In very much of this speculation there is not even 
anything really bought or sold. If all the professed sales 
of wheat sometimes made in the Chicago exchange in a 
single day were real instead of fictitious, there would not 
be enough in all that region to meet the conditions. A 
transaction of this sort is simply " betting " that the price 
will be so much at a certain time. If it is more than that 
when the time comes the seller loses and the buyer gains. 
If it is less, the buyer losses and the seller gains ; and the 
settlement is made, not by a transfer of the commodity, 
but by paying the difference between the real price and 
that at which the fictitious sale was made. It is gambling 
on a great scale. It is not only morally reprehensible in 
itself, but it furnishes a broad field and powerful tempta- 
tions for subsidiary fraud and false dealing. 

SECTION 5. — VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 
— WHERE THE EQUIVALENT IS IMMATERIAL. 

So far we have been considering material and tangible 
goods in exchange. We have further to take notice of 
such as are immaterial and intangible. Chief among these 
is labor of all kinds. This is a commodity that must have 
an immediate sale, as unless sold as soon as ready for the 
Labor as a market it is thenceforth unsalable. To-day's 
commodity power f labor must be used to-day : it will not 

and in ex- x J 

change. keep till to-morrow. There will be ability of 

the same kind to-morrow belonging to the same individual ; 
but it will be to-morrow's ability and not to-day's. 



PROPERTY. 147 

In speaking of labor as an article of exchange, refer- 
ence is had not to that labor which is expended by the 
individual producer carrying on business by himself and 
offering his wares in the market, as the small farmer, the 
village shoemaker, the cabinet-maker, and various other 
manufacturers, more numerous formerly than now, who sell 
their labor only in the form of commodities and not 
directly to employers. When we speak of a laborer, we 
generally mean those who work for daily, weekly, or 
monthly wages, and put forth their productive The wages of 
energies, not on materials and with machinery of labor - 
their own, but who go on farms and into shops and facto- 
ries under employers either individual or corporate, and 
who receive the compensation for their labor, not in the 
articles they have produced, but in a supposed equivalent 
in money or otherwise. 

The duty of the employer in all such cases is, first to 
pay a just compensation for the labor performed. It may not 
always be easy, amid the complicated conditions of modern 
production, to determine what is a just compensation. 
Unquestionably every man, whatever his labor, should 
receive the equivalent of the product of which he is the effi- 
cient cause. But the difficulty is just as great as before. 
The product must be divided between the owners of the 
plant and machinery, the purchasers of material, the gov- 
ernment, the insurance companies, the compen- Difficulties of 
sation for the management of the business, just distribu- 
whether by the proprietor or an agent, wages, 
and the legitimate profits of the business. With the 
exception of wages and profits the proper distribution is 
not very difficult to estimate. Perhaps there is no proper 
rate of profits. For the term as here used is narrower in 



148 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

its meaning than that usually attributed to it. It signifies 
little more than the compensation for the risk incurred. 
As risk is largely a matter of chance, and as no man can 
be quite certain whether his business will succeed, or to 
w-hat extent it will do so, the rate of profits which one 
Bisk and demands is only measured by the amount of 
profits. pjgk which he supposes himself to have assumed. 

A large proportion of such enterprises are entire failures ; 
a great number of others are only moderately prosperous, 
while a few make immense profits. Apparently in many 
cases, then, the wages paid will depend upon the amount 
determined to profits ; that is, if much is reserved for 
profits only a small amount can go to wages. But this is 
more apparent than real. For oftener than otherwise, 
where profits are large wages are also large, so that some 
of our ablest economists have declared that the two have 
no proper relation to each other, or, at least, that they are 
not in the inverse ratio of one another. The only means 
at present of determining what is fair compensation for 
labor are custom and competition, and it must vary accord- 
ing to the capability of individual workmen. There are 
instances where obviously the compensation is not fair and 
just, and where the emploj^er is evidently securing the 
labor of his employee at a rate which is unjust. This is a 
clear violation of the moral law. 

A second violation is when the laborer is not paid at 
reasonable intervals, and promptly at the time designated, 
other viola- Thirdly, when he is compelled to take his pay in 
laborer's 116 commodities upon which the employer puts his 
rights. own price, instead of in money. Fourthly, when 

he is compelled to work more hours than are stipulated, or than 
constitute a customary day's work. Fifthly, when he is 



PROPERTY. 149 

not furnished with reasonable facilities in the way of 
machinery and tools. Sixthly, when the workmen are 
compelled to work in ill-ventilated rooms, or under un- 
healthy conditions, or where they are exposed to unneces- 
sary danger from the character of the building or the 
machinery. 

There are other ways in which the laborer may be de- 
frauded, but they are so similar to these as not to require 
specific designation. In general, when the Advantage 
situation of the workman is such that he must necessitiesof 
take such wages as he can get or suffer for the the laborer, 
necessaries of life, and the employer takes advantage of 
this situation to diminish his wages or to subject him to 
unwholesome or dangerous conditions, then the employer 
is guilty of fraud ; and though the civil law may not apply 
to his case, yet he is morally culpable. 

On the other hand, the laborer is under certain moral 
obligations to his employer. First, he must exact no more 
than fair wages, even when he has the advantage . 0bliffations 
on his side. Secondly, he must perform the work on the part of 
he has stipulated to do. This implies that there the laborer * 
be no idling or loitering, such as would diminish the 
value of his labor. Thirdly, it must be faithful and honest 
work, no slighting or negligence so that the articles made 
or the general product shall be in any way defective. 
Fourthly, there should be no waste of material, or needless 
destruction of tools or machinery. Fifthly, the full time 
customary for a day's work should be put in, unless there is 
a stipulation otherwise. 



150 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

SECTION 6. — STRIKES AND OTHER COMBINATIONS. 

A question sometimes arises as to the moral character 
of combinations among employees, or what are commonly 
Ethical princi- ca ^ e( ^ "strikes" to compel the employers to 
pie pertain- advance wages or to grant some other advan- 
' tages of which the workmen consider them- 
selves unjustly deprived. It would seem that there can 
be no reasonable doubt about the right of laborers to com- 
bine, whenever by such combination there is a probability 
that they can obtain rights which they would not other- 
wise secure. No man can rightly be compelled to work 
when the compensation seems to him insufficient or un- 
just. It would effect nothing for a single individual or 
for a few to refuse to work. Their places might be easily 
filled, and they themselves would be left much worse off 
than to work at the unjust wages. But if a sufficient 
number should agree to quit work until their demands 
are complied with, it might induce the employers to grant 
their request. 

There are, however, several things to be taken into 
account when we undertake to justify such a combination. 
Considerations 1 ' Tnere should be a pretty strong assurance 
to be taken in the minds of the laborers that their demand is 
a just one. 2. There should be a large likelihood 
of success. Even though the cause be a just one, it might 
not be wise nor right for the laborers to run great risk of 
defeat, thus depriving themselves of their wages not only 
while the strike lasts, but also possibly for some time to 
follow. This would imply for a considerable proportion 
of those affected much suffering. 3. There should be no 
compulsion exercised upon those who do not wish to join 



PROPERTY. 151 

in the combination, no± any abuse or maltreatment of 
those who come to take the places of the strikers. To do 
this is to interfere with personal liberty, and it would be 
inconsistent to violate one right in the attempt to secure 
another. It is no doubt a great provocation when work- 
ing-men are uniting to secure what they regard as justice 
both to themselves and their fellow workers, to have their 
efforts thwarted by the refusal of some to join with them, 
and that the latter should even so act as to prevent the 
success of the whole scheme. The temptation to use com- 
pulsion, and even proceed to violent measures, is no doubt 
great. But, after all, each man has a right to himself, 
and unless this principle is preserved, the principle that 
" right is might " will soon prevail. It is, of course, im- 
plied that however just may be the demand, and however 
allowable the combination, any destruction of the property 
of the employers, or any attempt to do them injury, is un- 
justifiable. No righteous end may be secured by unright- 
eous means. 

On the other hand, we must on the same principle 
justify the combinations of employers to promote their own 
interests and to regulate prices both of labor Employers' 
and of commodities. It is true they run much combinati ons- 
less risk than do the laborers, and there is great advantage 
on their side. They also are much more likely to make 
an unjust use of such advantage than the workmen of 
theirs. The opportunities are more numerous and the 
temptations greater. Whenever they avail themselves of 
such means to force wages below a reasonable rate, or to 
compel other conditions unfavorable and prejudicial to the 
workmen, their conduct is unquestionably to be condemned 
as unjust and fraudulent. Still, I do not see how on 



152 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS, 

general principles we can deny the right of employers to 
form combinations to advance their own interests. If 
this be true, still more is it true that this right pertains to 
the laborers, as being in greater need of such a defence. 

SECTION 7. — BORROWING AND LENDING. 

We come now to the application of the moral law to the 
transfer of the right of property for a limited period. In 
modern society, and under our modern industrial and 
mercantile systems, a very large number of people are in the 
temporary possession of property which belongs to others. 
Hence arises the relation of borrower and lender, and as 
nearly synonymous with these that of debtor and creditor, and 
the obligations that grow out of these relations. We may 
for convenience' sake divide the subject into three parts : 
I. The borrowing of money. II. Buying and sell- 
ing on credit. III. Hiring other property than 

MONEY FOR A LIMITED PERIOD. 

I. In borrowing money there are two points to be con- 
sidered, the risk and the use. The risk is of two kinds : 
Two points to one when the lender depends entirely on the 
be considered. honor and ability of the borrower; the other, 

when the latter gives legal security for the payment of 
the debt ; as when getting a loan of five hundred dollars, 
I give the loaner a mortgage on my house or farm. It is 
evident that the risk is much less in the latter case than 
in the former. Even presuming the honesty of the 
borrower, he may become financially disabled, so that it 
would be difficult or perhaps impossible for him to pay. 

Let us consider first the case of the borrower who gives 
no security. He is bound in the first place, however 
much he may need the money, not to borrow unless he 



PROPERTY. 153 

believes in his ability to pay. To borrow without this 
probability is a pretty clear case of fraud. In the second 
place, he is bound to so use the money borrowed, 

, . , , . , , . Conditions 

and indeed any other property he may have, binding the 
in such a way as not to render himself unable borrower - 
to pay the debt. Thirdly, he is bound to pay the creditor 
according to the agreement and at times indicated in the 
conditions of the loan. Also if there be other conditions, 
as of interest, of Avhich I shall speak farther on, or of any 
other sort, they must be faithfully met. 

The borrower who gives security is under obligations to 
represent the property offered for this purpose just as it 
is. It must be free from incumbrance and from exposure 
other than is specified. In the second place, he is bound 
to keep it in this condition, and not to treat it so that 
it will deteriorate in value. Furthermore, if there is a 
failure to pay the debt, and the property pledged passes 
into the hands of the creditor, but by reason of deteriora- 
tion it is not sufficient to meet the obligation, it is the duty 
of the debtor, if possible, to make up the deficiency. 

The question naturally arises just here whether a man 
w T ho has failed to meet his obligations through inability 
or otherwise, is released from these obligations whether 
by taking advantage of the insolvency or bank- bankrupt is 
rupt laws. Legally he may be, but morally he "J™ n y ' t e [ e fl . n 
is not. The design of such laws is to give a gaily, bound 
man an opportunity to re-establish himself in cJeditorsf 
business without the annoyance from creditors, Design of in- 
who by continuously pressing him with demands, bankrupt 
or levying executions upon his means, might laws * 
prevent him from getting upon his feet again. Many a 
man who has been compelled to suspend payment has, 



154 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

through the protection of these laws, been able to meet 
all his obligations ; whereas, if he had been pushed every 
day by impatient creditors, his case would have become 
hopeless. Nevertheless, this does not relieve him from the 
moral obligation to pay every dollar of any previous debt 
he may have incurred. The same is true when one's 
creditors come together and agree to release him from all 
legal obligations by the payment of a certain percentage 
of the amount due. They cannot subsequently collect 
the remainder by law, but the debtor is none the less 
morally bound to pay the whole debt. 

Another question about which there has been much 
discussion is whether the receiving of interest for money 
loaned is ethically justifiable. This is denied by certain 
M l har- WI> iters. The denial is sometimes based on the 
acter of prohibition of usury by the Mosaic code ; usury 
interest on tnen meannl g precisely what we mean by inter- 
money est now, namely, payment for the use of money. 
The term has become diverted from its original 
signification, and now means unlawful interest. In 
justification of the modern usuge, it is said that this pro- 
hibition is no part of the moral law, but belongs to the 
civil code of the Hebrews. 1 Also it is noted that the 
Relations industrial and business methods of modern soci- 
existing in ety are totally different from those of the ancient 
mun^ties C °but Hebrews. With them business was not carried 
not in modern on by means of great capitals. Next to no capi- 
tal at all was needed for industrial enterprises. 
The borrowing and lending of money was like the bor- 

x It is remarkable that the representatives of the nation upon whom this 
prohibition was laid have been for some centuries the great money-lenders 
and usurers of the world, many of them accumulating vast fortunes. 



PROPERTY. 155 

rowing and lending of tools and implements and other 
movable property among our rural population. In such 
a community one seldom thinks of charging a neighbor 
for the use of a horse for a short time, or of a cart or 
sled, or an axe or a spade. Each neighbor accommo- 
dates another, knowing that he may need a like favor at 
another time. Among the Hebrews it was regarded with 
the same aversion to demand payment for the use of 
money as it might be regarded in certain of our commu- 
nities to require pay for the use of the articles mentioned. 

But, in our times and society, more or less capital is 
necessary for the carrying on of any industrial undertak- 
ing ; and unless the credit system should prevail, some of 
the capable business-men would fail of the opportunity 
to exercise their peculiar productive ability, and produc- 
tion would be incalculably more limited than now. Hence 
there is a combination between men who have business 
ability without capital, and those who have capital without 
business ability. It must be also remembered that what is 
loaned in nearly all cases, though nominally money, is really 
some other form of capital ; and no one denies that when 
a house, or a farm, or a factory, or machinery is loaned for a 
considerable time, compensation should be paid for the use. 

The ethical law applying to interest is somewhat as 
follows : The lender is under obligations to exact no more 
than a fair rate. This will vary according to The moral 
circumstances. If capital is scarce, and there- law applying 

. -, to the pay- 

fore the sacrifice is greater on the part of the ment of inter- 
lender, it will naturally be higher than when it ***' (1 '' °£ 
is abundant. Then, again, the risk is far greater the lender. 
in one case than in another ; and where the risk is greater 
the rate of interest may properly be higher. But the 



156 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

lender may not justly take advantage of the misfortunes 
or straits of the borrower to extort a higher rate than he 
would otherwise demand. Nor may he urge upon him a 
loan to be secured by mortgage or pledge of any sort, and 
then, if the borrower happen to be crippled at the time of 
payment, foreclose and get possession of his property at 
less than its value. Sometimes this is done to a scandal- 
ous extent, and money-lenders enrich themselves at the 
expense of their victims. 

On the other hand, there are moral obligations binding 
upon the borrower in respect to interest. He should pay 
2 Obiiffa- a * a * r ra * e ' ^ e snou ld pay it punctually at the 
tionsofthe time stipulated in the contract. Sometimes 
such loans are the property of persons of mod- 
erate means, and the interest may constitute their main 
dependence for support, and to be kept out of it even for 
a time may be the cause of much distress. But in any 
case one is bound to comply with the obligations he has 
assumed. It is not often that the borrower has the lender 
at a disadvantage ; but it is sometimes the case ; and it 
would be wrong in such a case to demand a lower than 
reasonable rate of interest, or when payment is due to 
compel him to settle for less than the stipulated amount. 

II. Buying on credit is another form of borrowing. If I 
purchase a horse on the condition that I pay for it at some 
Moral princi- future time, the seller in effect loans the value 
pies to be f ^q horse for that time. It is so of all goods, 
debt and The same general principles hold here as in the 
credit. borrowing and lending of money. The buyer 

is under obligations not to take the property unless he 
sees a probability of paying according to agreement. 
Having received it, he is bound to make all reasonable 



PROPERTY. 157 

effort to pay for it ; and no mere convenience of his own, 
nor the fact that he needs the money for some other desir- 
able purpose, nor that it will require more exertion and 
self-denial than he is willing to make, can excuse him. 

The seller is bound not to urge the purchase upon the 
buyer, nor to persuade him to get so deeply in his debt as 
to give him an advantage, or a control of his property, as 
is sometimes done. When such an advantage is inciden- 
tally or unintentionally gained, it would not be morally 
honest, though the creditor were acting within Advantaff0 
legal limits, to use it to the damage of the taken by the 
debtor. Years ago it was not uncommon for a cre ltor ' 
country merchant doing business with farmers in his 
vicinity, to trust them to an almost unlimited extent. 
Some of the more improvident of these would run up bills 
so large that the merchant would demand security in the 
form of mortgages on their farms ; and in no long time he 
would come into possession of the farm, perhaps at a 
forced sale and a cost much less than its real value, and 
this, too, after having made considerable profits on goods 
sold to these customers. I do not say that in all these 
cases, or in most of them, there was an intention on the 
part of the creditors to bring about this result ; but there 
is always a temptation of this kind, and when yielded to 
results in a positive wrong. 

III. The third division of borrowing and lending com- 
prises all the cases of Rental of Property. Most of the same 
general principles prevail here as in the divisions Sense in 
already considered: but there are peculiarities « rent" is 
in the temporary conveyance of property which here used, 
need to be treated separately. The term Rent is used 
here not in the strict economic sense of that term, 



158 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

that is, of compensation for the use of real estate, but in 
the looser sense of compensation for the use of any prop- 
erty which is loaned. The borrower in this case, as in that 
of interest, is bound to pay the owner a fair compensation, 
Duties of the an( ^ sucn as ma 7 De agreed upon between them, 
borrower. He is to pay this at the stipulated time. He is 
to return the article at the end of the stipulated time un- 
less the loan be extended by the consent of the owner. 
He is to return it in as good a condition as he received 
it except the natural wear and tear by the use to which it 
has been put. There is also an obligation concerning this 
use. The property must not be used in a way not con- 
templated in the conditions of the loan. It would not be 
just to hire a house ostensibly for a dwelling-house, and 
then convert it into a stable or a carpenter's shop ; or to 
hire a lightly built horse to go in a carriage, and then use 
him to plough in the field or to draw a heavy dray. 

The lender is under obligations to furnish such an article 
as he represents and as the borrower supposes it to be. 
Duties of the He may demand no more than a fair price, and 
lender. fo e mav no t demand its return before the stipu- 

lated time. If the property come back in a damaged con- 
dition, the loss must be sustained by one or the other party 
as the damage has been incurred in the way of the under- 
stood use or otherwise. If I hire a cart for the season, 
and it breaks down under an ordinary load and without 
being exposed to any unusual strain, the damage must be 
sustained by the lender unless he had indicated the weak- 
ness, and made it a condition of the loan that particular 
care should be taken in this respect. But if I hire a cart 
which it is understood is good for a ton, and I put on it a 
ton and a half and the cart breaks down, then I am prop- 
erly liable for the damage. 






PROPERTY. 159 

The borrower is entitled to any unexpected advantage found 
in the property hired when used for the purpose intended 
or indicated. If a vicious horse is hired for the The borrower 
season, and hired at a cheap rate because of his entitled to 
character, and the person hiring him by peculiar P e C ted ad- 
tact in managing him finds that he is twice as vantage, 
valuable as was supposed, the advantage is rightly his and 
not that of the owner. So if a man hire a piece of land 
the productive capacity of which is supposed to be fifteen 
bushels to the acre, and under his management it produces 
thirty bushels to the acre, this advantage is his and not 
that of the owner. But if, as Dr. Wayland „ A 

7 J But not to 

points out, he discovers on the land a coal-mine, use the prop- 
he has no more right to that than he has to cut erty for an J 

& purpose not 

off all the wood that may be growing on the contemplated 
land and sell it for fuel. He did not hire the intheloan - 
land for this purpose, and the advantage is not his. 



160 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 



CHAPTER IV. 

CHARACTER AND REPUTATION. 

By Character is meant all that a man is : all the qualities 
that belong to him, — his faults and his virtues, his purposes 
Difference be- and convictions, his tendencies and dispositions, 
tweenChar- ]^ s strength, and his weakness. Reputation is 

acter and & r 

Reputation, what others think of us, — how we are regarded 

by the community in which we live or by the world at 

large. It will be seen that these may be widely different. 

A man may have a good Character and at the same time 

a bad Reputation ; or he may have a bad Character and a 

good Reputation. But I do not think either of these is 

likely to be the case. For the most part the Character 

and Reputation of a person somewhat nearly coincide, 

though it is probable they seldom do exactly. 

SECTION 1. — CHARACTER. 

We are to a certain extent responsible for the character 
of those over whom we have any influence. Parents 
Eesponsibil- especially are regarded as having much to do in 
ity to some shaping the character of their children ; and 

extent for the ,-1,1 -, . -n i jy 

character of teachers, though m a smaller degree, may artect 
others. their pupils. In the various relations of society 

every person has a certain power over others for either 
good or evil. Probably no man comes into even brief 



CHARACTER AND REPUTATION. 161 

communication with another, but that he affects him in 
some way so that he will never again be exactly the same 
man he was before. 

The general rule at this point obviously is to do others 
as much good and as little harm as possible. This rule 
is violated when those who are under our influence, 
and whom we ought to help in the formation of a good 
character, are neglected by us. It is an exceedingly 
great fault when children and youth are allowed by those 
who have the charge of them to grow up without moral 
discipline and instruction. It is bad enough when their 
bodies are neglected and their minds untrained ; but it is 
still worse when their moral natures run wild, and there 
are developed in them all sorts of lawlessness, self-indul- 
gence and vice. 

It is especially a violation of this obligation when 
positive influence for evil is exerted. For one to deliberately 
attempt to harm the character of another, and _ . • . 

x , Positive in- 

to make him worse than he otherwise would fluencefor 

become, is execrable, — it is something akin to evil# 

moral murder. Men sometimes persuade others to act 

viciously and wickedly for the sake of some advantage 

to the person exercising this pernicious influence, or for 

the purpose of personal self-gratification. Where a man 

for the sake of gain places temptation in the Tempting the 

way of a man, as when alcoholic liquors are a PP etlteor 

J \ other pro- 

placed before a person whose appetites are pensities. 

already deranged and easily influenced, or where one 

endeavors to corrupt the mind of another in order that he 

may secure his co-operation in some iniquity, that is a 

wanton and infamous wrong. There are some in all our 

communities, and very many in some, who are the victims 



162 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

of such evil influences, and some of whom are hopelessly 
ruined. These are crimes against humanity such as are 
rarely equalled by other species of wrong-doing. To steal 
a man's property, to injure his health, or even to take his 
life, is not so great a wrong as to harm and degrade one's 
character. 

SECTION 2. — REPUTATION. 

A good Reputation is among the choicest treasures that 
we can possess. " A good name is rather to be chosen 
Value of one's than great riches, and loving favor rather than 
Reputation, silver and gold." It is with many all they have 
to depend upon for success in life. Hence for any one to 
carelessly detract from it is to do a great wrong, and to 
commit an injustice not easily atoned for. 

There are three forms of injuring the reputation of 
others : namely, Slander, Backbiting, and Rash Judgment. 

I. Slander consists in reporting and circulating state- 
ments of the faults of others of which they are not culpa- 
sianderde- kle. ^ combines falsehood and evil-speaking 
fined. or detraction. Of the vice of simple falsehood 

we shall speak later. But the effort to rob any person of 
a good name, and untruthfully to put in circulation reports 
detrimental to his reputation, and calculated to make him 
.. to be held in disrepute and dishonor, is, as has 
character of been intimated, not only unjust, but cruel and 
sue con uct. w i c k e( j an( j cowardly. It is all the worse so 
since the maligned party has no redress till it is too late. 
The bad rumors have spread and gathered volume as they 
have gone, till sometimes an innocent person comes to be 
regarded with almost universal execration. It is no pal- 
liation of the injustice that the individual who starts the 



CHARACTER AND REPUTATION. 163 

rumor pleads that he thought it was true. He had no 
right to give utterance to the statement unless he knew it 
to be true, and not even then except that there was some 
end to be served besides that of creating a sensation by- 
idle and senseless gossip. 

II. Backbiting consists in unnecessarily speaking evil 
of persons, even when the statements made may 

be substantially true. Some persons have a 
malicious delight, a kind of " ghoulish glee," in publishing 
the faults of their fellow-men. They enjoy it as buzzards 
enjoy carrion ; and when they have heard of some scandal 
they regard it as a choice treasure, and have no rest till 
they have divulged it where it will create surprise and 
excitement. 

I have spoken of this retailing of the faults of others 
as unnecessary. There are some who cloak their evil pur- 
pose under the pretext that they are jealous of the good 
morals of the community, and they hypocriti- Hypocrisy of 
callv profess to utter the facts in their posses- thlskindof 

J r r communica- 

sion only that they may condemn them and tion. 
bear witness against them. But the untruthfulness of 
this pretence is very palpable. It is not necessary that 
every fault of an individual should be paraded before the 
community and become a matter of public comment. 
There are few persons who do not sometimes give way to 
temptation or commit some ethical error. Is it wise, and 
for the interests of virtue and good morals, to publish 
every such lapse from rectitude, and to condemn and 
reprobate the unfortunate doer of the evil deed ? Virtue 
would make but little progress in a community where 
such a usage was universal. 

III. Rash Judgments are those which are uttered in con- 



164 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

demnation of character on an insufficient basis of facts. 
There may have been some wrong act on the part of an 
Malicious gen- absent person. This is discussed freely but 
eraiizations. one-sidedly, and the sweeping conclusion is 
made that this indicates a general bad character. Such 
reasoning is erroneous and often bitterly unjust. We do 
not like to have persons treat us in that way, and to reason 
from isolated instances of conduct to general consequences. 
Such judgment is unkind and uncharitable. Frequently 
it is the case that even the single act from which this disa- 
greeable induction is made is exaggerated or misunder- 
stood, or taken without the mitigating circumstances 
which belong to it, and which if presented would have 
changed its whole complexion. If all men were to exer- 
cise this harsh censorship on each other, and then proceed 
to draw unwarrantable inferences, the state of our com- 
munities would be utterly intolerable. 

Much of this detraction is inspired by a malevolent 
. feeling" which possibly conceals itself from even 

(nfirfiptpr find. ' 

malice of the detractor. Envy is not only a malevolent 
Envy. affection, but one of the meanest that can exer- 

cise the human mind. In the struggle for superiority 
men often forget that the only superiority worth striving 
for is that of real, not comparative, excellence. If I aim 
at a high standard of scholarship, and have determined to 
surpass that to which some one else may attain, it avails 
me nothing that I am superior to my competitor simply 
because either by indolence or accident he may have 
failed at various points. Yet so strongly does this feel- 
ing fix itself in some minds, that they are not only glad 
when such failures take place, but with bitter enmity in 
their hearts underestimate the attainments of their rivals, 



CHARACTER AND REPUTATION. 165 

and take pains to get their estimate accepted by others. 
Sometimes there is added to the low estimate the sugges- 
tion, or something more than the suggestion, of unfair and 
dishonest means. Thus there gathers a whole brood of 
vicious and malicious sentiments, not only harmful to the 
person accused, but dishonorable and baneful to the 
accuser. 

But it is not merely by open and explicit statements 
that this evil is perpetrated. It is often by Indirect but 
hints, suggestions, innuendoes, and even by equally effec- 
silence, that the reputation of another is dam- tlvemet ° s * 
aged. There are those who not daring openly to lie, or 
to actually say what they wish to have believed, put on 
a show of virtue, and intimate that they do not choose 
to tell all they know, or that they prefer not to speak 
evil of their neighbors, or that the case is bad enougli as 
it is, or that we all of us do wrong sometimes. Or they 
may tacitly assent to all that is said, even to outrageous 
misrepresentations. All this is done perhaps when there 
is actually nothing that these persons know to the detri- 
ment of the persons in question ; and yet they could not 
more effectually confirm the worst impressions concern- 
ing them. A bold statement, even in a case where there 
is some truth at the bottom of the rumors, would not be 
half so damaging. 

SECTION 3. CASES IN WHICH FAULTS MAY BE JUSTLY 

EXPOSED. 

It may be asked, Are there no circumstances under which 
we are to give utterance to our knowledge of others' mis- 
doings ? There is little doubt about this. There are 
occasions when to frankly state the truth is not only per- 



166 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

missible, but actually obligatory, even when it would harm 
reputation. An extreme case is where a man in endeavor- 
Whenaman ing to pass himself off for something better 
under pre- than he is, and by getting into the confidence 

tence of good ' J & ° 

character of certain persons, is likely to do them serious 

toTJure ^ n J ul T* ^ man ma J w * sn to DOrrow a large sum 
another. of money of my neighbor, to lead him to invest 
his property in an enterprise which he is managing and 
which if unsuccessful would be the ruin of the investor. 
If I know that the man is a mere adventurer and a swin- 
dler, or an unsafe man of any sort, it is clearly my duty to 
expose this dishonorable person, however much I may dam- 
age his reputation by so doing. Between these extremes 
of making known to others who are likely to be deceived 
the bad character of a man, and that of dealing with a 
person's reputation in the way of idle gossip, and thus 
needlessly trifling with sacred interests, there are many 
grades of good and evil in our treatment of the reputation 
of our fellow-men. To what extent we may freely canvass 
their conduct, or what should be the limit of our silence 
on such a subject, no hard and fast rule can be laid down. 
It is impossible to draw a line which shall be the same in 
all cases. But probably very few are in the danger of 
erring on the side of too much charity, though no doubt 
that is sometimes the fact. The great majority are natu- 
rally inclined to take too much liberty with what ought to 
be regarded as the sacred right of our fellow-men. 



VERACITY. 167 



CHAPTER V. 
VERACITY. 

i Veracity and Truth are not the same, but they are insepar- 
ably related. Truth is a quality of propositions Diff . 
or statements ; and a proposition or statement is tween Truth 
true when it agrees with the facts concerning an eracit y- 
which it is made. Veracity is a quality of Character: it 
belongs always to a person. A veracious man is one who 
habitually intends to speak the truth. But here a distinc- 
tion is to be made. A man may intend to speak the truth, 
and yet through ignorance or error may state what is 
really false. This is no impeachment of his veracity ; 
though it may be a serious fault, and will go so far to 
modify the general verdict in respect of his veracity if the 
mistake is made through carelessness in ascertaining his 
facts, or if he speaks at random what should have been 
asserted only after diligent investigation. 

SECTION 1. — WHAT IS A LIE? 

A lie is not merely a statement which does not literally 
agree with the facts — sometimes even that is 
not a lie ; but it is a statement which is intended 
to convey a false impression, or to make others believe what 
is actually not true. I may state what is physically and 
literally true, and yet so state it that I induce my hearers 



168 R UDIMENTAR Y ETHICS. 

to believe what is positively false. For instance, a boy 

tells the Principal of his school that he did not buy a 

certain explosive in the city, that he did not 

Illustration. . . . . r . . . ,,. ■ , , , 

bring it home in his travelling-bag, and that 
it was not thrown from his room. All of this is literally 
true, but it is at the same time morally false. The boy 
got the article in the city, but asked the seller to give it 
to him, promising to make it all right subsequently. He 
did not bring it to the building, but persuaded another 
boy to bring it, the latter not knowing what it was. It 
was not brought in his bag, as the bag was a borrowed one. 
It was not thrown from his room, but carried from his 
room and laid down in the corridor. 

On the other hand, statements not literally and physically 
Fictions not ^ rue are sometimes not ethically false, for the 
always false- reason that they are not designed to convey any 
false impression and do not do so, since those 
who hear and read them are aware of their character and 
intention. Such are fables in which inanimate things and 
animals are represented as talking ; also parables, alle- 
gories, and many other professedly fictitious writings and 
oral narratives. Into this category come many facetious 
utterances and pleasantries, the wit and humor of which 
consist in their incongruity with reality, or in their 
absurdity. Yet all these devices need to be used with 
much caution lest they mislead, and have the effect of 
actual falsehood. 

SECTION 2. — VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF VERACITY. 

Men are so constituted that they naturally tell the truth ; 
and it is only when the mind has become perverted by some 
other immorality that one consents to falsify. Probably 



VERACITY. 169 

a lie is always subsidiary to some other sin. A person has 
done something to be ashamed of, or something of which he 
fears the consequences, before there is any temptation to 
utter a falsehood. It is frequently thus that one Lies usually 
in attempting to deceive is entangled in a compli- subsidl2 "T to 

r & ° i some other 

cated web of falsehoods, one being necessary to immorality, 
explain another, till it becomes almost appalling to any but 
the inveterate liar. It is also the fact that we are so con- 
stituted that we naturally believe what is told us. It is to 
be presumed that men speak the truth unless there is some 
obvious reason to the contrary. Hence the execration in 
which lying is held by all persons, at least in the abstract. 
It is regarded as among the meanest of vices. Hence, too, 
to call a man a liar is so put upon him the most intolerable 
indignity, and one more likely to be resented than almost 
any other. It is an unnatural as well as a vile fault. 

The law of veracity is violated first when one utters as 
truth what he knows to be untrue. I say utter as truth ; for, 
as indicated in the previous section, one may v iolationsof 
utter physically untrue statements which are veracity, 
nevertheless not falsehoods, as not conveying any false 
impressions. 

Secondly, he violates the law when he utters as true 
what he does not know to be so. It is not enough that he has 
some authority for what he says, or that there is some 
reason for believing it to be true. He may assert such a 
thing as a matter of opinion, but not as a matter of fact 
or knowledge. 

So, also, in reporting matters of fact, we may not exag- 
gerate or extenuate, as sometimes persons are tempted to do, 
either for the sake of rhetorical effect or for some worse 
reason, as that of prejudice or partisanship. Omissions of 



170 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

certain features are occasionally made in a statement, 
which, if fairly presented, would change the whole aspect 
Untruths °^ ^ e case - So, also, remarks may be thrown 
may be con- in, which, while not in themselves untrue, yet 
being at- ° U ma 7 nave such a relation to other parts of the 
tered. story as to produce a totally false impres- 

sion. By such means, and others that are similar, an 
ingenious but uncandid speaker or writer, without express- 
ing a literal untruth, may, nevertheless, mislead and 
deceive more effectually than if he were uttering an abso- 
lute falsehood. Here, too, as in the case of slander, 
silence may play a delusive and deceptive part, and be as 
perverting as the most explicit untruth. There are 
many times when for a person not to speak is to confirm 
the false utterance of others and to be accessory to the 
most outrageous deceptions. 

SECTION 3. — LIMITATIONS. 

The question arises here, How far are we to go in order 
to prevent men from being deceived? This, it will be 
perceived, is not the same as how far we may cause decep- 
tion ? The answer to the latter is, We must not go at all 
in that direction. But must we always tell all the truth 
we know, when if we do not tell it harm may come to 
others ? If a categorial answer must be given to such a 
s f question, I should unhesitatingly say No. 

that an in- There are cases, where even though some evil 
no^ghtTo might come to the inquirer from not knowing the 
know. truth, more would come to others from his know- 

ing it. I am now supposing a case in which an individ- 
ual may have put himself in a position to deservedly suffer 
from not knowing how to save himself, as a criminal trying 



VERACITY. 171 

to escape an officer. I may know that if he goes in a cer- 
tain direction he will be intercepted. I decline to inform 
him of his danger, even if he asks me. It is not in the 
interest of justice for him to know, or at least to be 
informed by me. It is therefore right for me to be silent. 
There are a thousand other cases in which, if I were to 
impart the truth to persons asking it, they might in a 
way profit by it ; but they have no right to know it, and I 
have a right to withhold it ; that is, in withholding it there 
is no transgression of the law of veracity. Discretion as 
well as veracity is a virtue, and neither needs conflict with 
the other. Still there may be instances of great difficulty 
in deciding what ought to be done, but the intentionally 
and habitually truthful man is not likely to go far wrong. 
There are many other ways besides those speci- Affectations 
fied in which veracity suffers. All affectations and false 
and false pretences, or attempts to seem to others P retences - 
what one is not, are at variance with a truthful character. 
There is such a thing as what the Hebrew poet calls 
"truth in the inward parts;" a settled disposition to know 
what is genuine and actual, to act upon it, to live the 
truth, and to scorn all conduct that would mislead another 
or convey any false impression of ourselves. To be frank 
and transparent and ingenuous, while at the same time we 
are sensible and discreet and modest, this is to have a 
veracious character, and to be noble and worthy of honor. 
Enough has been said, doubtless, to indicate the opinion 
of the writer that an intentional and essential intentional 
falsehood is never justifiable. Still, lest any and essential 
should take advantage of an insufficiently ex- never justifl- 
plicit statement, I wish to remove all doubt on able * 
that point. I can think of no instance in which it is right 



172 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

to utter a lie. There are extreme cases where it is 
claimed that an untruth deceiving no one but a criminal 
and wicked person, and told to preserve a life or to pre- 
vent a crime, is innocent. But I know no warrant for it 
in any reliable authority or in the nature of things. We 
have no right to do evil that good may come. The 
moment the slightest concession is made to such a doc- 
trine it is as " when one letteth out water." There is no 
sure and safe place to draw the line but at absolute prohi- 
bition. The most that can be said is that some sins are 
not as bad as others. But sins are sins, and we may not 
commit them for any purpose. 

SECTION 4. — PROMISES AND CONTRACTS. 

So far the discussion has had reference to veracity as 
applying to utterances concerning the past and the present. 
Promise de- But it also has to do with the future. A prom- 
how fajbind- ^ se * s something personal ; that is, it is an 
ing. engagement of a person to perform or not to 

perform some act in the future. Veracity requires that it 
be made in good faith, or that the person promising 
intends to do exactly what he promises, and that having 
promised, he will perform it. There must be no equivo- 
cation or deception in the promise. The person or persons 
to whom the promise is made may misapprehend its import 
or the extent of its meaning ; but if the promiser has 
intended to state his promise fairly, that is not his fault. 
He must also perform what he has engaged to do, not in 
some way that will possibly answer the verbal conditions 
of the promise, but in the sense that he supposed the 
promisee understood it. Thus, if I promise to give a man 
my horse in payment of past service or even as a gratuity, 



VERACITY. 173 

having the horse, a very good one, there present, and he 
not knowing that I have another horse, and naturally sup- 
posing that I mean to give him the one there present, and 
I afterwards give him another horse not half so valuable, 
I have broken my promise, and violated the law of veracity. 
If I have made a promise, and find subsequently that it 
will be inconvenient for me to perform it, or that it will 
involve more sacrifice on my part than I anticipated, that 
is no excuse for violating it. I must do as I agree, unless 
the other party release me from the engagement. 

There are, however, exceptions to these general rules. 
If I have promised what it is impossible for me to per- 
form, then, of course, I am not bound by my Exceptions 
promise. If I did not or could not know of the totnerul e- 
impossibility, then I am not at fault. But if I knew or 
might have known, and through my negligence failed to 
know, then I am guilty of simple falsehood. Also in case 
the thing promised is unlawful or morally wrong, I am at 
liberty not to perform it. But if I knew this when the 
promise was made, I am guilty of an immoral act. 

A promise is not binding when made to a third party. 
If I tell my neighbor that I will give my horse to another 
neighbor, but have not so informed that other neighbor, I 
may subsequently change my mind and do the latter no 
wrong. Still, if the promise be of the nature of a subscrip- 
tion made, promising to give to a certain person or cause 
on condition that others give, then the promise is binding. 

A Contract is a peculiar kind of promise. It is an 
engagement entered into by two parties, each of whom 
promises to do a certain thing or certain things Contracts de- 
on condition that the other does a certain thing fined « 
or certain things. The same general principles hold here 



174 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

as in other promises. There must be no equivocation in 
making the promise ; it must be fulfilled according to the 
terms of what each contractor had reason to suppose the 
other understood the contract to mean ; it must be ful- 
filled with the exceptions before mentioned of impossi- 
bility, or illegality, or immorality, unless the other party 
fail to comply with the conditions involved in the con- 
tract. If I agree to convey to a man a piece of land on 
the condition that on or before a certain day he pays me 
a designated sum of money, and if the day passes and the 
money has not been paid, I am no longer bound by my 
promise, — the contract is void. Generally the failure of 
either party to comply with the conditions of the contract 
nullifies the obligation of the other party. There are, 
however, some apparent exceptions to this, as when one 
joins a society for certain purposes in which all the mem- 
bers are pledged to do certain things : the failure of one 
or a few of the number to keep their promises does not 
absolve the others. 






CLASS IIL— DUTIES IN RELATION TO 
CIVIL GOVERNMENT 



CHAPTER I. 

SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT. 

[en are so constituted that Society is essential to their 
highest well-being. No individual is complete in him- 
self. Each lacks something that another or Society essen- 
others must supply ; and each can do something tial t0 * he 
that others cannot do ; and each has something nessofthe 
that others do not have. We find this even in individual - 
the most primitive humanity. As civilization advances, 
the need and the fact of Association increase, so that they 
are always great in proportion to the degree of civilization. 
This does not conflict with Individuality ; on the individual- 
contrary, Individuality is essential to Associa- ityacondi- 

. t -i ™> tion of effect- 

tion, since men associate only as they diner, tiveassocia- 
and in proportion as they differ is their associa- tlon * 
tion. It is this difference that constitutes the individu- 
ality ; and it is because of this that men have need of one 
another. For one man to undertake to live by and to him- 
self would be against nature, and would greatly diminish 
the volume of his life. 

175 



176 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

Since, then, the natural and necessary tendency of men 
is to Society, there must exist certain conditions in order 
to its highest welfare. These conditions are mainly arti- 
ficial and conventional from the fact that in the different 
stages of development, and under different circumstances, 
their social needs are different. But there are certain 
fundamental conditions that are substantially the same in 
Fundamental all societies. Among these are the surrender 
sal conch- 1 "" *o Society of the individual right to protect 
tions. life, liberty, and property. It would be impos- 

sible for each member of Society to exercise this right to 
his own advantage or to the advantage of the whole. The 
weak would everywhere be at the mercy of the strong, 
and generally subject to them. The defence of the indi- 
vidual Society takes upon itself, and where acting justly 
brings all its power to bear against those who would 
defraud or do violence to any member. 

In order to this there must be organization, rules of 
action, laws and penalties for their violation ; and to these 
Government ends there must be action by the whole com- 
tionto Srela " munr ty, or by representatives appointed for this 
society. purpose. In other words, there must be Gov- 

ernment; and Government is the agent of Society for 
carrying out its purposes. 

There must be Legislation, or the making of laws for the 
protection of the life, property, and liberty of the citizens, 
Govermentai and for the safety of Society itself ; as also to 
i U Legisia- promote the general welfare in such ways as 
tion. may be deemed advisable. In most modern 

nations there is a fundamental law, or Constitution, which 
comprises the general principles on which the government 
is based, and which fixes the limits beyond which neither 



SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT. 177 

legislators nor any other officers may go in the perform- 
ance of their duties, and which also prescribes what those 
duties are. This instrument may be changed ; but the 
conditions of change are contained in it, and are of such 
a character it is not often that a change takes place. 

Legislation is performed by a body called the Legislature, 
which comprises representatives of the people constitut- 
ing the society, and is supposed to consist of men who, 
while fairly representative of the various interests of 
their several constituencies, are at the same time men of 
more than the average intelligence and wisdom. They are 
not at liberty in the performance of their functions to 
enact any laws that conflict with the fundamental law ; 
and if they should do so these laws, when ascertained to be 
thus in conflict, would be null and void. 

Another branch of the government is that which tests 
the constitutionality of the legislative enactments, explains 
these, and applies them in particular instances. 
This is the Judiciary. It investigates the action 
of members of the society accused of violating the laws, 
ascertains the facts as far as possible, decides whether the 
accusations are true, and, if the laws have been violated, 
adjudges the penalty. 

There must also be an agency by which the laws made 
and adjudicated may be carried into effect. This branch 
of the government is called the Executive. In 
most nations it consists of a single person with 
whatever number of subordinates may be necessary. The 
Executive may be elected directly by the members of the 
society, or by representative bodies clothed with the elect- 
ive function ; he may hold the office for a term of years 
subject to a re-election, or be limited to a single term, or 



178 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

elected for life, or the office may be hereditary, as in 
Great Britain and some other European monarchies. In 
most modern nations, however, where there are hereditary 
monarchies, they have been so modified by constitutional 
and legislative enactments that the monarch is little more 
than the nominal head of the government, while the real 
executive is some individual, who, though in form a ser- 
vant of the monarch, is actually the ruler of the nation for 
the time being. 



THE RIGHTS OF SOCIETY. 179 



CHAPTER II. 

THE RIGHTS OF SOCIETY. 

Among the rights of Society, the foremost is that of 
its own preservation. The individual, it is true, is not 
ignored nor suppressed ; indeed, in the most society and 
important sense his rights are superior to those its members. 
of Society, since Society exists for the sake of the indi- 
vidual. But for this very cause the preservation of Society 
may be a paramount consideration. Nevertheless, the 
rights and authority of Society are not limitless. They 
must be confined to the objects for which Society is insti- 
tuted. If powers outside of these limits are assumed 
they are usurped powers, and therefore unjust. 

Society may, as has just been intimated, protect the lives, 
liberty, and property of its members. Laws may be enacted 
for this purpose, and penalties for their viola- protection of 
tion fixed and applied. It may call upon its individuals, 
members to repel invasion, or to engage in war where 
this is the only alternative to the destruction of its 
independence, or the curtailment of its liberties. 

Society has also a right to levy taxes. To carry on the 
government requires the labor of men, and they must 
receive an equivalent therefor. Legislators, Reasons for 
judges, and executive officers, who are acting taxation. 
for the preservation and defence of the rights of the peo- 



180 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

pie and of their various interests, must have their share of 
the product of which by their efforts is made possible. 
There must also be penal institutions and properties 
devoted to these purposes as well as to other functions of 
the government. The expense involved in these must be 
contributed by the members of the community according 
to some rule approximating justice and equity. In order- 
ing this levy, Society is bound to show no favoritism, to 
except none from the proper share, and to burden no one 
disproportionately. 

It is also bound to collect no more than is required to 
carry on effectually its business, to waste nothing by 
extravagant outlay, either in the way of compensation, or 
G vernmentai on buildings and other appliances that are 
responsi- needlessly costly. No exact rule can be laid 
1 lty ' down in this respect. What would be nig- 

gardly in one nation might be prodigal in another. It is 
not to be presumed that any considerable nation should 
limit its expenditures to the bare necessities of its 
existence. 

It is maintained by some that Society cannot go much 
beyond this without improperly interfering with the liberty 
of its members. But in most modern nations the sentiment 
is nearly universal that there are other most important 
duties devolving on Society in its organized capacity. 
Among these are the following : — 

It may provide for and establish a system of general 
education to which all children in the community shall 
have access. Those who deny this right do so on the 
ground that it is a violation of national economic laws ; 
that it is like supplying everybody with food and raiment 
and other necessaries of life ; and that it is better, both to 



THE RIGHTS OF SOCIETY. 181 

the individual and for the state, that each should provide 
these conveniences for himself, and as well the education 
of his own children. But there is a wide difference here. 
Men feel the spur of want in the matter of food and 
raiment, but they do not feel the like in relation to edu- 
cation : so that while some effort is almost uni- 

. tip General edu- 

versally forthcoming to supply the former, the cation a po- 
latter may be totally neglected. Here emerges l ^™\l ^f 
a great peril to Society itself. That the great nomicai 
masses of its members should be ignorant, un- necessl y * 
cultivated, and incompetent to understand the ordinary 
duties of citizens as well as the common principles of 
government, would tend to the destruction of the social 
fabric, or, at least, make the people an easy prey to the 
few constituting a privileged class. This is of special 
consequence under a popular form of government. 

Society may go farther than this in the attempt to 
protect itself. It may demand that the children of its 
members have this privilege, and require parents 
to see that this is the case. It is sometimes ?° t cl ^f™^ 

not only pro- 

said that this is an unwarrantable interference vide for the 
with the liberty of the individual and the rights children, but 
of the family. That is one way of looking at demand tha t 

,. -r, , . . r. . . they avail 

the subject. But there is a point ol view m themselves 

which it is put in a new light. The children of this P ro " 

• -m vision, 

have relations to the state as well as to the 

family, and out of these relations arise legitimate demands 

of the state upon them. Moreover, the children have 

rights as well as the parents, and among these rights is 

that of an education ; and if the parent is disposed to 

withhold that right, it is the duty of the state to require 

it to be granted. Sometimes, as in a few of our American 



182 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

States, a certain degree of education is made a condition of 
the exercise of the elective franchise. This seems to me 
an eminently proper condition, yet in most parts of our 
country it is unpopular. 

Society may also properly interfere to protect laborers from 
the exaction of their employers, and from the consequences 
May regulate °^ ^ ne disadvantages which the former incur by 
the relation reason of their situation. Bv some this is 

of laborers . 

and employ- thought to be opposed to economic theory ; but 
ers * many modern nations refuse to take this view, 

and are legislating in this direction. Men and women 
are often compelled to work in badly ventilated rooms, or 
under conditions hostile to their health. Society may 
require employers to adopt such hygienic measures as will 
prevent the sacrifice of health or life. Employers may 
also be required to provide all reasonable precautions in 
the case of fire, or in relation to dangers from machinery, 
and from accident pertaining to their business. 

Within the last fifty years there has been much legis- 
lation, not only on the points just mentioned, but in 
Py . reference to the employment of married women 
this direction and young children. Formerly little children 
of five to seven years of age were employed in 
shops and factories, and even in mines, many hours in the 
day, earning a mere pittance to contribute to the support 
of the family ; and the mothers of large families, besides 
having the care of them, engaged in mills or other places 
of labor every day, and sometimes the whole of the day. 
Public opinion, after much agitation, came to the con- 
clusion that such customs were not only extremely cruel 
to the wretched victims, but that the strength and vital 
power of society were being undermined in a perilous 



THE RIGHTS OF SOCIETY. 183 

degree. In such a case it was not only merely the right, 

but the obvious duty, of the state to interfere to compel a 

cessation of these hideous evils. Great improvements 

have been made in this respect in Great Britain and in 

this country, but something still remains to be done by 

government regulation. 

There are certain enterprises of great public importance, 

affecting all the members of Society, which can be assumed 

by government with greater efficiency and 

larger certainty of success than by private indi- ityoftneas- 

viduals. Some of these it has already been the sumption by 

custom for many nations to manage through certain pro- 

the government. Such are the highways, the ductlve 

° L . -i enterprises, 

post-office, the lighthouse system, and some 

others. It is a question agitated in our times whether 
there are not other kinds of business which might be 
profitably taken in hand by the government. Cities have 
in a few instances assumed the management of gas-sup- 
plies and of electric lighting, and generally of furnishing 
water to the inhabitants. It is urged by some that this 
supervision and ownership may properly and rightfully be 
extended to telegraphic communication, railroads, and 
street railways. Indeed, there is a class of thinkers who 
insist that the government should assume direction of all 
industrial enterprises, and become the owner of all the 
capital and of all the land of the nation. But evidently 
the world is not yet ready for the full socialistic regime. 
It is probable that many of the evils which such a scheme 
is expected to cure must be removed before Theworld 
socialism under any aspect could be practicable, not yet ready 
It is not reasonable to presume that the great orSociahsm - 
moral ills of humanity can be removed by economic meas- 



184 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

ures. Ethical disorders must be remedied by ethical 
means. Yet it is not unlikely, that, as the moral condition 
of mankind improves, Society may more and more be 
intrusted with some of these great enterprises that have 
been mentioned and as well with some others. But just 
where the line of limitation should now be drawn it is 
impossible to decide. 

It is generally admitted that the state may prohibit 
gambling. If any argue this is something that should be 
left to individual responsibility, it is to be said in reply, 
Gambling to that such a practice concerns not individuals 
be prohibited, merely but the whole community, and that 
those who practise this vice affect multitudes of others and 
are thus productive of wide-spread mischief. This kind 
of legislation, it seems to me, might properly enough be 
extended to certain speculations which, though carried on 
under the forms of trade, are neither more nor less than 
sheer gambling, in which one man gains only as another 
loses. 

Nor is there much doubt* that many of the combinations 
which are formed for the purpose of transferring property 
from those to whom it legitimately belongs to those who 
have no right to it should feel the restrictions and penalties 
of wholesome laws. Instances such as I have alluded to 
_ . . .. are found when a few men who can command 

Combinations 

to produce large amounts of money, so manipulate the 
raiseprices mai 'ket as to get possession of most of the sup- 
to be sup- plies of a certain kind, and then put up the 
pres ' prices to exorbitant figures. If the commodity 

be of a kind upon which great numbers depend, possibly 
one of the necessaries of life, the factitious price will 
enable the combination to realize immense profits, perhaps 



THE RIGHTS OF SOCIETY. 185 

some of them to make great fortunes, and all taken out of 
the pockets of consumers, many of them poor people, to 
whom such extortion adds a great burden. This, by 
whatever respectable name it may be called, is neither 
more nor less than robbery on a gigantic scale. The 
legislation of a state may find some difficulty in reaching 
such cases effectually, but earnest efforts should be made 
to do away with these great systems of fraud. 

Somewhat akin to this is the formation of "Trusts," 
which has recently been devised, and is now in extensive 
operation. It is conceivable that a trust may "Trusts,"- 
be formed with an honest and laudable purpose. ^ eir „ P° s , si- 

• rni • i blyfraudu- 

A combination ot all the enterprises engaged lent char- 
in the production of a certain commodity, if acter * 
properly managed, would result in diminishing its cost, 
and thus make the article cheaper for the consumer. But 
by its very nature such a combination furnishes an oppor- 
tunity to arbitrarily fix prices at a high range, and thus 
not only put what has been saved from the cost of pro- 
duction in the pockets of the members, but to add to the 
original price, and thus fairly rob the buyers. Any legis- 
lation which would prohibit, or at least regulate, such 
combinations would be legitimate, and come within the 
legislative scope of society, provided it did not trench 
upon individual rights. 

In the great agitation now for many years existing on 
the subject of the prohibition of the liquor traffic, there have 

been on the one side enthusiastic supporters of e 

rtr Suppression 

the measures involved, and on the other bitter of the liquor 
hostility to them. It is not strange that, among tra c * 
unprincipled and base men, whose hope of illicit gain is 
threatened, there should be fierce and' unscrupulous oppo- 



186 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

sition. But these, unhappily, are not the only opposers. 
There are some honorable and no doubt conscientious men, 
of conservative temper and timid disposition in matters of 
moral reform, who do not see their way clear to accept the 
convictions of the majority of good men. This opposition 
can hardly be based on the opinion that these measures 
are inconsistent with the national constitution, or with 
the genius of our institutions^ since they have been re- 
peatedly approved by our highest judicial authority. 

The only argument against it is that they limit the 
liberty of certain individuals. This, as a matter of fact, 
is undoubtedly true. But in any form of government it is 
essential that certain individual rights be surrendered for 
the good of the whole. Take, for instance, taxation. No 
law, nor any set of laws, has ever been devised that can 
make the taxes perfectly equitable. A large part of 
the population pay more than their just proportion ; 
hence their rights are violated. But there is no other 
alternative but to pay such taxes as are assessed, or 
cripple the government ; and if this is done to any con- 
siderable extent, the individuals who refuse will suffer 
more than if they submitted to the unintentional, but 
inevitable, injustice. 

So the fact that a few persons are moderately incom- 
moded by prohibitory laws is a small matter in comparison 
with the poverty and disgrace, the incalculable wretched- 
ness, the pauperism and crime, the ruin of bodies and 
souls of millions of individuals, which may be greatly 
diminished, and possibly done away, by these restrictive 
measures. It would seem that only the most sordid self- 
ishness would complain of the violation of any right 
likely to be invaded under such conditions. 



DUTIES OF CITIZENS. 187 



CHAPTER III. 

DUTIES OF CITIZENS. 

If such be the rights and duties of Society acting 
through the agency of government, there must be corre- 
sponding duties on the part of the citizens. Citizens 
The first of these is obedience to the laws. This have *? ties 

as well as 

is essential to the stability and to the existence rights, 
of Society as an organization. It is only as each member 
abides by the agreement implied in the consti- individual 
tution of Society that it can hold together. It j*®^®}" 56 
is no excuse for repudiation of this obligation guaranty 
that the individual disapproves of the law. It of order - 
is hardly presumable that in any community every mem- 
ber will regard every law in the same estimation as every 
other member. If, then, a law is to be disregarded because 
it does not coincide with the judgment of the individual, 
there would be an end of government, and anarchy would 
ensue. Human laws at the best will be imperfect, and 
will bear imperfectly upon the different members of the 
community. But in any fairly intelligent state of society 
the most imperfect system likely to be adopted would be 
incalculably better than none. 

Nor is it an excuse that the laws are not only distaste- 
ful, but unjust and burdensome. By the very constitu- 
tion of Society, as has been already shown, its members 



188 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

are expected to make some sacrifice ; and the sacrifices 
that any member is called to make are seldom anything 
injustice of as great as the benefits he on the whole receives. 
excus7for -^ ut su PP ose a conflict of authority arises, — 
violation. that is, if the law of the state conflicts with the 
supreme moral law, what is to be done ? There are three 
ways open to the individual in such a situation. First, he 
r may obey the human law, and violate his con- 

law para- science ; secondly, he may resist the law, and 
of°supreme violently oppose its execution ; thirdly, he may 
authority. simply refuse to obey the law and quietly sub- 
be V nonored° imt ^° ^ ne penalty. Where there is a clear and 
even in its obvious conflict between the civil and moral law, 
the last appears to be the proper method of 
solution. The individual honors the law by accepting 
without resistance its penalty. He gives proof of honest 
and conscientious principle by the sacrifice he makes in 
its maintenance. He also testifies his allegiance to the 
government by abstaining from any violent opposition. If 
it be asked, What, then, is to hinder any man from setting 
the caprice of his individual conscience against the order 
of the government ? the ready answer is, that the sacrifice 
is always great enough to deter any except the most genu- 
inely conscientious from taking such a position. Some- 
times it involves loss of property, long imprisonment, great 
suffering, or even death. These liabilities are not often 
incurred on mere caprice. Except under an exceedingly 
bad government, such cases of conscience coming in con- 
flict with the laws are not likely to be enough to percept- 
ibly affect the order of society. 

Under a popular form of government it is the duty of 
all citizens to use their influence for the enactment of good laws. 



DUTIES OF CITIZENS. 189 

To this end they must have intelligent men of correct 
views, and men of integrity, to represent them. There 
are two kinds of serious faults to which citi- Dut of citi _ 
zens are liable. One is that of indifference as to zens in the 
civil and political affairs. It is sometimes said, ^adminis- 
and oftener thought, that one vote will not trationof 
make much difference, and that the government 
will go on fairly well whether we give personal attention 
to it or not. There is also sometimes the feeling that poli- 
tics are corrupt, and that it is vexatious and disagreeable 
to mingle in them. For this reason every year thousands 
fail to express their minds at the polls. A majority of 
those are likely to be upright and respectable citizens, many 
of them among the most thoughtful in our communities. 

The evil of such negligence would be seen if we would 
attempt to estimate the effect if all or a majority of good 
citizens should do the same. The making and G t i 
execution of the laws would be left to incom- consequent 
petent and unprincipled men under the direc- differe^cVof 
tion of partisan demagogues. There would be good men to 
a lack of needful and wholesome legislation, pu 
while harmful and demoralizing laws would be enacted; 
and the execution of such laws as might be valuable 
would be impeded and neglected, and corruption and pecu- 
lation would be common. We see such effects as these 
even now in our great cities. 

The other evil to which allusion was made is that of 
intense and supreme partisanship, and individ- Evil of selfish 
ual and local selfishness to which men yield their P a r tlsansni P 

J and local ex- 

political action. Important measures, which clusiveness. 
have to do with the vital and moral interests of society, 
are sacrificed to the success of a party, or because some 



190 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

project which affects individual gains, or the advantage of 
a city or section, comes in conflict with them. Utterly 
unfit men are supported for office, simply because they 
are supposed to represent a platform, though they are 
known to advocate measures which good men everywhere 
deprecate. 

It is the duty of all citizens enjoying the electoral 
franchise to vote. They cannot evade their responsibility 
Duty to vote, under any of the pretexts previously mentioned, 
and to secure j^ j s their dutv to vote for good and upright 

the nomina- J ° . , 

tionofgood men and for good measures. It is not an ob- 
officers. jection that they vote with a political party. 

Such a party may be representative of important ideas, and, 
in the estimation of thoughtful citizens, furnish a govern- 
ment that would be for the honor and prosperity of the 
nation. But no man should so ally himself to any party 
as to lose his individuality or independence. If he desires 
to adhere to his party he should be active in all its pre- 
liminary work, and in such primary meetings, conventions, 
and caucuses as are influential in determining its policy 
and nominating its delegates and representatives. To 
leave this important work to a few, and those not the 
most substantial and upright of the party, and then to 
accept the result of their action as the platform and can- 
didates to be supported, is a grievous evil, and one not to 
be tolerated. 

It is also the citizen's duty to aid in the execution of the 
laws. It is only where there are good laws, and where 
Personal aid these are faithfully executed, that liberty is at 

timctST* * ts ^ est * ^ * s true ^ at there are men appointed 
laws. for this very purpose, and that the ordinary 

citizen may be relieved from this particular duty. But 



DUTIES OF CITIZENS. 191 

this does not exempt him from all responsibility. When 
citizens are indifferent to the administration of justice, 
and claim that it is not their affair whether the violations 
of law are punished or not, it is an unfortunate state of 
society, and may be expected to rapidly grow worse. It 
is for the interest as it is the duty of all good citizens, as 
far as it is practicable, to see that the lawless and disobe- 
dient are restrained. In cases of obvious misdemeanor, 
for the citizens to aid in concealing the crime through 
fear, or because it may involve some sacrifice, is unpatri- 
otic, and does not lack much of being cowardly. It fre- 
quently implies a kind of participation in the offence. To 
" compound a felony " is itself a punishable act, and is so 
treated by modern governments. There is a prejudice 
against " informers ; " and there are no doubt instances 
when pragmatical action on the part of individuals is to be 
condemned. But to apply such an epithet to a person 
whose aim is to preserve the good order of the community 
and to uphold the law, is much more dishonorable than any 
act to which that epithet is thus applied. 

Of the duty to honestly pay one's taxes, some intimation 
has already been given. The amount of these must be 
determined by either the assessed party or Dut in 
others. It needs no argument to show that respect to 
justice is more likely to be done by disinterested 
parties than by those who are interested. To avoid the 
payment on any mere pretext, is to unjustly throw a part 
of the burden on others, and is thus dishonest. To make 
false returns of property, or to conceal it by any device, is 
equally unworthy and immoral. 

It is the duty of the citizen not only to abstain from all 
unlawful acts, but in respect to the great number of acts 



192 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

which the Statutes do not explicitly touch, but of which 
many may be morally wrong, to avoid also the latter. A 
Dut to be public-spirited and patriotic citizen will not at- 
pubiic- tempt to see how much license he may allow 

promote ° himself and yet avoid the penalty of the law ; but 
peace, moral h e w [\\ ra ther strive to avoid all evil example, 

order, and . 

good fellow- and to do as much as possible to promote vir- 
ship * tue and peace and good-fellowship among the 

members of the community, and for these ends will restrain 
himself from conduct which can be construed into any 
sanction of immoral principle, or tend to encourage harm- 
ful action in others. 



DIVISION II. — DUTIES OF BENEFICENCE. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE GENERAL NATURE OF THESE DUTIES. 

As already explained, the duties of Beneficence differ 
from those of Justice, in the fact that the latter are those 
which our fellow-men have a right to demand of us ; while 
they have no right to demand the former, though it is our 
duty to render them. If a man has done me a service he 
may justly require that I return him an equivalent. But 
if he be hungry, though he have done me no service, while 
he cannot on the score of reciprocity demand that I give 
him food, it may nevertheless be my duty to do so. 

The general obligation to do good to our fellow-men 
whenever we have an opportunity, is deeply imbedded in 
our constitution. The law of humanity in a The general 
greater or less degree is well-nigh universal, obligation, 
though often overborne and concealed by self-interest 
tending to selfishness. We see it manifesting itself in a 
community when an individual, even if he be a stranger, 
is in misfortune or peril by reason of accident. Let a 
neighbor's house be on fire in a country region, and the 
whole population for miles around perhaps will rush to 

193 



194 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

the rescue. Let a man be reported as lost, or a child 
missing, and hundreds who have never before indicated 
any special interest in the individual concerned will 
almost spontaneously go out by night or day to aid in the 
rescue. Travellers have said that in every nation, even 
among barbarous peoples, let a man be disabled, or sick, or 
famishing, there will be some who, though they have 
never seen him before, and though he be a foreigner, will 
have compassion on him, and do what they can to relieve 
his wants. 

It is true these are impulses of generosity and sympathy, 
and that they only manifest themselves occasionally. Yet 
What such ^ ne y indicate something in our constitution 
impulses which prompts us to be kind to our fellow-men. 
But these spontaneous and occasional impulses 
do not constitute the whole of the duty of Beneficence. 
The moral law demands that a constant kindness be exer- 
cised towards our fellow-men generally, a disposition to do 
good as we have opportunity ; and opportunity of some 
sort is seldom wanting. Every day, almost every hour, 
to one who associates much with his kind, furnishes occa- 
sion to make some other person happier, it may be only a 
little happier, at small expense and inconvenience to him- 
self. How much the proper improvement of such occa- 
sions by a large number of persons adds to the sum of 
An addition happiness no one can estimate. It would be 

to, instead of WO rth while, even if it were a considerable sub- 
subtraction , . ic 

from, one's traction from one s own enjoyment ; but so iar 

happiness. ig thig from the fact? ^ [t addg mucll more 

than it subtracts. Indeed, many have found in their own 
experience the declaration true, that " it is more blessed to 
give than to receive." 



GENERAL NATURE OF THESE DUTIES. 195 

Not many of us are called upon to devote ourselves 
wholly to the work of helping others. Nor are we obliged 
to devote all our substance, if we have any, to this pur- 
pose. It is the performance of offices by the way and 
incidentally that is required. We do not have to neglect 
any other duty or violate any other obligation in order to 
discharge this. If the disposition we have cultivated be a 
kindly one, and genuine benevolence be a characteristic of 
us, there will be no lack of opportunities and means by 
which we shall be the instruments of beneficence more 
than we have ever dreamed of. 



196 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 



CHAPTER II. 

MANNERS. 

Among the commoner, the least costly, but not the least 
important, duties of Beneficence are those comprised in 
Good manners S 00 ^ manners. They are sometimes spoken of as 
included in " minor morals." In the classic languages the 
goo mora s. game worc [ [ s use( J f r both morals and manners. 
There are certain conventional rules of politeness as 
observed in good society, and sometimes codified in books 
on etiquette, which are to be observed not merely for 
fashion's and custom's sake, but because for the most 
part they render intercourse pleasant and agreeable, and 
which observed make men and women in one another's 
company at ease. But these rules may be scrupulously 
observed where there is still an entire absence of that 
kindliness of which they are intended to be the outward 
expression. It is quite possible to find men and women in 
_ .. x our communities whose outward manners are 

Politeness 

does not nearly perfect, who never do an awkward 
impiy S eie- y thing, and make no mistakes in their cleport- 
gance, nor ment, yet who, it is easy to see, are simply con- 
ventional, having the outward sign but not the 
inward grace. There is no heart in the conduct. The 
most polished and externally unexceptional behavior may 
be coincident with a false and treacherous disposition. 



MANNERS. 197 

One may " smile and smile and be a villain still." Where 
there is real kindness and a genuine disposition to make 
others happy, there is both moral character and real polite- 
ness. It is not seldom that rudeness of speech and of 
outward demeanor consists with the most thorough and 
hearty desire for others' good. 

" Howe'er it be, it seems to me, 
'Tis only noble to be good; 
Kind hearts are more than coronets, 
And simple faith than Norman blood." 



198 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS, 



CHAPTER III. 

DUTIES TO THE UNFORTUNATE. 

There is no community of human beings in which 
there are not some afflicted persons. In rural communi- 
individuais ties and small towns in our own country, there 
everywhere are no t likely to be many who are in great 
sympathy, if want ; though there are always some even here 
not relief. to w h om our kindest ministrations are due, 
those who are ill, or upon whom has come some calamity, 
and to whom sympathy manifested is very precious. Such 
sympathy and benevolence are to a great extent natural 
and spontaneous in such communities, and scarcely need to 
be urged as a duty. Still, there are some who have little 
interest in their fellow-men, and who stand selfishly and 
coldly apart. To them public sentiment would apply the 
term heartless and unfeeling. There are others, doubt- 
less, who from a certain shyness and awkwardness fail to 
show the kindness that they really feel. But the moral 
education of our people has been such that in almost any 
community of such a character that most of the members 
know one another, if there is a distressing or protracted 
illness, or a serious accident, or a flood, or fire, or a bereave- 
ment, or any other disaster, there will be offers of help, an 
inquiry if any service is needed, and frequently much self- 
denial undergone in the aid of the afflicted. This is the 



DUTIES TO THE UNFORTUNATE. 199 

result of the widespread moral culture which is a large 
element in our civilization, and without which the charac- 
ter of society would verge on barbarism. 

But in our large cities we find another state of things. 
Here are vast numbers of human beings living in abject 
poverty such as it is almost impossible for those wretchedness 
who are unacquainted with it to conceive of. to^iaree* 
In tenement houses, some of which are rickety cities. 
old buildings ready to fall to pieces, there may be found 
in a space which would be accounted insufficient for one 
small family in moderate circumstances, a dozen families 
living in the midst of filth and squalor, and under other 
most revolting conditions. Sometimes a family of several 
members will occupy one room, not very spacious, almost 
bare of furniture, with only an occasional fire in the cold- 
est weather, scantily clad and in rags, seldom having 
enough food on hand for a decent meal, and huddling 
together in the night on a heap of straw to keep warm. 
In many of these wretched substitutes for homes, it is not 
a very strange thing to find a father or mother helplessly 
ill, with no medical attendance and no means of procuring 
medicine. What is indescribably worse, in hundreds of 
instances one or both parents are frequently intoxicated. 

The misery, the utter destitution, and the famishing 
condition of many of these families, are absolutely appall- 
ing. In some of them the father earns a few shillings a day 
on such days as he can get work, or the mother by sewing 
for the soulless ready-made clothing houses fourteen to 
sixteen hours a day, earns a meagre pittance which seems 
almost as nothing over against the unnumbered wants of 
those dependent on her. 

In London it is said that there are thousands who even in 



200 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

the most inclement season sleep out of doors, — men, and 
women, and little children. Some of them by odd jobs 
earn now and then a penny or a few pence, barely enough 
to keep them from starving, but not enough to give them 
decent covering or any shelter. So in many great cities, 
within short walks of palatial residences and splendid 
homes where wealth is lavished in luxurious appointments 
and magnificent shows, thousands are suffering for the 
very necessities of life, and many dying because these 
cannot be had. 

Now, it is not altogether because men and women who 
have the means to relieve this vast mass of want and woe 
Failure to are selfish and penurious and indifferent. It is 
the^reatness n0 doubt true that some are cruel and hard- 
of this misery, hearted; but these constitute a small minority. 
The great majority have hearts of pity, and would gladly 
help in any case of destitution or distress which might be 
brought to their notice. But many are ignorant of the 
misery that is even very near them. Others know of it in 
the aggregate, at least, to a certain extent, but are not 
acquainted with particular instances. Most of these and 
still others know much of the condition of these miserable 
multitudes, yet know not how to reach it so as to be of 
any appreciable help. 

Real beneficence cannot go about its work haphazard 
and indiscriminately. It must have system and order, and 
Beneficence some principle of ministering aid. It would 
must be not be beneficence to distribute even hundreds 

systematic, 

and not at of thousands of dollars among the wretched 
random. families ; nor would it be wise for the rich, even 
if so disposed, to share their wealth with the poverty- 
stricken multitudes. Such aid would be but temporary, 



DUTIES TO THE UNFORTUNATE. 201 

and another week or month would find the poverty just as 
great as ever. It is a sensible principle that some men 
adopt never to give money to the common beggar except 
in cases where the situation is obvious. In most instances 
it would not be a real benefit, but only an aggravation of 
the evil that one would seek to relieve. One may safely 
give a hungry man food, and carry sustenance to a starv- 
ing family, or medicine to the sick. But even this charity 
must have its limits. So vast a number of wants must be 
relieved, if at all, through organized and systematic 
effort. 

In all our cities there are scores of benevolent associa- 
tions which give attention to this work, and through 
which much suffering is alleviated or pre- smaiiimpres- 
vented ; and yet it seems to make scarcely any sion made bv 
impression on the great mass of human misery, benevolent 
Our philanthropy must evidently have a broader associations, 
scope than the relief of temporary w-ant. Nor is it enough 
that provision be made by the state, or county, or city. 
We cannot forego these methods of relief doubtless ; but 
doubtless also they do not, on the whole, diminish the 
amount of want and destitution. The very presence of 
relief will make many of the improvident and indolent 
depend upon it. Several methods have been suggested as 
an improvement of, or a substitute for, those now in 
operation. 

One of our most public-spirited citizens, a clergyman and 
a philanthropist, has recently proposed that this matter be 
taken up by the religious bodies, not as hereto- a plan sng- 
fore independently, but acting in combination, s e stedfor 
and so parcelling out the city into divisions that operation. 
each church should have its own district, and should be 



202 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

made as far as possible, and a vast deal would be possible 
in this way, responsible for all the really needy in its 
section. 

But after all, and even should the most nearly perfect 
system be adopted, only a part of the misery could be 
reached. A wise philanthropic scheme would look after 
the causes of this wretchedness, and not merely seek to 
relieve individual instances. There are four principal 
Fourprinci- causes of the bad condition of the classes we 
pal causes of are now considering : — 

our great ym 1- First, there is the tendency of the country 
cities. people to flock to the city. Young men and 

women who are in fairly good condition at home have a 
craving for the excitement of the crowded town, and the 
hope of making a fortune, as now and then a country boy 
going to the city has done. So they come in great num- 
bers, many of them having secured no situation before- 
hand, and enter into the struggle for work, dropping down 
from one anticipation to another, till they are willing to 
take anything that will give them bread. They become 
seedy and shabby in appearance, thus making their chances 
of securing a good position less and less likely, till they 
find themselves in a nearly hopeless condition. 

2. The second cause of this desperate poverty in the 
city is ignorance. It will be found that among the degraded 
masses education is at a low ebb. It is true there are con- 
siderable exceptions ; but the vast majority are grossly 
illiterate. It is also true that some ignorant men are 
wealthy and prosperous ; so that it cannot truly be said 
that ignorance is either a sole cause of poverty or that it 
is an inevitable cause ; but it is answerable for a very 
large proportion of the want and misery of which I have 
been speaking. 



DUTIES TO THE UNFORTUNATE. 203 

3. This gigantic evil is largely induced by the bad habits 
of individuals. Chief among these is the drink-habit, though 
there are closely connected with it other vices, as indo- 
lence, prodigality, and self-indulgence. It is sometimes 
urged by those who would charge the whole responsibility 
for this evil condition upon vicious social economic sys- 
tem, that the drink-habit, instead of being the cause of 
this misery, is the effect of it. It is undoubtedly true that 
there are instances in which discouragement and utter 
hopelessness have driven a previously sober man into this 
wretched indulgence, with the vain hope of drowning his 
sorrows. Still, after all possible allowance is made, there 
is scarcely a doubt that five-sixths of the destitution and 
want in our cities are traceable to this cause. 

4. Finally, a considerable cause is found in a social and 
industrial system which furnishes employment fitfully and 
irregularly, and which allows, perhaps compels, such large 
numbers to live in enforced idleness, or puts them at the 
mercy of unscrupulous employers who get their labor for 
the merest pittance, in thousands of instances not enough 
to furnish more than the meagre necessities of life, and 
those under the hardest conditions. It is not my business 
here to inquire into the causes of such a social condition. 
But about the facts there is no doubt. There are thou- 
sands of men and women able and willing to produce so 
much of value that the equivalent will give them com- 
fortable homes and a decent support, and whose work, 
and the results of work, are needed in our communities, 
but who have no opportunity to use their productive 
power. 

Now, any scheme of beneficence that is to do anj^thing 
more than transient good to the children of want and 



204 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

destitution, must take cognizance of all these causes, and 
must address itself to their diminution or removal. 

It may be difficult to devise means to send back into 
the rural districts many who have exchanged them for 
city life, only to be disappointed and rendered miserable 
and hopeless. But such schemes have been suggested, 
Gen. Booth's which, in connection with other remedies, seem 
plan, feasible. 1 The drink demon and the agencies 

under its control must be exorcised and banished. In view 
of the formidable defences which this interest constructs, 
and the comparatively small progress made in the past, 
this appears to many to be a hopeless task. But from the 
fact that some progress has been made, and that public 
sentiment is slowly though steadily growing to appreciate 
the perils which are involved, we may hope for more and 
more mitigation of the evil and its final suppression. 

The illiteracy which plays so considerable a part in pro- 
ducing and retaining the unfortunate conditions, it must 
be an united effort as a part of all philanthropic schemes 
to remove as rapidly as possible. Provisions for elemen- 
tary education of all children should be large and accessi- 
ble, and all children of proper age should be required to 
avail themselves of them. All private benevolent under- 
takings should also look to the cultivation of intelligence 
as a part of their means of relief and rescue. 

As to the fourth of the chief causes of the evils spoken 
of, it may be hard to find a remedy. Of one thing I think 
Economic we may be sure: this evil will not cure itself. 

curethem- * ^ ^° no ^ De ^ eve there are any economic laws 
selves. which, by their own operation, will rectify bad 

economic conditions. Here, again, General Booth's plan 

1 See Gen. Booth's " Darkest England and the Way Out." 



DUTIES TO THE UNFORTUNATE. 205 

may prove effectual. This would provide homes and 
workshops and industries in the cities themselves for the 
poor who are willing to work : it would send from these 
crowds thus gathered in the cities, such as are adapted to 
the country, to industrial communities formed for the pur- 
pose, and in other ways provide productive labor for 
them. 

Another thing which we may take for granted is that 
no scheme will be successful which does not recognize two 
conditions as essential, namely, that the aid Twocondi . 
given must not be so much for support as for the tions to be 
means of earning it; and that a large infusion of rec °£ mzed - 
the moral element must characterize the remedy proposed. 
So long as vice and immorality are ignored or tolerated, so 
long much of the beneficence will be wasted. It is not 
desirable, nor is it necessary, to use compulsory measures 
of moral reform ; but all such influences should be 
brought to bear as will persuade men to be temperate and 
honest and truthful. 

To bring such a scheme into practical operation would 
involve the union of many of the benevolent enterprises 
and associations now existing separately. The Union of the 
cost would be great, but probably not so great ^esnowln" 
as is the present expenditure under the earnest operation, 
but largely futile effort made in behalf of the poor. The 
government, too, should find some way to co-operate. It 
would be incalculably preferable and more effective than 
the present system of out-doors and in-door relief. The 
whole plan of government aid, though greatly improved 
in recent years, yet inevitably tends to perpetuate the 
pauperism it seeks to mitigate, and to destroy the man- 
hood and womanhood that, after all, is about all that is 
worth preserving. 



206 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

There are important elements of genuine beneficence 
that may seem inconsistent with all these organized means 

The personal of a PP lvm g ^- Tne most valuable feature, 
element es- especially to the subject, in administering to the 
wants of the needy, is the personal element. What 
is done by proxy or through the machinery of associations, 
such as committees and paid agents, however indispensable 
in many cases, still lacks the most radical condition. The 
bestower of benefits who never comes in contact with the 
persons whom he seeks to aid, and with whose sorrow he 
sympathizes, fails to secure for himself that blessedness 
which is greater in giving than receiving. So the receiver 
gets less good when it comes not from the hand of the 
bestower with the kindly word and the assurance of some- 
thing better than mere material good. 

It is sometimes the case that men by a pecuniary com- 
mutation hope to purchase for themselves an exemption 
from personal contact with suffering and want which 
shock and annoy them. But such givers can seldom 
know the rewards of real beneficence. It is true that in 
great plans for removing the immense evils of which we 
speak there must be much machinery and many agents ; 
but this should not, as it certainty need not, exclude 
personal beneficence. 



BENEFICENCE TO THE CRIMINAL CLASSES. 207 



CHAPTER IV. 

BENEFICENCE TO THE CRIMINAL CLASSES. 

A very large proportion of those to whom it is our duty 
to do good are not virtuous persons. But if a man has 
become vicious he is not therefore incapable of a return 
to righteous ways. The greatest kindness we can do him 
is to induce this return. It may be necessary to punish 
him, or in some way more or less painful to make him 
realize the unprofitableness of wrong-doing. Punishment 
But this alone will not always win the wicked. not * su ? fi " 
We can do a person little good unless we can atory means, 
convince him that we have a kindly feeling towards him. 
It is often the case that when a young man has fallen into 
evil ways and begins to realize the disapprobation of pub- 
lic sentiment, he comes to feel that good people are hostile 
to him, and this very feeling drives him further into 
wrong-doing. If in such cases the truly benevolent can 
only evince their benevolence to such an one, and make 
him realize that there are charity and sympathy for him, he 
may be easily rescued. 

It is one of the unfortunate conditions of a criminal 
who has been detected and passed a period of The social ob- 
imprisonment, that on his release every one is st * cles *° the 
distrustful of him. No one cares to employ of criminals, 
him. He is an outcast, and it is nearly impossible for 



208 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

him to gain a footing in society. Such a person is almost 

driven again into crime. If persons when set free could 

be met at their prison doors by those who are really 

friendly, and who will care for them for a time, 

"Pprnprlipc ** 

and see that they have work till their disposi- 
tion to reform is tested, and then recommend them to 
employers who need their labor, thousands of such per- 
sons would be restored to manhood, and, instead of re- 
maining outcasts, would become respectable citizens. But 
here, as everywhere else in our benevolent undertakings, 
we must not trust too much to the machinery of associa- 
tions. Personal effort is the only effectual way of reach- 
ing individuals of this class. 



BENEFICENCE TO OUR ENEMIES. 209 



CHAPTER V. 

BENEFICENCE TO OUR ENEMIES. 

A benevolent feeling towards those who are hostile to 

us is none the less a duty, because it involves some sacrifice 

on our part. The first spontaneous impulse The spirit of 

when one has mimed us is to retaliate. If this ' etaliation t0 

j be sup- 

impulse were to control men universally, it is pressed. 

easy to see that the consequences would be most deplor- 
able. When we are injured, and allow free scope to our 
resentment, the excitement we are under renders us quite 
unfit to judge between ourselves and the offending party. 
We are pretty sure to overestimate the amount of harm 
received. We are also incompetent to determine the 
amount of retaliatory harm we are inflicting. Add to 
this double miscalculation on our part, the double mis- 
calculation our adversary is likely to make, and we see 
that in any individual instances the estimates are likely to 
differ widely, and both are greatly unjust. If I inflict 
upon him the evil that I think he deserves, there will in 
his judgment be a large balance due me which he may 
proceed to inflict. Evidently, in this way endless quar- 
rels, criminations, and recriminations will go on ; and if this 
spirit is universal, society will become an arena of ill-will, 
bitter strife, and moral confusion which it is painful to 
contemplate. 



210 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

On the other hand, to treat our enemies with kindness, 
to exercise patience and charity to those who have neither 
towards us, to accept without retaliation, and to give a 
soft answer to an ebullition of wrath, indicate a noble and 
generous spirit, and a power of self-control which is 
Moral effect amon g tne most valuable attributes of a human 
of a generous soul. Nothing so much tends to bring an 
offender to a sense of his own wrong doing and 
wrong feeling, while it mightily promotes the peace and 
harmony of the community. The Christian religion en- 
joins the forgiveness of injuries, and the love of our 
enemies ; and theoretically there are few who doubt the 
desirableness of such a disposition. 

This does not imply that we are to treat crime as 
though it were of no consequence, or to stand between 
c tibi Society and the punishment of the violation of 
with strict law. We may properly, and without any viola- 
justice. j.. Qn Q £ ^ e kijg a tions of benevolence, aid in 

bringing evil-doers to justice ; but this because we should 
love the whole community more than any individual. 
While we co-operate in the execution of the laws, even 
if the results should be imprisonment or death, we may do 
this with no evil animus, and may desire most heartily to 
benefit the transgressor to the whole extent of our power. 



PART III. 
DUTIES TO GOD. 

211 



DUTIES TO GOD. 



CHAPTER I. 
LOVE IN ITS RELATION TO THE MORAL LAW. 

It has been shown by many writers that the whole range 
of duties to God and our fellow-men is comprehended in 
the one word Love. It is the very essence of How Love 
love to inspire the subject of it with a desire to fulfils the law - 
please the object loved. Hence, to love God with all the 
heart, is to desire above all things to please him, and to 
do what he desires us to do. So, also, if we love our 
fellow-men we will desire to render them happy, and to 
abstain from whatever is disagreeable to them. So our 
Scriptures say with remarkable truthfulness, " Love is the 
fulfilling of the law." It is unquestionable that the com- 
pleteness of love in the human soul would lead that soul 
to comply with all moral requirements. 

In such a soul it is evident that the feeling of obliga- 
tion and duty would be virtually lost, and men would per- 
form the acts which these terms imply, not Effect on the 
because they are binding upon them, but be- subject. 
cause they want to do them. There would be no restraint 
nor constraint, but perfect obedience and yet perfect freedom. 

213 



214 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

Men would be perfectly adjusted to their conditions, and 
the laws of their being, and self-denial and sacrifice, and 
the disagreeableness of duty, would in a sense become 
Love not yet obsolete. But to this state most men have not 
so abounding yet attained ; and the great mass of us still 

as to preclude J . f 

the necessity ieel the pressure oi obligation, and right con- 
of sacrifice. fact w ^ involve duties more or less burden- 
some and irksome. Hence, the impracticability of leaving 
our actions to spontaneous impulses, and the necessity of 
explicit precepts and formal rules of action. 



DUTIES IN RELATION TO GOD. 215 



CHAPTER II. 

DUTIES GROWING OUT OF OUR IMMEDIATE RELATION 

TO GOD. 

A brief survey of our relations to God will prepare us to 
discern more readily and clearly the obligations we are 
under to him, and the nature of the duties we owe 
him. 

There are certain characteristics which all who believe 
in a personal God attribute to him. He is regarded as our 
Creator, and the Creator of all the conditions The Divine 
and concomitants of our existence. He con- character, 

• if -i • i an( * our rela " 

stantly upholds and provides tor us, and with- tions to the 

out this support we should remedilessly perish. DlvmeBein £- 
Hence, our relation to him is that of absolute dependence. 
" In him we live and move and have our being." By the 
very fact of creation he has entire proprietorship in us. 
He has a right to do whatever he sees best with us. We 
are under obligations to submit to him, and to do what- 
ever he may require at our hands. 

In the second place, he is a Being of all conceivable excel- 
lences, of power, wisdom, justice, goodness, love, purity, 
and holiness; and these are so harmonized and blended 
that they form a character of transcendent moral beauty. 
Furthermore, we are constituted to love and admire just 
these qualities above all others. Hence, in our moral con- 



216 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

dition we cannot be otherwise than irresistibly attracted 
by them if once we know them. 

Again, God has been exercising the powers implied in these 
attributes for our good ever since we were born ; and this 
not because of any obligation on his part, but freely, 
spontaneously, and graciously ; so that there must natur- 
ally arise in an unperverted human soul, not merely a 
marvellous delight in contemplating such a character, but 
a feeling of the most profound and glowing gratitude. 

Out of these relations, and the natural feelings that are 
excited by a contemplation of them, grow a variety of 
duties and obligations. Among the most definite and 
obvious of these are those of Worship, of Sabbath Observ- 
ance, and of Studying the Holy Scriptures. 

SECTION 1. — WORSHIP. 

In all the diverse religions of the world, even in those 
most corrupt and preposterous, the idea of worship has been 
the most constant and the most prominent. Addresses 
- and offerings to Deity are present in them all. 

and effect of In ancient times, the latter consisted largely in 
wors ip. ^ e £ orm £ sacrifices and material offerings. 
In the later development of the race, this tends more 
towards the spiritual, and embraces adoration, praise, 
thanksgiving, confession for sin, petition for forgiveness 
and for help in the temptations and trials of life. By 
this means man is brought into communion with his 
Maker, he is made to contemplate the Divine character, 
and thus to be changed into the same image. He also 
reflects upon his own wants, and is more ready to discern 
the provisions for these wants, and the remedies for his 
moral ailments. Men of undevout spirit and of a scepti- 



DUTIES IN RELATION TO GOD. 211 

cal disposition sometimes deny the efficacy of prayer, 
declaring that it changes nothing, and that it is unphilo- 
sophical to regard God as doing anything because men 
pray that he would not do if they do not pray. Yet all 
the causes and conditions on which all things in Reasonabie- 
the universe depend, and all events turn, are ap- ™" *° d effi " 
pointed by God, and among them are hundreds prayer. 
for which we know no reason : the secret of them rests 
with the Creator. We do know that men sometimes fur- 
nish the conditions on which God produces certain effects. 
It is clearly within the range of possibilities that prayer 
may be a condition of this very kind. But in any case, it 
is obvious that the spirit of man thus brought into inter- 
course with the Infinite and Eternal Spirit, dwelling upon 
his perfections, and reflecting upon his requirements, and 
the obligations corresponding to them, cannot but be puri- 
fied, elevated, enlarged, and ennobled. 

SECTION 2. — A SPECIAL DAY FOR RELIGIOUS OBSERV- 
ANCE. 

That there should be some special time set apart for 
religious observance is neither unnatural nor unreason- 
able. It is true that our relations to God are such 
that all our time should be devoted to his ser- The setting 
vice. But as in most other important matters apart ° f , a 

- 1 - , special day 

we set apart special seasons to their more par- for religious 
ticular considerations, so here. Among Chris- observance - 
tians one day in seven is thus devoted to special 
religious exercise. It is an ancient ordinance, estab- 
lished early in the history of the race, and has been 
observed by a certain portion of it through all the genera- 
tions. The value of such sequestration of time should be 



218 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS, 

obvious even to those who have no regard for the authority 
claimed for it. The physical and mental advantage of 
periodical seasons of rest and recuperation, recognized by 
eminent medical authorities, the benefit accruing to the 
spiritual nature, the increase of religious knowledge com- 
ing from instruction, reading, meditation, and the inspir- 
ation and courage gathered from such opportunities, 
cannot be estimated. 

How the day should be spent so as to meet the ethical re- 
quirement involved, is worthy of some consideration. In 
the first place, it should be a day of rest. This does not 
mean that it should be a day of sloth and idleness. There 
would he no refreshment nor spiritual invigoration in such 
a day. Periods of vacuity and inanity usually add noth- 

idieness and * n £ *° tne va ^ ue °f one's existence except in 
indolence not cases of prostration and debilitation from over- 
a ways res . exer ^ on# 'p^g reS £ ^ w hi cn such a season may 

be reasonably devoted is compatible with more or less 
activity of a kind wholly different from that of the secular 
days, and directed either to moral and spiritual self-culture 
or to some effort for the good of others. Genuine rest is 
found rather in a change of occupation than in cessation 
from exertion. 

In the second place, it should be a part of the observ- 
ance of the day to bring the mind to a contemplation of moral 
and spiritual truth. That men should devote a portion of 
the sacred day to assembling together, uniting their devo- 
tions, and listening to the word of instruction, appears 
rational and sensible. There are also opportunities af- 
forded by such a day to aid in the religious training of the 
young, to visit and minister to the sick and unfortunate, 
to assist in mutual moral culture, as well as to engage in 



DUTIES ID RELATION TO GOD. 219 



* 



private reading and meditation. It certainly is not part 
of the requirements of such a day to make it, by a mis- 
taken rigidity, disagreeable and offensive to the young, 
so that they will deprecate its coming, and Not to be 
rejoice when it is gone. There are many house- ^ e ^abie and 
holds where it is a day of delights, of enjoyable offensive, 
exercise, and of happy experiences, better than all the 
other days of the week. 

SECTION 3. — THE STUDY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 

It is the belief of Christians, that in addition to the 
light of nature, God has given to us a more special revela- 
tion of his will and our duty in the form of Holy Scriptures. 
Here are accounts of the early moral history of the human 
race, of God's dealings with them, of the process of 
religious education of humanity, of the nature Contents 
of sin and holiness, of the character of God of the 
and of man's relation to him, of the means for crip ures ' 
our redemption, of the mission of Jesus Christ, the record 
of his wondrous character and works and the means used 
by him to effect that restoration, of the example he set of 
perfect human conduct, and the injunction he laid upon 
his followers to propagate his doctrines and methods of 
living, and of the efforts put forth by them in spreading 
his religion in the earth. 

It contains in all parts of it moral and spiritual com- 
mandments, accompanied by penal sanctions, and by 
promises of rewards, grand object lessons of noble con- 
duct on the part of individuals, and instances of moral 
heroism, offset by pictures of personal wickedness, appal- 
ling apostasy and condign punishments. 

Such a revelation is surely entitled to our deepest and 



220 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

most reverent consideration and most careful study ; and 
we are bound by the strongest motives to accept its teach- 
Our obiiga- i n gs, and shape our lives by its precepts. If 
tions in ^e children of a familv are under obligation to 

relation to J ° . 

such a attend to the statements 01 a father in re- 

reveiation. S p ec t to conduct, and to submissively accept 
his instructions and apply them in their lives, how much 
more is it our duty to regard the Divine revelation as 
paramount, to study it constantly and diligently, and to 
make its counsels the guide of our lives. 



THE RELIGIOUS USE OF ALL OUR POWERS. 221 



CHAPTER III. 

THE RELIGIOUS USE OF ALL OUR POWERS. 

It is not exclusively in special classes of duties such as 
have been named, that we are to discharge our obligations 
to God. By his very nature we owe him the Not by the 
whole service of our lives. Nor is this service performance 
such as to subtract from our own interests or d ut ies that 
advantage, as it might conceivably do and still ^ e can dls " 

charge our 

be obligatory. He has graciously ordained, in religious 
accordance with his own disposition towards obh sations. 
us, that every service demanded by him also redounds to 
our own welfare. Entire devotion to his interests results 
in the highest possible degree to the promotion of our 
own. 

Devotion, then, to the service of God does not by any 
means imply that we are to make our lives uninteresting 
or unenjoyable. Christian self-denial does not Religious 
mean that we are to go out of our way to find service does 

t ill- -ii i , . not imply the 

disagreeable duties, simply because they are dis- making of life 
agreeable. God has designed for us the very unna PPy- 
highest conceivable happiness, and we are never called 
upon to sacrifice pleasure unless it is in conflict with some 
higher and nobler pleasure. 



222 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

SECTION 1. — THE SERVICE OF OUR BODIES. 

This devotion of all our powers to the Divine service 
implies first, that we serve God with our physical powers. 
There are right ways and wrong ways of using our bodies. 
That we should have bodies of the highest utility and 
greatest value to ourselves, perfectly coincides with our 
having bodies most effective for the Divine service. That 
Physical they are to be the instruments of our souls, and 
members to ^ ^ e s t r0 ng, healthy, capable of endurance, and 
mentsofthe not instruments of mere sensual gratification, 
amiheaithy SUD J ec ^ to ^ usts an( ^ passions, defiled, debilitated, 
and effective, and rendered incompetent by excess, is as 
clearly God's will as it is the dictate of broad and 
enlightened self-interest. Hence, to keep the body in con- 
dition for God's service, is equivalent to having it in 
condition for our own highest interest and enjoyment. 
This service The service here required is not something 
not abstract separate and abstract from common human 

from common , 

human inter- interests. On the contrary, the Divine demands 
estSi on our physical powers are for much the greater 

part that they may be employed to our own personal 
advantage, and the advantage of those dependent on us. 

God calls men to all sorts of secular labor ; and this 
labor is to be performed, not merely because of its obvious 
benefit to the individual, but also because it is an appoint- 
ment of God. Hence, there is no man so rich but that it 
is his duty to labor, and in some way to be a producer as 
well as a consumer. So, also, there is no man, however 
lowly his lot, however severe his toil, but he may feel that 
he is God's workman. Every effort he puts forth to secure 
sustenance for his family may be also a service in the 



THE RELIGIOUS USE OF ALL OUR POWERS. 223 

Divine interest, and will be rewarded by the great 
Employer. 

SECTION 2. — THE SERVICE OF THE INTELLECT. 

It is not the less possible to devote the intellect to God's 
service. As in the case of the body, it may be a part of 
this service to make the Intellect as powerful as possible. 
Hence, the long years of training to which Th h l 
children and youth are subjected, in all the process of 
effort to gain knowledge, to discipline the fac- ? e rfectfng nd 
ulties, and to secure the control of the mental the intellect 
forces. It is true that persons may go through "udedVn" 
all this process with little recognition of God, religious 
and no purpose of devotion to him. But on the 
other hand, all this process may go on with religious 
devotion as the foremost element, and where this purpose 
is not the less effective because it is paramount. 

We serve God with our Intellect when in our studies 
we recognize discovered truths as truths of God ; for such 
they all are. All laws are his laws ; all causes trace back 
to him ; and the whole order of the universe is as he 
ordered it. So in the study of the sciences, men What implied 
are investigating God's designs, and are con- Ject^aiser- 
tinuously coming upon evidences of his wisdom, vice. 
If in a semi-barbarous age, when men's conception of the 
Universe was only a minute fraction of what it is now 
known to be, when the whole of it might have been 
regarded as contained within limits less than the orbit of 
our moon, if, with such knowledge of the universe, the 
heavens seemed to the men of that age to " declare the 
glory of God, and the firmament to show his handy work," 
how much more now, when its extent has been magnified 



224 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

All scientific to man ' s conception a million-fold, and our 
truths Divine thoughts are lost in the infinitude of the mate- 
rial creation, should the Divine power, majesty, 
and wisdom impress the student. No wonder that an 
astronomer who had made marvellous discoveries in his 
scientific, investigations exclaimed, " O God, I think thy 
thought after thee ! " 

Many years ago I heard Professor Agassiz lecture in 
Boston to a large audience on some subject in Natural 
History. At one point he was setting forth in his simple 
but effectual manner the skilful adaptations in certain 
plants, and the wonderful contrivances that characterized 
them, when the audience, among whom there could have 
been very few of much scientific culture, broke into hearty 
responsive cheers, he turned to them and said quickly and 
with much emotion, " Applaud in your hearts the won- 
derful wisdom that devised these adaptations." 

It is not only throughout the vast range of physical 
science that the devout intellect may recognize and 
immaterial acknowledge God, but as well in the metaphys- 
and spiritual ical world, though the studies here are more 
difficult than in material nature. But while 
there are scores of unsettled questions here, there are 
hundreds of facts in Psychology, in Philosophy, and in 
other departments of immaterial nature, which startle men 
by the vivid impression they give us of the superhuman 
skill which is involved in their existence. 

SECTION 3. — SERVICE OF THE SENSIBILITIES. 

The Sensibilities comprise that part of our constitution 
through which all our enjoyment and all our sufferings 
come. As the name implies, they indicate rather states 



THE RELIGIOUS USE OF ALL OUR POWERS. 22o 

of mind and conditions of activity than activities and 
energies themselves. As we have already seen, they con- 
stitute Springs of action. Still they have a part allotted 
them in this supreme service. 

It has already been observed that Love is the one com- 
prehensive element in all right conduct towards God and 
our fellow-men ; and love is of the sensibilities. Love as duty 
It has been objected by some that love cannot and service. 
be a duty, since it is not proximate to the will ; that is, no 
one can by his own volition produce love. It is true that 
love is not the product of direct volition. Yet the fact 
that the Scriptures enjoin men to love, and the additional 
fact that men universally approve or condemn one another 
as they do or do not love certain objects, indicate a natu- 
ral conviction that we are responsible for the direction our 
affections take. 

The truth evidently is, that every man feels himself at 
fault when he loves an unworthy object and also when he 
does not love a worthy one. In other words, we ought to 
love some objects, and we ought not to love certain others ; 
and this implies on our part a certain control over our 
affections. This is not a direct, but an indirect, control. 
If a child does not love its parents, or a brother has been 
estranged from his brothers, while they cannot by a simple 
volition command the glow of affection, they can at least 
consider the motives and reasons for the exercise of this 
affection, and so, sooner or later, come into the free exer- 
cise of it. It is thus that men who have no drawings 
towards God may come to love him. They contemplate 
the excellency of his character, the goodness of his provi- 
dence, the tenderness of his dealing with their infirmities 
and disobedience, the wonderful exhibition of his love in 



226 RUDIMENTARY ETHICS. 

the provision made for their deliverance : and such con- 
templation is likely to kindle their affection for him. 

What is true of the affections is true also of the other 
sensibilities. The desires which in the earlier stages of 
Harmony of our being run wild to self-indulgence, and thus 
take'thepiace an t*gonize one another and produce all sorts of 
of conflict. unhappiness, can be so trained as to run parallel 
with God's desires, and thus become parallel with each 
other, and free themselves from mutual conflict and its 
consequent unhappiness. It is true our desires are no 
more than our affections under the direct control of the 
will; but we know very well that by checking the gratifi- 
cation of the harmful desires, and steadily resisting them, 
they lose their power and may finally be suppressed. We 
know also, that by plying ourselves with proper motives 
we may strengthen a feeble desire till it becomes vigorous 
and perhaps dominant, and even an aversion may be trans- 
formed into a healthful craving. Inordinate desires become 
hurts, and thus issue in immoralities and vices. They are 
to be avoided, or, if they become actual, are to be reduced 
to their normal limits. Even the appetites can be con- 
trolled, and made to do service for God. 

SECTION 4. — SERVICE OF THE WILL. 

In an important sense all service is of the Will. It is 
the executive power of the soul, and initiates all acts of 
Th x cutive tne body and of the mind. It uses these other 
power of the powers as instruments. It has also ways of 
coming into direct service. The mind is capa- 
ble of developing a state of fixed obedience to the Divine 
requirements. In every man's life a time comes when the 
question arises, Shall I make my own enjoyments the 



THE RELIGIOUS USE OF ALL OUR POWERS. 227 

paramount object of my action, or shall I subordinate 
this to the supreme law of righteousness, the will of God ? 
The decision may be postponed ; there may The supreme 
be vacillation and devices to evade the issue ; question, 
but it must sooner or later, in one way or another, be made. 
If the latter alternative is elected, and no one denies that 
this is the proper choice, henceforth it becomes a govern- 
ing purpose in the life, and all the moral acts will harmon- 
ize themselves with it and all subsequent volitions will be 
subsidiary to it. It will become a fixed state of mind, a 
kind of perpetual volition to execute this purpose. 

Much depends upon the strength of will as to its effi- 
ciency for service. Many wills are weak by nature : hence 
the service is fluctuating and ineffectual. Every obliga- 
tion to devote the service of the will to God also implies 
the obligation to render it strong and efficient. 

All the duties which a man owes to his will as set forth 
in a former chapter are incumbent here. We are, as a part 
of the service of the will to God, to cultivate A11 duties t 
Decision, Penitence, Independence, Courage, the Will du- 
Fortitude, and Patience ; and to discourage and resp ect of the 
extirpate Pride, Self-conceit, Vanity, Ambi- WiU - 
tjon, and such other vices as pertain to an infirm and 
disordered will. Whatever tends to render our will 
unworthy of God should be destroyed, and whatever ren- 
ders it noble and worthy should be cultivated and greatly 
encouraged. 






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